dissenting.
I begin with a synopsis of the salient undisputed facts. Joanne M. Cushing is a single mother caring for three children. She encountered financial difficulties. After obtaining the automatic extension for filing her 2006 federal tax return, she sought bankruptcy protection under chapter 13 of the Code. During the § 341(a) meeting, Ms. Cushing was examined on matters other than any tax troubles and the filing of the mentioned federal tax return. The Trustee made no pronouncement that would show she left the meeting open, adjourned or concluded it. Thereafter, the Internal Revenue Service filed a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(e), even though it did not object to the confirmation of the Debtor’s plan, the Debtor filed her 2006 federal tax return within the extended time afforded by the Tax Code, but, as the agency claims, outside the parameters set by § 1308(b)(1), and she is complying with the confirmed plan.
I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion reversing the bankruptcy court’s finding, “that the Chapter 13 Trustee neither concluded the section 341(a) meeting nor continued it to a specific date ... [and] for purposes of this decision only, the Chapter 13 Trustee held open the meeting of creditors in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1308(b)(1).”
The circumstances here provide good and deliberate reasons justifying the bankruptcy court’s choice. First, the bankruptcy court’s Order dealt with an “aspect of the statute’s application on which the statute itself is silent”. Petit v. Fessenden (In re Petit), 182 B.R. 59, 63 n. 4 (D.Me.1995), aff'd on other grounds, 80 F.3d 29 (1st Cir.1996). Next, the Order “addresse[d] a fact complex in which the actions of the trustee are to be assessed in terms of concepts of reasonableness and fairness”.11 *539Id. Then, while the bankruptcy court’s Order provided some guidance for the future,12 it also seemed to recognize that a judge may not have the authority to provide the bright-line approach urged by the Internal Revenue Service that appears neither in the statute nor the rules.13 In re Flynn, 200 B.R. 481, 484 (Bankr.D.Mass.1996); In re Koss, 319 B.R. 317, 321 (Bankr.D.Mass.2005). Lastly, to suggest that the Internal Revenue Service needed to file this appeal in order to reverse a “terrible precedent” invites abuse, given the compelling circumstances of this case and the bankruptcy court’s expression specifically limiting its ruling to “this decision only”.
In my view, the bankruptcy court’s Order balanced Ms. Cushing’s interest and those of her creditors, including the Internal Revenue Service. It also promoted the efficient administration of Debtor’s financial reorganization. Therefore, I would affirm.
. Section 1307(e) mandates the dismissal or conversion of a bankruptcy case (whichever is in the best interest of creditors), when a debt- or does not file required tax returns in the manner set forth in its § 1308. See n. 4 at p. 3 of the bankruptcy court's Order, Appellee's Appendix.
. The bankruptcy court's Order states: “The Court further observes that should a debtor wish to take advantage of the provisions of § 1308(b), he or she should request from the Chapter 13 Trustee to old the meeting open for a specific period of time.... Similarly, if the United States or any other party in interest wishes to withhold the relief afforded to debtors by § 1308(b), a request should be made to the Chapter 13 Trustee to conclude the meeting ...”.
. During oral argument, the Internal Revenue Service wanted us to “[a]nnounce ... and encourage all of the other judges, to basically announce that in the future, in all cases, unless the docket entry says it's held open, you are going to deem it not held open for tax purposes.”