dissenting.
In this medical malpractice case tried to a jury, the jury determined that St. Michael’s Hospital’s negligence was a proximate cause of the death of plaintiffs decedent, and returned a damages verdict against the Hospital in the amount of $150,000. The jury also returned a verdict of no cause of action in favor of Doctors Rubenstein, Senft, and Haddad. On appeal, the Appellate Division ruled that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs claims against Nurse Forshage at the close of plaintiffs case, and that because of trial error the verdict in favor of Dr. Haddad must be set aside and a new trial ordered. 295 N.J.Super. 212, 222, 684 A.2d 994 (App.Div.1996). Although preserving the damages verdict of $150,000, the court ordered a retrial of liability against Dr. Haddad, Nurse Forshage, and St. Michael’s Hospital. Id. at 228, 684 A.2d 994. The Appellate Division also held that on retrial the jury should be informed that pursuant to the provisions of the Charitable Immunity Act then in effect, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-8, the *483Hospital’s liability could not exceed $10,000 no matter what relative proportion of fault is assigned to it by the jury. Id. at 229-30, 684 A.2d 994.
We granted certification, 150 N.J. 26, 695 A.2d 669 (1997), limited to the question whether the Appellate Division properly required an ultimate outcome charge. The Court now disapproves of the proposed instruction, concluding that the charge, much like a reference to insurance coverage, improperly focuses the jury’s attention on the collectibility of the verdict. Although the issue is a close one, I disagree with both the Court’s reasoning and with its conclusion.
I
Both the Court’s and the Appellate Division’s opinions agree that the most influential New Jersey precedents bearing on the ultimate outcome charge issue are Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 413 A.2d 322 (1980), and Fischer v. Canario, 143 N.J. 235, 670 A.2d 516 (1996), but the opinions disagree sharply about the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from those decisions.
In Roman, supra, damages were sought on behalf of a twelve-year-old plaintiff who, while standing with his bicycle on the shoulder of the New Jersey Turnpike after being stopped by a state trooper, was seriously injured when a dump truck being driven on the Turnpike lost its two left rear wheels, one of which careened across the roadway onto the shoulder causing serious injuries to the plaintiff. 82 N.J. at 340, 413 A.2d 322. The plaintiffs suit joined as defendants Mitchell, the truck’s owner; Wade, the driver; and Salvaterra Construction Co., Mitchell’s employer, who had been authorized by Mitchell to use the truck on the day of the accident. Loose lug nuts on the truck’s rear wheels apparently caused the accident, and Mitchell acknowledged responsibility for cheeking the lug nuts to make certain they were secure. At trial the plaintiff testified and acknowledged that he knew prior to the accident that the Turnpike was unsafe for *484bicyclists and that he had been cautioned not to ride on roads with high traffic volume.
Prior to the jury verdict, the plaintiffs counsel requested that' the jury be instructed essentially that “for the infant plaintiff to recover, the jury would have to find that the defendant’s percentage of negligence was greater than that of the plaintiff, and that the damages awardable to the infant must be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to him.” Id. at 342-43, 413 A.2d 322. The trial court denied the request. The jury apportioned twenty-five percent of the fault for the accident to defendant Mitchell and the remaining seventy-five percent to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment for Mitchell as required by the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(c). Following the Appellate Division’s affirmance of the judgment below, this Court, in an opinion by Justice Sullivan, reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 343. The Court held that the trial court erred in granting Salvaterra Construction Co.’s motion for involuntary dismissal, concluding that a jury could find that Salvaterra had an independent duty to check the safety of the truck prior to use. Id. at 344. In addition, the Court held that the jury’s apportionment of seventy-five percent of fault to the infant plaintiff was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Id. at 343 n. 1.
On the ultimate outcome charge issue, the Court acknowledged the plaintiffs contention that
unless the jury is made aware of the legal effect of its findings as to percentages of negligence, such findings may be premised on an erroneous concept of the law and can result in a molded judgment far different from that intended by the jury. In this very ease it has been suggested that the jury may well have concluded that its findings of the infant plaintiffs negligence quota of 75% and defendant Mitchell’s 25% would result in a monetary verdict for plaintiff for 25% of the damages found.
[Id. at 345.]
This Court concluded that in comparative negligence cases a jury should be given an ultimate outcome charge “so that its deliberations on percentages of negligence will not be had in a vacuum, or possibly based on a mistaken notion of how the statute operates.” *485Ibid. The Court observed that “ordinarily, a jury informed of the legal effect of its findings as to percentages of negligence in a comparative negligence trial is better able to fulfill its fact finding function.” Id. at 346. The Court also noted that “[t]his is a much more effective way to control the problems of misunderstanding and bias in jury verdicts than attempting to blindfold the jury.” Id. at 347 (quoting Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683, 692 (1978)).
This Court’s insistence on an ultimate outcome charge in Fischer v. Canario, supra, 143 N.J. 235, 670 A.2d 516, arose in a context different from that which motivated the use of the charge in Roman, supra. Fischer involved a claim for damages on behalf of the decedent, Rachel Fischer, who died of metastatic lung cancer in 1988. Her administrator’s complaint alleged that the defendants, Dr. Canario, an orthopedist, and Dr. Magid, a radiologist, deviated from accepted medical standards by failing to inform the decedent of the result of a chest x-ray, performed in connection with a 1984 hospital admission, that revealed a probable tumor. At trial, the parties stipulated that if the decedent’s cancer had been diagnosed in 1984 she would have had a fifty-percent chance of survival. The plaintiffs expert testimony asserted that the defendant’s failure to review the chest x-ray and inform the decedent of the probable tumor increased her risk of death and was a substantial factor in causing her death. Id. at 239, 670 A.2d 516. At the conclusion of trial, the plaintiffs counsel requested an ultimate outcome charge that would instruct the jury that, irrespective of the decedent’s fifty-percent chance of survival without taking into account the defendants’ negligence, the jury — assuming it found one or both of the defendants’ negligence to be a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s death — should award in full the damages to which it found the decedent to be entitled, after which the court would reduce the award to reflect the decedent’s fifty-percent chance of cure. Id. at 253, 670 A.2d 516. The trial court declined to so instruct the jury. Ibid.
*486The jury determined that Dr. Canario, but not Dr. Magid, was negligent, that his negligence was a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s death, and awarded damages of $134,231. The trial court declined to apply retroactively this Court’s decision in Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93, 112-13, 574 A.2d 398 (1990), in which we held that “[t]o the extent that a plaintiffs ultimate harm may have occurred solely by virtue of a preexistent condition, without regard to a tortfeasor’s intervening negligence, the defendant’s liability for damages should be adjusted to reflect the likelihood of that outcome.” The Appellate Division affirmed. Fischer v. Canario, 277 N.J.Super. 302, 310, 649 A.2d 875 (1994).
On appeal, we held that the Scafidi rule should apply to all cases tried after the date of that decision, 143 N.J. at 251, 670 A.2d 516, and that the lower courts erred in failing to apply Scafidi to mold the jury verdict. We also addressed the ultimate outcome charge issue, noting that the defendant acknowledged the appropriateness of an ultimate outcome charge in Scafidi-type cases but contended that the trial court’s failure to give the charge constituted harmless error. Ibid. The Court summarized the plaintiffs argument in support of an ultimate outcome charge:
Plaintiff contends that an ultimate outcome charge was necessary because throughout the trial the jury heard testimony that, as of the date of the alleged malpractice, Mrs. Fischer had a fifty percent chance of cure. Plaintiffs counsel was concerned that the jury would likely infer from this testimony that plaintiffs total damages equalled half of what the total damages actually were. Because the court refused to give the ultimate outcome charge, plaintiff contends that the jury itself compromised its award to reflect the value of the lost chance.
[Id. at 253, 670 A.2d 516.]
In concluding that the trial court’s failure to provide the jury with an ultimate outcome charge constituted reversible error mandating a retrial on damages, we observed:
The value of an ultimate outcome charge in lost-chance cases is that it informs the jurors of the effect of then- causation apportionment. The charge makes clear to jurors that they are to award full damages, and the trial court will make any necessary adjustments in light of their findings. Without the charge, there is the risk that the jurors will reduce their damage award in light of the apportionment of fault they find as part of their verdict. Then, once the trial court makes the same reduction, the plaintiff would receive an inadequate recovery. When a Scafidi *487damage-apportionment rule is applicable, an ultimate outcome charge generally should be given.
The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, did not give an ultimate outcome charge because it concluded that such a charge would “tend to mislead or confuse the jury,” because “[tjhey don’t have to reach a conclusion of what percent the chance of survival was in this case.” However, even though the jury did not decide the percentage of lost chance of recovery, an ultimate outcome charge would have clarified matters. It would have explicitly separated in the jury’s mind the fifty percent stipulation from the damages award. Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred by declining to provide an ultimate outcome charge.
[Id. at 254, 670 A.2d 516.]
II
This Court’s opinion in Roman, supra, adverted to the growing trend in favor of providing ultimate outcome instructions to juries in comparative negligence cases. 82 N.J. at 346, 413 A.2d 322. The development of that trend contradicted early decisions by a number of state appellate courts holding that juries should not be informed of the legal effect of their answers in cases submitted to juries by the .use of special verdicts. Wisconsin, one of the first states to adopt comparative negligence, was a firm advocate of the rule against ultimate outcome charges when special verdicts were used. See McGowan v. Story, 70 Wis.2d 189, 234 N.W.2d 325, 328-30 (1975). Other state courts expressed a similar hostility to the use of ultimate outcome charges. See Argo v. Blackshear, 242 Ark. 817, 416 S.W.2d 314, 315-16 (1967); Avery v. Wadlington, 186 Colo. 158, 526 P.2d 295, 297 (1974), overruled by statute as stated in Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883, 887 (Colo.1983); McCourtie v. United States Steel Corp., 253 Minn. 501, 93 N.W.2d 552, 563 (1958); Grasso v. Cannon Ball Motor Freight Lines, 125 Tex. 154, 81 S.W.2d 482, 487 (1935); McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1974), overruled by Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 596-97 (Utah 1982). Until the 1970s, the practice of precluding the use of ultimate outcome charges in cases submitted to juries on special verdicts represented the majority rule throughout the country. See Stuart F. Schaffer, Informing the Jury of the Legal Effect of Special Verdict *488Answers in Comparative Negligence Actions, 1981 Duke L.J. 824, 832-33.
The majority rule, however, was subjected to sharp criticism. Professor Leon Green, an early critic, expressed strong disagreement with the Texas rule prohibiting ultimate outcome instructions:
No one would contend that the purpose of instructions should be to prejudice a case in favor of one party or the other. Nor would it be contended that the purpose of an explanatory instruction should be the direction of the jury to proceed to find for one party or the other without respect to the merits of the issue as supported by the law and the evidence. The purpose is to explain the issue so that its significance can be understood, intelligently considered and fairly determined. If so knowing the significance of issues, juries also know how to answer them for one party or the other, that is not only their right and a matter for their conscience, but it is likewise a right of the parties under the law. Admittedly jurors do understand the significance of most issues and are trusted to answer them honestly. What reason is there for not trusting them on complex issues if their significance is explained?
It does not seem that the blindfold is a proper remedy for this evil, for there is no blindfold known that will prevent a jury from thinking they know the legal effect of their answers. The better remedy seems to be to inform a jury of the legal effect of the issue so that the evidence can be weighed with respect to that issue and its consequences. If they mistakenly think they know the significance of their answers, this false assumption results in a verdict they do not want and one out of line with the facts as the jury conceive[s] them to be. But if they know the legal effect of the issue, its effect and the evidence to support it are open for debate both by counsel and by the jurors themselves without emphasis on the end to be reached.
[Leon Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 Texas Law Rev. 273, 281-83 (1955).]
Professor Charles Alan Wright also took issue with the majority rule:
It hardly seems logical to restrict the discretion of the trial judge. Since he is free to choose either a general verdict with a general charge, or special verdicts with no charge, he should be permitted the intermediate device of special verdicts accompanied by a charge on the law. Judges who think that the jury is intended to reflect the voice of the man in the street may well prefer to follow this course.
Finally, it must be evident that in most cases the jury will in fact know which party is favored by a particular answer. If plaintiff’s counsel argues eloquently that there is no evidence of contributory negligence, even a juror who has never heard of the doctrine is likely to deduce that it will be in the plaintiffs interest for him to answer "No” to the question about contributory negligence. Interestingly the Minnesota court, in order to preserve its rule against letting the jury know the *489effect of the answers, has found it necessary to hold that it is error for counsel expressly or by necessary implication to inform the jury which side will benefit from a particular answer. I find it difficult to imagine any argument counsel can make which will not have such an effect, at least by implication. Thus the attempt to keep the jury in the dark as to the effect of its answers is likely to be unavailing. Indeed the rule barring instructions on this point gives rise to the danger that the jury will guess wrong about the law, and may shape its answers to the special verdicts, contrary to its actual beliefs, in a mistaken attempt to ensure the result it thinks proper.
[Charles Alan Wright, The Use of Special Verdicts in Federal Court, 38 F.R.D. 199, 205-06 (1965)(footnotes omitted).]
Beginning in the mid 1970s, a number of cases were decided that permitted the use of ultimate outcome instructions in eases submitted on special verdicts, primarily in comparative negligence litigation. In Porche v. Gulf Mississippi Marine Corp., 390 F.Supp. 624 (E.D.La.1975), involving the comparative negligence principles of admiralty law, the jury inquired whether the plaintiff would receive all damages awarded by the jury. The district court informed the jury that the damages would be reduced by the percentage of the plaintiffs contributory negligence, rejecting the contention that the jury should not be informed of the legal consequences of their answers:
There is some authority that, when a judge requires a jury to return a special verdict, under F.R.Civ.P. 49(a), the jury should not be informed of the legal consequences of [its] answers. But the better view is that a jury is entitled to know what effect its decision will have. The jury is not to be set loose in a maze of factual questions, to be answered without intelligent awareness of the consequences. One of the purposes of the jury system is to temper the strict application of law to facts, and thus bring to the administration of justice a common sense lay approach, a purpose ill-served by relegating the jury to a role of determining facts in vacuo, ignorant of the significance of [its] findings.
[Id. at 632 (citations omitted).]
In Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683, 691-92 (1978), the Idaho Supreme Court abandoned its earlier practice prohibiting ultimate outcome charges in cases submitted on special verdicts, holding that such charges would be permissible in comparative negligence litigation. In the course of its opinion, the court noted the growing trend in favor of ultimate outcome charges, and observed that several states, namely Colorado, Minnesota, North Dakota, Texas and Wyoming, had adopted statutes or rule amend*490mente that modified earlier decisions precluding the use of such charges. Ibid.
In addition to this Court’s decision in Roman, supra, 82 N.J. at 346-47, 413 A.2d 322, a number of other state courts have authorized ultimate outcome charges in comparative negligence cases submitted on special verdicts. See, e.g., Mountain Mobile Mix, supra, 660 P.2d at 887; LaFleur v. Farmington River Power Co., 187 Conn. 339, 445 A.2d 924, 925 n. 2 (1982); Kaeo v. Davis, 68 Haw. 447, 719 P.2d 387, 396 (1986); Thomas v. Board of Twp. Trustees, 224 Kan. 539, 582 P.2d 271, 280 (1978); Rosenthal v. Kolars, 304 Minn. 378, 231 N.W.2d 285, 287 n. 2 (1975); Verner v. Nevada Power Co., 101 Nev. 551, 706 P.2d 147, 151 (1985); Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908, 914 (Wyo.1977).
A relatively recent opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals presents the issue in a context most analogous to the case before us. In In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 871 F.2d 812 (1989), Pan American World Airways, Inc. (Pan Am) appealed an adverse jury verdict rendered after a trial involving the crash of a Pan Am flight in which the crew and all the passengers were killed. Based on a prior ruling in the same litigation, In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301, 1313 (9th Cir.1982), it was established that the trial would be governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention that limit damages in airline crashes to $75,000 per passenger except where the crash resulted from willful misconduct or where the passenger was not given adequate notice of the Convention’s damages limitation. On appeal, Pan Am contended that the district court erred in instructing the jury that if it found against plaintiffs on the issue of willful misconduct the plaintiffs would be restricted by the damages limitation of the convention. In its answers to special interrogatories, the jury determined that Pan Am’s management was liable for willful misconduct.
In sustaining the propriety of the district court’s instruction, the Court of Appeals observed:
*491Since the jury was charged with deciding whether Pan Am gave the passengers adequate notice of the damages limitation of the Warsaw Convention, the jury obviously had to be informed about that limitation____ If the jury had not been informed of the connection between the plaintiffs’ arguments that Pan Am committed willful misconduct and the damages limitation, the jury would have deduced a connection on its own and it might have been erroneous. The district judge did not abuse his discretion when he decided to eliminate the risk that the jury would deduce an inaccurate connection between a finding of willful misconduct and the damages limitation. See 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2509, at 513 (1971) (“an attempt to keep the jury in the dark as to the effect of its answers is likely to be unavailing, and there is always the danger that the jury will guess wrong about the law, and may shape its answers to the special verdicts, contrary to its actual beliefs, in a mistaken attempt to ensure the result it deems desirable”).
[In re Aircrash, supra, 871 F.2d at 815. ]
Another federal court ruling reversing a jury verdict because the trial court failed to inform the jury concerning plaintiffs actual financial stake in the outcome demonstrates that ultimate outcome charges need not be avoided merely because they require specific reference to amounts of money. In Vinieris v. Byzantine Maritime Corp., 731 F.2d 1061 (1984), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals set aside a portion of a jury verdict because of the trial court’s failure to inform the jury of the financial magnitude of plaintiffs claim. Plaintiff was Chief Mate on a Greek merchant vessel and because of a dispute with the Captain he was confined to his cabin and allegedly was denied payment of wages amounting to $1,361.08. He recovered a verdict of $1,000 on a false imprisonment claim. He also sued to recover his lost wages and, pursuant to 46 U.S.C.A § 596, to recover a penalty of two days pay for each day during which payment of wages was delayed. As of the date of the Second Circuit’s opinion, the penalty amounted to approximately $144,000. Uninformed of the penalty despite appellant’s request for a specific instruction explaining the nature of plaintiffs statutory claim, the jury found for plaintiff on the lost wages claim, resulting in a verdict in plaintiff’s favor for lost wages plus the statutory penalty. Reversing the jury verdict, the Court of Appeals observed:
*492Even those who advocate nondisclosure could hardly quarrel with the proposition that, when a party’s intention is at issue, the jury should make its determination only after considering all the circumstances connected with the act charged____
... Equally important was the issue of credibility. The district judge denied appellant’s motion for a new trial despite the fact that he “did not believe the plaintiff” and would have reached a different result. Had the jurors known, as did the judge, how large a financial stake plaintiff had in the outcome of the case, their reaction might have been the same as that of the-judge. A jury should not be asked to weigh credibility with only half the facts on the scale.
[Id at 1065 (citations omitted).]
Ill
In applying our decisions in Roman and Fischer, supra, to the issue posed by this appeal, it may be helpful to restate the analytical bases for those rulings. In Roman, the jury was asked to apportion fault between the twelve-year-old plaintiff who negligently rode his bicycle on the shoulder of the Turnpike and the owner of the dump truck who negligently failed to cheek the rear wheel lugs. The jury apportioned fault seventy-five percent to the plaintiff and twenty-five percent to Mitchell, a task that the jury obviously was capable of performing without being informed of the statutory provision that barred the plaintiff from any recovery if his negligence was greater than the negligence of Mitchell. As the Court noted, uninformed of the rule of law that barred the plaintiffs recovery, the jury may well have assumed that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover twenty-five percent of the damages awarded. 82 N.J. at 345, 413 A.2d 322. Thus, although the jury’s lack of knowledge about the applicable rule of law did not impede its ability to apportion fault between the parties, its ignorance of the law may have affected significantly its ability to render what it perceived to be a just verdict. Underlying our holding in Roman was a clear policy choice, unstated but necessarily inferable from our decision. Because we understood that the apportionment of fault by a jury uninformed of the legal consequence of its verdict might result in a reasonable allocation of fault but also in an unjust verdict from the jury’s perspective, we elected to define the jury function more broadly, requiring an ultimate outcome charge so that the jury would be aware of the *493outcome that its verdict would produce. Id. at 345-47, 413 A.2d 322.
A similar analysis dictated the result in Fischer. Surely, the jury in Fischer, instructed as it was to award the total amount of damages resulting from Mrs. Fischer’s death, could perform that deliberative function without knowing the Scafidi rule. As in Roman, there was a concern that the jury might have incorrectly assumed, contrary to law, that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the full amount of damages awarded, a result that would be unjust in view of the decedent’s fifty-percent chance of survival, and that in response to that assumption the jury reduced the damages award by fifty percent. Fischer, supra, 143 N.J. at 253, 670 A.2d 516. In requiring the ultimate outcome instruction in Fischer, this Court made the policy determination that the scope of the jury function was not limited to the ministerial determination of total damages, but that it extended to an interest in assuring that the ultimate outcome was just. Accordingly, we required the jury to be informed that the court would mold the verdict, reducing the damage award to reflect the decedent’s fifty-percent chance of survival. Id. at 255, 670 A.2d 516.
The rationale for requiring an ultimate outcome charge on the retrial of this case is virtually identical to the rationale underlying our decisions in Roman and Fischer. The jury on retrial obviously would be capable of apportioning fault among St. Michael’s Hospital, Nurse Forshage and Dr. Haddad without being informed of the statutory limitation on the Hospital’s liability. However, as the Appellate Division observed, a jury uninformed of that limitation might
conclude that plaintiffs full recovery can be had against the corporate party, which it may well assume to have the deeper pocket, and it may therefore believe that it can more certainly make the plaintiff whole without having to assign fault to individual doctors, nurses, and other staff members, who, although negligent, clearly intended no harm and who are hardworking and dedicated professionals doing difficult jobs under difficult circumstances.
[Weiss, supra, 295 N.J.Super. at 229-30, 684 A.2d 994.]
*494As in Roman and Fischer, the jury on remand might or might not reach a verdict that is significantly influenced by a misperception of the ultimate outcome that would result from its verdict. In Roman and Fischer, we elected not to run the risk that the jury’s verdict and the ultimate outcome would be incongruent. In those cases, as here, informing the jury of the relevant legal principle carried with it a risk that the jury would conform its fact-finding with the desired result. In Roman, the ultimate outcome charge might have encouraged the jury to reduce the plaintiffs percentage of fault below fifty percent. In Fischer, such a charge might have encouraged the jury artificially to increase its damages award based on the knowledge that the trial court would reduce it by half. In this case, an ultimate outcome charge might encourage the jury to reduce the apportionment of fault to the Hospital and increase its apportionment of fault to Dr. Haddad and Nurse Forshage.
In short, in each case the ultimate outcome charge is intended to avoid a jury verdict that, because of a legal principle unknown to the jury, would result in an outcome that the jury would find to be unjust; and in each case, providing the ultimate outcome charge to the jury carries with it the risk that the jury will distort its fact-finding function in order to achieve an outcome it believes to be fair to the parties. The Appellate Division’s opinion thoughtfully and persuasively addresses the concern that a jury instructed with an ultimate outcome charge will subvert its fact-finding responsibilities:
With respect to the “sympathy” factor that defendants fear, we say only this. Our entire system for the administration of justice is built upon our trust in the jury system and our abiding confidence that juries act conscientiously and diligently in following the instructions given them by the judge. We trust juries to find all lands of facts — in life and death issues as well as the full range of less consequential ones. Our jurisprudence is committed to the proposition that juries can and will follow the judge’s charge and will do so best if they understand the legal consequences of their findings. A jury’s potential passion and prejudice that may favor one or the other of the parties can most effectively be averted by cautionary instructions accompanying a charge that tells it fully and correctly how the law will affect its findings of fact.
[295 N.J.Super. at 232, 684 A.2d 994.]
*495The jury should be told explicitly and emphatically that the statutory limit on the Hospital’s liability can have no • bearing whatsoever on its apportionment of fault. Unquestionably, to inform the jury of the statutory limit on the Hospital’s liability carries with it a risk that the jury artificially will distort its findings on liability to impose more fault on the individual defendants. But that risk is no greater than the risk that an uninformed jury will return a verdict that distorts the apportionment of fault in a misguided effort to achieve a result that the limitation of liability statute prohibits.
The Court’s opinion argues that an instruction informing the jury about the dollar limitation on the Hospital’s liability is an instruction that “focuses on money and not percentages of fault,” and is highly prejudicial because it is analogous to informing the jury about whether a defendant’s liability is covered by insurance. Ante at 479-81, 713 A.2d at 433-34. I find the Court’s analogy to insurance coverage unpersuasive. • An instruction about coverage would inform a jury that a verdict against a defendant will have little or no financial consequence, and will be collectible because insurance is available. The instruction at issue here informs the jury only that a statutory provision limits the liability of hospitals irrespective of the percentage of fault found by the jury. The distinction is obvious. The latter instruction, as in Roman and Fischer, informs the jury of a legal principle that may alter substantially the intended effect of the jury’s verdict.
As for the proposed instruction’s focus on money, that focus is simply the result of the statutory language. The principle at stake would be no different if the statute limited the Hospital’s liability to ten percent of the damage award. In that instance, I assume the Court would find it difficult not to acknowledge the analogy to the question posed in Roman. But whether the limitation on the Hospital’s liability is expressed in dollars or in a percentage of damages is irrelevant: in either case, the limitation derives from a legal principle unknown to the jury, and poses a significant risk that the jury verdict may result in an unjust *496outcome. Given the choice, I would put my trust in a jury informed of the law and solemnly reminded of its duty to decide the factual issues solely on the basis of the evidence in the record. A jury not informed of the consequences of its verdict is handicapped in its effort to return a just verdict. A jury that understands the consequences of its verdict is far more likely to perform faithfully its function as the conscience of the community.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and COLEMAN — 6.
For affirmance — Justice STEIN — 1.