dissenting:
I am unable to agree with the majority’s conclusion that the tort of wrongful discharge as articulated in Geary v. United States Steel Corporation, 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), is available only to an at-will employee. Such a reading is in my view too narrow. While the dictum in Geary of course does outline “a remedy for employees with no other recourse against wrongful discharge,” At 354, the tort of wrongful discharge also serves “the interest of the public in seeing to it that the employer does not act abusively and a proper balance between the employer’s and employee’s interests is preserved.” Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa.Super. 560, 572, 422 A.2d 611, 617 (1980) (emphasis added). Our cases have consistently recognized this broader principle. In Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978), we identified the right to trial by jury as the public policy mandate violated by an employer who discharged an employee because he did not seek to be excused from jury service. In Hunter v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 277 Pa.Super. 4, 419 A.2d 631 (1980), we similarly held that the public policy favoring rehabilitation of criminals, as well as the Pennsylvania Constitution, prevented a public employer from refusing to hire a job applicant solely because of a prior conviction unrelated to his ability to perform the job sought. In Yaindl we held that although the employee had failed to make out his case, the public policy favoring product safety could limit an employer’s discretion to fire “whistle blowers.” In light of the concerns emphasized in these cases, I believe that the majority mischaracterizes the tort of wrongful discharge when it states that the cause of action “was never intended to provide a forum to vindicate public policy and punish those who deviate from it.” 1 At 354.
*357I should nevertheless not uphold a common law cause of action in this case if the collective bargaining agreement provided an equivalent remedy. The majority states that appellant is not “without recourse,” id., because he can file a grievance alleging discharge without “proper cause.” It is true that section 8 of the collective bargaining agreement provides for such a grievance; however, section 8(d) specifically authorizes a “make whole” remedy only:
Should it be determined by the Impartial Umpire that an employee has been suspended or discharged without proper cause therefor, the Company shall reinstate the employee and make him whole for the period of his suspension or discharge, which shall include providing him such earnings and other benefits as he would have received except for such suspension or discharge, and offsetting such earnings or other amounts as he would not have received except for such suspension or discharge. In suspension and discharge cases only, the Umpire may, where circumstances warrant, modify or eliminate the offset of such earnings or other amounts as would not have been received except for such suspension or discharge.
R.R. at 45-46.
It is therefore apparent that punitive damages would not be available to appellant in arbitration. Cf. John Morrell & Co., 69 LA 264 (1977).
The majority does not find this difference in remedies compelling; it points out that the contractual employee may obtain reinstatement, unavailable to the at-will employee in a wrongful discharge action. If, however, the tort of wrongful discharge satisfies a public as well as a private interest in circumscribing employer discretion, as I believe it does, then punitive damages are a necessary component of the remedy. As the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned in extending the tort of wrongful discharge to unionized employees, “If there is no possibility that an employer can be liable in punitive damages, not only has the employee been afforded an incomplete remedy, but there is no available *358sanction against a violator of an important public policy of th[e] State.” Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill.2d 143, 150, 85 Ill.Dec. 475, 479, 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (1984). The public interests implicated in the retaliatory discharge of a contractual employee are no less than those implicated in the retaliatory discharge of an at-will employee, and deserve no lesser protection.
I should reverse the order granting summary judgment and reinstate the complaint.
. I recognize, as the majority notes, that federal courts have applied the Pennsylvania tort of wrongful discharge only to at-will employees. State courts, however, are not bound by federal interpretation of state law. See, e.g., Rader v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 407 Pa. 609, 182 A.2d 199 (1962).