DISSENTING OPINION BY
BOWES, J.:¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s rejection of Appellee’s claim that her incriminating remarks were improperly obtained in violation of her Miranda rights. The majority maintains that Miranda warnings were not required, reasoning that “[s]inee Detective Aston only detained Appellee temporarily by a show of authority for investigative purposes, we determine that the interaction did not amount to the functional equivalent of arrest such as to constitute ‘custodial detention.’ ” Majority opinion at 8. The majority has not applied the correct standard in assessing when Miranda warnings are required.
¶ 2 The administration of Miranda warnings does not depend on whether a person has been detained for investigative purposes. Instead, a “custodial interrogation” occurs and Miranda warnings must be given when “the person is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted.” Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 579 Pa. 217, 228, 855 A.2d 783, 790 (2004). Furthermore, “The test for custodial interrogation does not depend upon the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer, but rather, focuses on whether the individual being interrogated reasonably believes his freedom of action is being restricted.” Id. at 228-229, 855 A.2d 783, 885 A.2d at 790.
¶ 3 Herein, the record establishes beyond question that Appellee’s freedom of action was restricted significantly and that she was not free to leave when the questioning occurred. After Appellee exited the store, she placed her purchase in the car and re-entered it, and the car began to exit the parking lot. Detective Aston and several other police officers stopped the car and ordered the occupants to return to the parking lot and exit the car. N.T. Preliminary Hearing at 1, 12. The occupants of the car were separated and moved. Id. at 12. Detective Aston placed Appellee in front of the vehicle and was *1095informed by other officers that the other occupants were underage. Detective Aston then began to question Appellee in order to obtain her admission that she had purchased the liquor for the other occupants of the car. Detective Aston admitted that he did not give her Miranda warnings. Id. at 14. He also specifically admitted that Appellee was not free to leave when the interrogation began. Id. at 15.
¶ 4 Thus, Appellee’s car was stopped by a show of police authority and by a number of officers. She was ordered from her car and then separated and moved. She never was informed that she was free to leave or otherwise refuse to answer questions. She objectively was subjected to a custodial interrogation. In the Interest of K.Q.M., 873 A.2d 752 (Pa.Super.2005); see also Commonwealth v. Donaldson, 786 A.2d 279 (Pa.Super.2001) (when suspect’s car was stopped and suspect was ordered from car and subjected to interrogation, he was not free to leave). Furthermore, Detective Aston specifically admitted that Appellee was not free to leave when he began his questioning. Thus, both objectively and subjectively, Appellee was not free to leave, and a custodial detention occurred for purposes of Miranda.
It is well-established that the prosecution may not use any statements resulting from the custodial interrogation of a defendant unless he was first informed of his right against self incrimination and his right [to] counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Statements made during custodial interrogation are by their very nature involuntary, unless the accused is first advised of his Miranda rights and permitted to exercise these rights. Commonwealth v. Nester, 551 Pa. 157, 709 A.2d 879 (1998) (citation omitted)....
Commonwealth v. Gaul, 867 A.2d 557, 559 (Pa.Super.2005). Hence, I would affirm the suppression court’s decision6 and agree that Appellee’s incriminating statements should have been suppressed, albeit on different grounds.7
. I agree with the Commonwealth that the suppression court had authority to suppress Appellee’s incriminating statements but should not have dismissed these charges.
. If a trial court’s decision is correct, it can be affirmed by the appellate court on any basis. Devine v. Hutt, 863 A.2d 1160 (Pa.Super.2004).