dissenting:
Essentially for the reasons stated in Judge Schwelb’s opinion, I agree that the trial court did not err in revoking appellant’s outpatient commitment and committing him for inpatient care. (Appeal No. 86-1697). In my opinion, the Hospital’s failure to comply strictly with the time limits specified in the civil commitment order does not invalidate the court’s determination, after hearing, that appellant’s condition required inpatient treatment. No statutory deadlines were violated in this case which would provide a basis for an independent judicial determination of the need for appellant’s involuntary hospitalization to remedy legal imperfections in the revocation proceedings. See In re Reed, 571 A.2d 801, 803 (D.C.1990).
Moreover, the procedures set out in In re Richardson, 481 A.2d 473 (D.C.1984) were not violated. A careful reading of Richardson reveals its holding to be “that a trial court may authorize an outpatient’s summary rehospitalization in certain situations, provided the patient is detained only temporarily and the Hospital complies with the affidavit and notice requirements set out in Part II [of the opinion].” 481 A.2d at 483-84. The requirements specified in Part II of the opinion are that the Hospital provide: (1) the court and appellant’s counsel with an affidavit within twenty-four hours reciting facts from which the court can find affirmatively that the Hospital’s action in returning the patient for temporary treatment is supported by probable cause; and (2) written notice to the patient and counsel “that the Hospital must either release him after the fifth day of institutional care and observation, or thereafter move for a prompt adversary judicial hearing seeking the permanent revocation of his outpatient status.” Id. at 480-81. Aside from the “narrow issue” which the court stated was before it,9 Richardson was concerned with minimizing the risk of erroneous rehospitalization by assuring some procedure for prompt judicial review. Appellant was accorded what Richardson requires. I do not read Richardson to mandate more than that the petition for revocation be filed promptly. Due process does not require the precise deadlines which appellant requests that this court judicially impose. Moreover, the Hospital’s delay of two days in filing the petition in this case can be regarded only as a minimal procedural deficiency which does not so infringe upon appellant's due process interests as to require invalidation of the hearing on the petition for revocation. See In re Rosell, 547 A.2d 180, 182 (D.C.1988). Due process does not require perfection. Therefore, I agree with the opinion of Judge Schwelb that no manifest injustice occurred here which requires the court’s consideration of an issue raised for the first time on appeal.
I also agree with Judge Schwelb that an indefinite commitment under the circumstances is not inconsistent with the “least restrictive alternative.” A trial judge faced with a patient truly mentally ill, dangerous to himself and others and requiring hospitalization as the least restrictive alternative is confronted with a situation which may or may not change. The factual basis for the court’s conclusions were established by the evidence. The trial court was not required to enter a temporary order given future uncertainties. Although the inpatient commitment was indefinite, the trial court ordered a report and review of the case in two and a half months. The order assured immediate hospitalization as necessitated by Mr. Plummer’s condition and an early review to address changed circumstances. In my opinion, the order is consistent with the “least restrictive alterna*754tive” requirement. See Richardson, supra, 481 A.2d at 479.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of the court reversing two orders of the trial court with instructions that appellant’s outpatient commitment be restored. In my view, the records in the cases which the court reverses do not support the relief granted. Although I agree generally that a committed inpatient placed on indefinite leave by the Hospital for a lengthy period acquires a conditional liberty interest which triggers due process safeguards, I discern no violation of the minimum procedural protections in the proceedings which resulted in the orders the court reverses. Moreover, the mandate of the court extends beyond what is reasonably necessary to address any perceived procedural deficiencies. It requires that a lawfully committed inpatient be restored to outpatient status without the benefit of a medical assessment of the patient’s condition and the treatment warranted for the patient’s care. If the case is remanded, it should be left to the trial court, after development of an evidentiary record, to fashion an order consistent with appellant’s treatment needs, giving due consideration to the interest of the patient and the public. See Richardson, supra, 481 A.2d at 479.
A brief examination of the proceedings which resulted in each of the orders reversed by the court dispels the conclusion that appellant’s due process rights were violated in the trial court in appeal Nos. 87-1239 and 87-1423. In appeal No. 87-1239, appellant challenges the trial court's denial of relief under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 60(b). Our standard of review of the trial court’s decision is abuse of discretion, and “we do not review or determine the merits of the underlying action.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Brown, 593 A.2d 184, 185 (D.C.1991). Applying that standard, in my view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The trial court entered the order revoking Mr. Plummer’s outpatient status and imposing an inpatient commitment order on December 11,1986. Not until February 18, 1987 was Mr. Plummer placed on convalescent leave from the Hospital. The motion for relief from the court’s order was filed on May 27, 1987, just three months later. The Hospital opposed the motion and submitted the affidavit of Mr. Plummer’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Francine Schwartz. That affidavit revealed that Mr. Plummer had complied only minimally with the treatment plan, that he had no increased insight into his mental illness and that the nature and severity of his condition required further hospitalization and a long period of recuperation. Appellant submitted no opposing evidence.
Nor does the fact that appellant had been first on temporary leave, then convalescent leave, undermine the court’s determination that no modification of the prior order was warranted. This court has observed that “[ojutpatient release is a therapeutic strategy long recognized as effective in treating mental illness.” Richardson, supra, 481 A.2d at 477 n. 2 (citations omitted). Considering that the court had before it evidence presented by the hospital, the absence of contrary evidence by appellant, the recent evidentiary hearing and order for inpatient treatment, and the knowledge that convalescent leave is a part of that treatment program, there is no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request for relief under Rule 60(b). Therefore, in my view, the order in appeal No. 87-1239 should be affirmed.
The second order which the court reverses in appeal No. 87-1423 arises out of an application by the Hospital for appellant’s return to the Hospital pursuant to D.C.Code § 21-592 (1989).10 That section of the Code provides:
[w]hen a person has been ordered confined in a hospital or institution for the mentally ill pursuant to this chapter and has left such hospital or institution without authorization or has failed to return *755as directed, the court which ordered confinement shall, upon the request of the administrator of such hospital or institution, order the return of such person to such hospital or institution.
In this proceeding the Hospital filed an application and provided appellant’s counsel with a copy. The application was supported by a letter from appellant’s treating physician reporting that appellant had failed to report for an appointment or to obtain the medication necessary to control his illness. It was only after a hearing at which appellant presented oral argument in support of his position that the court finally entered an order on October 27, 1987 returning appellant to the Hospital pursuant to D.C.Code § 21-592 (1989).11 The court’s order directed appellant’s return to the Hospital and denied appellant’s request that upon rehospitalization he be afforded the rights set forth in Richardson.
Since appellant was a legally committed inpatient at the time of the application, the Hospital was authorized to apply for his return provided the conditions in D.C.Code § 21-592 were met. In fact, appellant was given notice, and the hearing was held before the order was entered and before appellant was actually returned to the Hospital. Under the circumstances, I find no basis to conclude that the essential requirements of due process were not met in this case. See Matthews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); see also In re Mills, 467 A.2d 971, 976 (D.C.1983). Therefore, I am unable to agree that the order should be vacated and appellant’s outpatient status reinstated in appeal No. 87-1423.
On the other hand, it cannot be said that the minimal requirements of due process were accorded appellant in the case which resulted in appeal No. 88-642.12 In that case appellant was not provided with notice of the government’s application to return him to the Hospital pursuant to D.C.Code § 21-592 (1989). Appellant was not afforded an opportunity to contest even whether the statutory criteria for issuance of the section 592 order had been met. Additionally, appellant’s status as an inpatient on indefinite convalescent leave gave rise to a conditional liberty interest which required at a minimum prompt notice and an opportunity to be heard on the application at the earliest time possible. See Richardson, supra, 481 A.2d at 481; see also In re Commitment of B.H., 212 N.J.Super. 145, 514 A.2d 85, 89-90 (N.J.L.1986). It is beyond our judicial function to mandate precise procedures to be followed in such cases, and we should not do so here. See Birl v. Wallis, 619 F.Supp. 481, 493 (D.Ala.1985). However, notice is such a fundamental safeguard that it is readily apparent that appellant was denied minimal required protections in the case out of which appeal No. 88-642 arose. If appellant were still hospitalized pursuant to the order appealed from, a remand would be warranted. However, in my view, justice can be served by simply vacating the order in appeal No. 88-642. See Friend v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 326, 388 F.2d 579, 582 (1967).13
. “The narrow issue here is whether the commitment order may authorize the patient’s summary return to the Hospital for a brief period of reevaluation and treatment in the event his condition deteriorates or he fails to comply with the terms of the outpatient treatment program.” Richardson, supra, 481 A.2d at 479.
. This request was the first in a series of three requests which resulted in two other appeals, Nos. 88-642 and 88-1565.
. The Hospital represents that although an order for Mr. Plummer’s return to the Hospital was entered initially on September 17, 1987, it was never docketed or mailed to the parties. Mr. Plummer was not hospitalized until July 23, 1988 pursuant to a later order issued on May 2, 1988.
. This is one of the appeals dismissed by the court as moot. Since I dissent from the decision of the Court reversing two orders of the trial court (Appeal Nos. 87-1239 and 87-1423) with instructions to restore appellant’s outpatient commitment, I must also respectfully disagree with its decision to dismiss appeal No. 88-642, which is based on the disposition of those two appeals. See ante, p. 751 n. 7. Accordingly, it is my view that appeal No. 88-642 should be addressed under the mootness exception. See In re W.L., 603 A.2d 839, 841 (D.C.1991); see also United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1324 n. 2 (D.C.1981).
.The trial court dismissed appellant’s petition for "Richardson " rights with respect to a later section 592 application out of which appeal No. 88-1565 arises. The dismissal by the trial court was based on lack of jurisdiction because the *756same issues were pending on appeal in the other cases. In view of that fact, and since this court restores appellant's outpatient status and dismisses appeal No. 88-1565, I do not address it.