Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Musmanno:There can be no question in my mind that the Defendant in this case is entitled to a new trial. I have known the Trial Jiidge for a long time and I have a high regard for him personally. I respect his ability and his zeal for righteousness, but in this case, as I see it, he allowed zeal to becloud judgment and eagerness to displace thoroughness.
Section 2 of the jury-waiving law (Act of June 11, 1935, P. L. 319) says of the judge that he “shall have jurisdiction to hold the trial and shall proceed to hear, try and determine all issues of law and fact, and to render a general verdict in like manner as if the defendant had put himself upon the inquest or country for trial, and his cause were being tried before a jury . .*
In the case of Commonwealth v. Richman, 132 Pa. Superior Ct. 529, 531, the defendant was being tried on the charge of receiving stolen goods. The Judge, who was sitting without a jury, declared at one stage of the trial: “I do not understand counsel or defendants in this case. If you want me to sit as a judge and jury and ask me to believe testimony like that you are making a big mistake. I am telling all of you that. Think of it, a boy like that walks into a pawnshop and a transaction takes place and you want me to believe *594the man did not know it was stolen.” The Judge returned a verdict of guilty and the defendant appealed. The Superior Court properly reversed. Judge Rhodes (later President Judge), in a very able and courageous opinion, said: “Appellant, as a defendant in a criminal action, was entitled to the usual safeguards and to have all the evidence considered by the trial judge before his guilt or innocence was determined. The presumption of innocence of the accused continued in his favor throughout the entire case (see Com. v. Barrish, 297 Pa. 160, 171, 146 A. 553) and whether it was overcome was to be determined by the trial judge after the introduction of all the evidence. The testimony of the last witness in a criminal case may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt as to a defendant’s guilt. The trial judge clearly indicated in the midst of the trial that he had determined that appellant was guilty. The premature conclusion of the trial judge constitutes reversible error.”
The Trial Judge in this case also seems to have anticipated a verdict of guilty. During the defendant’s testimony the District Attorney objected to a question put by defense counsel, whereupon the Judge said to the District Attorney: “I wouldn’t worry about it. I will give him wide latitude, because there is a very strong case against him. He can answer it.”
Over and over judges tell juries that they are not to form an opinion on the guilt or innocence of the defendant until after they have heard all of the evidence and have listened to the charge of the Court. A judge in a non-jury case has no more liberties in this respect than a jury.
Was the Trial Judge disposed toward the prosecution’s side of the case even before the defendant opened his case? The police surgeon, who examined the defendant on the night of his arrest, testified that he *595found the defendant’s pulse normal, his temperature-normal, and that his pupils reacted to light and accommodation. He said further: “There was no evidence of any staggering gait. His face was somewhat flushed, slightly flushed. He ' ivas oriented, well dressed; his clothing was neat. I did ask him how many drinks he had, and he claimed he had two glasses of beer.’’ He said also that the. defendant had an odor of alcohol about him but that it was “not very strong.” He added: “I did speak to him, just a matter of a few questions to see whether the man was oriented and if he knew where he was, and I do not think there was any question in my mind about it, that he was oriented.”
This caused the Trial Judge to say “Do not say you do not think there is any question in your mind. That is absolutely meaningless. We will ask is there any question in your mind when the time comes.”
But was the answer of the doctor meaningless? He examined the defendant, talked to him, and concluded (there was no question in his mind about it) that the defendant was oriented. The answer, however, displeased the Judge. All the doctor’s testimony seemed to displease the Judge. When defense counsel asked the doctor: “You apparently talked to him and received intelligent answers”, and the doctor replied: “Yes, he knew where he was. As a matter of fact, I will even go further — ”, the Judge said: “Never mind; don’t go any further. Stay where you are. Just answer questions.”
The doctor definitely stated that in his opinion the defendant “was mentally and physically able to drive his automobile carefully.” Despite this positive statement by the doctor, the Judge said on three different occasions that the doctor testified that the defendant was under the influence of liquor. The doctor did not *596so testify. The testimony on that subject was as follows: “Q. What was your opinion? A. The opinion was that the man had a few drinks, but he had not had enough drink to the point where he was not able to drive a vehicle safely in traffic. That was my opinion. Q. Was or was not your opinion at the time that he was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such an extent where he was not fit to drive an automobile? A. That is correct. Q. As a result of your examination, would you say that he had clearness of intellect, which makes for proper mental and physical coordination? A. Yes, I do. Q. Would you say he was mentally and physically able to drive his automobile carefully? A. Yes, I do.”
The Trial Judge’s disregard of the evidence presented by the police surgeon, an obviously impartial witness, constituted, in my estimation, an abuse of discretion. He said that he could not accept the doctor’s testimony because “he was too gratuitous.” What does this mean? The doctor examined the defendant in the official discharge of his official duties as a police surgeon. There is no suggestion that he was motivated by any desire to betray the police department or to help the defendant. He testified to what he did and knew.
Since the doctor did not say that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, even though he had had a “few drinks,” the Judge announced a standard of his own as to what constitutes a “drink.” “What is a drink? If you get a drink in some of these hotels, you just get a little bit of alcohol from the bartender’s fingers, but they still call it a drink. If you get a drink some place else, you get a big snort. They are both drinks.”
Did the Judge find the defendant guilty of driving a car under the influence of intoxicating liquor on the *597supposition that he had had two “big snorts”? We are unable to say, but we cannot exclude that possibility, and if it be so, would the verdict be sustainable on the record?
The defendant testified that on the night of his arrest, the city was blanketed with a heavy fog and, because of poor visibility, he came into collision with another automobile. In relating how the accident occurred he said that he was adhering to a certain route in endeavoring to reach his home, but that, at a certain point, he decided to take another route, one with improved visibility. The Trial Judge saw something sinister in the fact that the defendant changed his mind about the route: “That cock-and-bull story of driving blind at 12 o’clock at night as he turned into Allegheny Avenue, and he said himself on the witness stand that he knew Aramingo Avenue was lower and would be more foggy, and he was going over there. He was pressed. There is one way of telling the truth, but there are a half dozen ways of telling an untruth or half truths. I can understand the mental processes, but it seems to me that a more frank statement here would be better. Whom is he fooling? He is able to talk, he has the power of expression, he knows how to do it, and he was giving a cock-and-bull story in final desperation. I watched him. He said, I changed my mind. That is the resort to flight. He was fleeing from his own previous expression — to paraphrase, you might say the guilty flee their statements when no man pursueth.”
The last sentence in the Judge’s expostulation was a neatly turned sentence. It was clever and witty. His application of a biblical quotation to a present-day event was adroit. The re-arrangement of the words was astute. But as an expression of judicial impartiality, it left much to be desired. Why didn’t the de*598fendant or any driver have the right to change his driving direction if he thought (even mistakenly) that he would find less fog over the new route? Why wouldn’t he have the right to change his mind in any event? There is no law against one changing one’s mind.
At the termination of the taking of testimony, defense counsel rose to address the Court in behalf of his client. A glance at the printed record will reveal that he never really got a chance to plead his cause. The Judge so constantly interrupted him that the supposed summation became a debate — a debate which could be likened to an argument between a prize fighter and the referee, with the outcome as readily foreseeable as the referee’s decision.
The attempted summation is spread over eight pages in the record. Practically one-half of that space is taken up with the Judge’s interruptions, interpolations, acidulous observations, and uncomplimentary references to the police surgeon, the defendant, and an unknown “somebody” who “fell flat on their face.” On the night of the arrest, the defendant’s ear collided with the car of one John MeKnight. It appears that Mr. McKnight’s three children m the car were injured (the extent of the injuries does not appear in the record). During defendant’s counsel’s attempted speech, the Judge broke in to say: “There is only one thing I dislike, after the determination, why wasn’t he indicted for aggravated assault and battery on these three little children? That is what he should have been indicted for. Somebody fell flat on their face. They made out a true case of aggravated assault and battery. Here is, in my opinion, an open and shut case of aggravated assault and battery.”
When defense counsel sat down the District Attorney rose, spoke twelve lines and then said: “I have *599nothing further to add.” He used excellent judgment. He had already been told by the Judge in the midstream of trial that he (the District Attorney) had presented a “very strong case” against the defendant. Why gild the lily? Why embellish the obvious? Why delay the inevitable judgment peeping over the horizon? He quickly sat down and the Judge quickly announced: “The verdict is guilty.”
I presume no one gasped in surprise in the courtroom. Defense counsel immediately moved for a new trial. The Judge informed him he would hear argument “a week from now in this room.” Defense counsel asked for a delay, whereupon the Judge said: “Then, withdraw your motion. It is an open and shut case. There isn’t an error on the record.”
The Judge undoubtedly conscientiously believed there was not an error on the record and my colleagues here apparently also so believe, but my belief is a contrary one.
I would grant a new trial.
Italics throughout, mine.