concurring.
Although I concur with the Court’s result, I do not join the majority opinion.
In Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 584-585, 632 A.2d 797, 803-804 (1993), this Court held “that Maryland’s second degree rape statute defines a strict liability offense that does not require the State to prove mens rea .... ” The Garnett Court went on to state that Art. 27, § 463(a)(3), “makes no reference to the actor’s knowledge, belief, or other state of mind” and that the General Assembly intended “this silence as to mens rea ...” 332 Md. at 585, 632 A.2d at 804. The Garnett opinion concluded that “an[y] element of mens rea” would have to be enacted by the General Assembly. 332 Md. at 588, 632 A.2d at 805.
In a dissenting opinion in Garnett, 332 Md. at 588-592, 632 A.2d at 805-807, I disagreed with the Court’s view “that the statute contains no mens rea requirement at all.” 332 Md. at 589, 632 A.2d at 806. Although I agreed “that an ordinary defendant’s mistake about the age of his or her sexual partner is not a defense to a prosecution under § 463(a)(3),” I disagreed with the Court’s conclusion that § 463(a)(3) enacted a “strict liability” offense “where criminal ‘liability is imposed regardless of the defendant’s state of mind.’ ” Ibid., quoting Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 645, 547 A.2d 1041, 1044 (1988). I went on to set forth my view of the mens rea requirement in § 463(a)(3) as follows (332 Md. at 590-592, 632 A.2d at 806-807):
“In the typical situation involving an older person’s engaging in consensual sexual activities with a teenager below the age of consent, and the scenario which the General Assembly likely contemplated when it enacted §§ 463(a)(3), 464A(a)(3), 464B(a)(3), 464C(a)(2), and 464C(a)(3), the defendant knows and intends that he or she is engaging in sexual activity with a young person. In addition, the defendant *692knows that the activity is regarded as immoral and/or improper by large segments of society. Moreover, the defendant is aware that ‘consent’ by persons who are too young is ineffective. Although in a particular case the defendant may honestly but mistakenly believe, because of representations or appearances, that the other person is above the age of consent, the ordinary defendant in such case is or ought to be aware that there is a risk that the young person is not above the age of consent. As the majority opinion points out, ‘the traditional view [is] that those who engage in sex with young persons do so at their peril, assuming the risk that their partners are underage ____’ It seems to me that the above-mentioned knowledge factors, and particularly the mental ability to appreciate that one is taking a risk, constitute the mens rea of the offenses defined by §§ 463(a)(3), 464A(a)(3), 464B(a)(3), 4640(a)(2) and 4640(a)(3). In enacting these provisions, the General Assembly assumed that a defendant is able to appreciate the risk involved by intentionally and knowingly engaging in sexual activities with a young person. There is no indication that the General Assembly intended that criminal liability attach to one who, because of his or her mental impairment, was unable to appreciate that risk.
“It is unreasonable to assume that the Legislature intended for one to be convicted under § 463(a)(3), or under any of the other statutes proscribing sexual activity with underage persons, regardless of his or her mental state. Suppose, for example, that Raymond Garnett had not had an I.Q. of 52, but rather, had been more severely mentally retarded as was the young woman involved in Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147, 103 S.Ct. 790, 74 L.Ed.2d 995 (1983). The mentally retarded person in Wentzel had an I.Q. of 25-30, was physiologically capable of bearing a child, but was unable to comprehend the act of sexual intercourse, or even to understand the difference between the sexes. If someone so disabled, having reached Raymond’s chronological age, then had ‘consensual’ sexual intercourse with a person *693younger than fourteen years of age, I do not believe that he or she would have violated Art. 27, § 463(a)(3). Under the view that §§ 463(a)(3), 464A(a)(3), 464B(a)(3), etc., define pure strict liability offenses without any regard for the defendant’s mental state, presumably a 20 year old, who passes out because of drinking too many alcoholic beverages, would be guilty of a sexual offense if a 13 year old engages in various sexual activities with the 20 year old while the latter is unconscious. I cannot imagine that the General Assembly intended any such result.”
I find the majority’s opinion today somewhat confusing. Thus, in some portions of the opinion, the majority seems to be reaffirming the Court’s holding in Garnett. The majority refers to § 463(a)(3) as a “strict liability” offense (352 Md. at 681, 724 A.2d at 52), and indicates that the statute “dispenses with any mens rea requirement ...” (352 Md. at 685, 724 A.2d at 54). Other portions of the majority opinion, however, appear to reflect the views set forth in my dissenting opinion in the Garnett case. For example, the majority states that “the sexual intercourse proscribed by § 463(a)(3) ... involves conscious activity which gives rise to circumstances that place a reasonable person on notice of potential illegality.” 352 Md. at 680, 724 A.2d at 51. The majority refers to the defendant being “on notice of the potential risks of miscalculating the victim’s age.” Ibid. The majority also suggests that a defendant violating § 463(a)(3) would not be “ ‘morally blameless.’ ” 352 Md. at 680-81, 724 A.2d at 52.
If the majority today is modifying the strict liability holding of Garnett, then I applaud the majority’s action. If, on the other hand, the majority is reaffirming the holding in Garnett, I continue to disagree.
I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Garnett.
BELL, Chief Judge, dissenting joined by CATHELL, J.
In Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 (1993), this Court held that Maryland Code (1957,1996 RepLVol.), Art. 27, *694§ 463(a)(3),1 the statutory rape law, is a strict liability statute. The majority of the Court stated in that regard:
“We think it sufficiently clear, however, that Maryland’s second degree rape statute defines a strict liability offense that does not require the State to prove mens rea; it makes no allowance for a mistake-of-age defense. The plain language of § 463, viewed in its entirety, and the legislative history of its creation lead to this conclusion.”
Id. at 584-85, 632 A.2d at 803-04. I dissented from that decision, concluding:
“I do not believe, however, that the General Assembly, in every case, whatever the nature of the crime and no matter how harsh the potential penalty, can subject a defendant to strict criminal liability. To hold, as a matter of law, that section 463(a)(3) does not require the State to prove that a defendant possessed the necessary mental state to commit the crime, i.e. knowingly engaged in sexual relations with a female under 14, or that the defendant may not litigate that issue in defense, ‘offends a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions of conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental’ and is, therefore, inconsistent with due process. See United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 776-77 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1042, 112 S.Ct. 897, 116 L.Ed.2d 799 (1992), quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674, 677 (1934).”
Id. at 593-94, 632 A.2d at 808 (Bell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted, emphasis in original). I also expressed, at some length, the reasons I reached that conclusion, namely, that a culpable mental state, often referred to as mens rea, or intent, is, and continues to be, as it long has been, an essential element of a criminal offense, id. at 595-98, 632 A.2d at 808-10 *695(Bell, J., dissenting), that statutory rape, not being a public welfare offense, can not be justified as a strict liability offense on the basis of either of the two theories, “lesser legal wrong” or “moral wrong,” that historically has underlain such treatment, id. at 601-05, 632 A.2d at 812-14 (Bell, J., dissenting), and that mistake of fact negates the mental state required to establish the crime of statutory rape. Id. at 605-11, 632 A.2d at 814-17 (Bell, J., dissenting). And, although the constitutional issue was not presented in that case, I addressed, again at some length, what I perceived to be the constitutional limitations on strict criminal liability. See id. at 611-26, 632 A.2d at 817-24 (Bell, J., dissenting). After discussing State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 839 (Alaska, 1978), in which the Supreme Court of Alaska recognized mistake of fact as a defense in statutory rape and opined, “where the particular statute is not a public welfare type of offense, either a requirement of criminal intent must be read into the statute or it must be found unconstitutional,” I concluded:
*694"(a) Elements of offense.—A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person:
(3) Who is under 14 years of age and the person performing the act is at least four years older than the victim.”
*695“the prosecution of statutory rape in Maryland necessarily brings into conflict the State’s interests in protecting minors and defendants’ due process rights because section 463(a)(3) operates ‘to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition,”’ Ransom, 942 F.2d at 776, quoting Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228, 78 S.Ct. at 242, 2 L.Ed.2d at 231, and, thus, removes reasonable ignorance of the girl’s age and consequent lack of criminal intent as a defense. The failure of section 463(a)(3) to require proof of a culpable mental state conflicts both with the substantive due process ideal requiring that defendants possess some level of fault for a criminal conviction of statutory rape and the procedural due process ideal requiring that the prosecution overcome the presumption of innocence by proof of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Notwithstanding the maxim that criminal statutes dispensing with the intent requirement and criminal offenses requiring no mens rea have a “generally disfavored status,” the rationale of parts V and VI of the majority opinion is that the legislature has absolute authority to create strict liability crimes. For the *696reasons reviewed, I do. not agree. On the contrary, I believe that due process both under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Declaration of Rights, precludes strict criminal liability for statutory rape. Interpreting section 463(a)(3) as the majority does has the effect of largely relieving the State of its burden of proof and burden of persuasion. By making the defendant’s intent, and, hence, blameworthiness, irrelevant, the Legislature has made inevitable, the petitioner’s conviction. Moreover, upon conviction of the felony offense of statutory rape under section 463(a)(3), in addition to a substantial penalty of up to 20 years imprisonment, a defendant’s reputation will be gravely besmirched. Where there is no issue as to sexual contact, which is more likely than not to be the case in statutory rape prosecutions, proof of the prosecutrix’s age is not only proof of the defendant’s guilt, it is absolutely dispositive of it and, at the same time, it is fatal to the only defense the defendant would otherwise have. So interpreted, section 463(a)(3) not only destroys absolutely the concept of fault, but it renders meaningless, in the statutory rape context, the presumption of innocence and the right to due process.”
See id. at 625-26, 632 A.2d at 824 (Bell, J., dissenting).
Today, the majority holds, “Appellant’s rights to due process under the Maryland and United States Constitutions were not violated when, upon being charged with statutory rape, the trial court prevented Appellant.from presenting his defense that he reasonably believed the victim was above 13 years of age.” 352 Md. 663, 667, 724 A.2d 43, 45 (1998). Thus, the Court answers the question that I anticipated in Garnett. And, as I did in Garnett, I dissent. Accordingly, what I said in my dissenting opinion, in Garnett, is directly relevant to the case sub judice, and I commend and urge its reading and consideration. To it, I also add the following.
I.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee each *697individual due process of law. Due Process protects those liberties that are “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674, 677 (1934). As Justice Chase observed more than 100 years ago:
“There are acts which the Federal, or State, Legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power, as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government was established.”
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 3 U.S. 386, 388, 1 L.Ed. 648, 649 (1798). Due process rights, which are integral to our republican form of government, protect all citizens, including the criminal accused, from unfair procedures and from deprivations of substantive rights.
a.
The requisites of procedural due process are satisfied only when the accused is afforded both notice and a fair opportunity to be heard. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577, 579, 95 S.Ct. 729, 738, 42 L.Ed.2d 725, 737 (1974); (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)); Reed v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 323 Md. 175, 183-84, 592 A.2d 173, 177 (1991); Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 30, 410 A.2d 1052, 1058 (1980). In addition, a court must ponder three competing interests:
“[FJirst the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative *698burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976); Hare v. Motor Vehicle Administration, 326 Md. 296, 303, 604 A.2d 914, 917 (1992); Brosan v. Cochran, 307 Md. 662, 671-72, 516 A.2d 970, 975 (1986).
In this case, the majority concludes the mandates of procedural due process were satisfied, because the appellant was given sufficient notice of what actions constitute statutory rape. See 352 Md. 663, 679-80, 724 A.2d 43, 51-52 (1998). The majority ignores the real issue. Even if the appellant were on notice that having sexual relations with someone below the consensual age constitutes statutory rape, this does not mean, and there is no evidence to suggest, that the appellant knew that the particular female with whom he was having sexual relations was underage. As the United States Supreme Court observed in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), notice means more than simply cursory knowledge of the law.
At issue in Staples was Art. 26, U.S.C. § 5861(d), of the National Firearms Act, which criminalizes possession of an unregistered firearm,2 imposing a sentence of up to ten years in prison, but is silent as to mens rea. See 511 U.S. at 603-06, 114 S.Ct. at 1795-97, 128 L.Ed.2d at 614-16. The defendant in Staples, had possession of an AR-15 assault rifle, when his home was searched by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & *699Firearms.3 Id. at 603, 114 S.Ct. at 1795-96, 128 L.Ed.2d at 614. The defendant testified that the gun had never fired automatically, when in his possession. Id. at 603, 114 S.Ct. at 1796, 128 L.Ed.2d at 614-15. He requested a jury instruction that the Government had to prove “ ‘he knew that the gun would fire fully automatically,’ ” but that request was denied by the district court, and he was convicted and sentenced to 5 years probation and a $5,000 fine. See id. at 603-04, 114 S.Ct. at 1796, 128 L.Ed.2d at 615. Reversing the district court, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the government bore the burden of proving a defendant’s knowledge as to the nature of the weapon beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at 619, 114 S.Ct. at 1804, 128 L.Ed.2d at 624, stating that it was “reluctant to impute [strict liability] to Congress where, as here, it would mean easing the path to convicting persons whose conduct would not even alert them to the probability of strict regulation____” See id. at 615-16, 114 S.Ct. at 1802, 128 L.Ed.2d at 622-23. The Court also noted that “punishing a violation as a felony is simply incompatible with the theory of the public welfare offense,” Id. at 618, 114 S.Ct. at 1804, 128 L.Ed.2d at 623-24, and reiterated its long line of cases holding that a defendant must have a guilty mind before being found guilty. See 511 U.S. at 604-08, 114 S.Ct. at 1796-98, 128 L.Ed.2d at 615-18.
I addressed the same issue and drew the same conclusion in my dissenting opinion in Garnett:
“A defendant who has knowledge that a victim has consented, in fact, to sexual relations, whether the consent is effective or not, is not thereby placed on notice as to the victim’s age. Knowledge of consent simply does not equate with knowledge of age, just as intent to engage in sexual relations does not reveal, without more, with whom. Moreover, it is not a crime to engage in sexual relations with a *700minor who is at least 16 years old; it may be morally wrong, in the minds of most Americans, but it is not a crime. It is only a crime if the defendant engages in such relations with a minor under a specified age, i.e., 14, as in section 463(a)(3), or 14 or 15, as in section 464C. But even when the act engaged in is necessarily a crime, e.g. possession of contraband, knowledge of the illegality—that the contraband is knowingly possessed—is still required. See Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988). Consequently, where the activity would be legal or, at least, not illegal, but for the ages of the participants, at the very least, the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age must be proven. Otherwise, a defendant who does not know he is acting illegally could be convicted.”
332 Md. at 622-23, 632 A.2d at 822-23 (Bell, J., dissenting). This observation is most relevant to the case sub judice, where even the trial court recognized that the defendant’s knowledge of his partner’s age was not at all clear:
“[I]n many instances... [a] 13 year old can look like a 13 year old or 12 year old; in other instances, a 13 year old can look like an 18 year old. So, I have no way of knowing whether this victim appeared to be older than she actually was. But I can only go by her statement to the police and to the Defendant that she was 16 years old.”
The majority also overlooks the second prong of the procedural due process test. See 352 Md. at 679-80, 724 A.2d at 51-52. The appellant was not given an opportunity to present a defense. By ignoring this fact, the Court apparently forgets that “ ‘[t]he critical issue in a statutory rape case is ‘the age of the rape victim..which serves two related, but distinct purposes: (1) it establishes the victim’s capacity to consent and (2) it represents notice to a defendant of proscribed conduct.” See Garnett, 332 Md. at 621, 632 A.2d at 822 (Bell, J., dissenting). As one court has astutely observed, where as here, the “outcome is determined not only by the child’s age, but by the relative age of the defendant ... [and][w]hen the law requires a mathematical formula for its application, [one] cannot say that being provided the wrong numbers is immate*701rial.” Perez v. State, 111 N.M. 160, 803 P.2d 249, 251 (N.M. 1990). In fact, it is the child’s age and the defendant’s age, which lead to prosecution for actions that would otherwise go unpunished.4
By denying the appellant a fair opportunity to present his defense of lack of knowledge, and construing the statutory rape statute as a strict liability statute, the Court has permitted, and made the appellant the victim of, an irrebuttable presumption.5 This can not pass constitutional scrutiny.
b.
Substantive due process functions to limit both the state’s substantive power to regulate citizens’ lives and to restrict the state from unconstitutionally denying liberty. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 15, at 1302-1435 (2d ed.1988). When the state deprives a person of life, liberty, or property it must have at least a rational basis, but when it infringes upon a fundamental right, it must demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and a narrowly tailored means of protecting only that interest. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388, 98 S.Ct. 673, 682, 54 L.Ed.2d 618, 631 (1978); Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 701, 501 A.2d 27, 33 (1985); Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 310, 385 A.2d 57, 78 (1978).
Assessing whether the State’s interest outweighs the appellant’s rights involves two competing considerations. The first is the nature of the interests involved. In other words, with respect to the defendant, it must be determined whether the right being infringed upon is “rooted so deep in the tradition and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674, 677 (1934), and as to the State, whether its *702interest is compelling. Second, the appellant’s interests must be balanced against the relevant State interests. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2461, 73 L.Ed.2d 28, 40-41 (1982).
Here, the interest the appellant seeks to vindicate is his fundamental due process right to present a defense, a right guaranteed to every criminal defendant. See White v. State, 324 Md. 626, 640, 598 A.2d 187, 194 (1991); Mitchell v. State, 320 Md. 756, 761, 580 A.2d 196, 199 (1990). This right is, “in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations ....” Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 403, 456 A.2d 29, 44 (1983) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973)). Much like the rights of defendants protected by the Sixth Amendment, the right to present a defense is fundamental, in that it gives the appellant the opportunity “to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, [which] is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecutions to the jury—” Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98, 93 S.Ct. 351, 353, 34 L.Ed.2d 330, 333 (1972) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967)). It is clear, therefore, that the appellant’s interest is deep rooted and serious. Indeed, the right is similar to other interests, of the defendant, that the United States Supreme Court has found to be fundamental in the criminal process. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) (concerning right to counsel on first appeal); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S.Ct. 410, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971) (concerning right to transcript in misdemeanor appeals); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) (concerning right to legal materials and access to courts).
The majority lists the state’s interests as: promoting the physical and mental health of children, preventing the sexual exploitation and abuse of children, and preventing venereal disease and pregnancy. See 352 Md. at 681-85, 724 A.2d at 52-54. To be sure, these interests are compelling. Even so, *703this does not vitiate the appellant’s due process rights and, in any event, must be narrowly tailored.
Aside from the fact that, rather than an exploitation or abuse of one of the parties, the facts of this case reveal only two teenagers engaged in a fully consensual act, see State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 772 (R.I.1998) (Flanders, J., dissenting)6, Maryland’s statutory rape law, as currently formulated is not the most narrowly tailored method for addressing those concerns.
To bolster its position, the majority cites Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1985). Hardwick was charged with violating a Georgia penal statute, which criminalized sodomy.7 See 478 U.S. at 187-88, 106 S.Ct. at 2842, 92 L.Ed.2d at 144. He brought an action in federal court, alleging: (1) the statute was unconstitutional in criminalizing consensual sodomy, (2) as a practicing homosexual the Georgia law placed him in imminent danger of arrest, (3) he had a fundamental Constitutional right to privacy in his own home, which encompassed the right to engage in sodomy, and (4) there was no rational basis for the law even if it did not infringe on his fundamental rights. See id. at 188, 195-96, 106 S.Ct. at 2842, 2846, 92 L.Ed.2d at 144, 148-49. Rejecting each argument, the Court declined to extend its fundamental rights jurisprudence as Hardwick proposed. See id. at 190-96, 106 S.Ct. at 2843-47, 92 L.Ed.2d at 145-49. The Court concluded that sodomy does not fall within one of the protected liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights. See id. at 191-92, 106 S.Ct. at 2844-45, 92 L.Ed.2d at 146-47. The Court also determined *704that the Georgia law survived a rational relations review, even if it was based on the Georgia electorate’s view that homosexual sodomy is “immoral and unacceptable.” See id. at 196, 106 S.Ct. at 2846, 92 L.Ed 2d at 149.
From Bowers, the majority distills the following, “[t]he state’s overwhelming interest in protecting children from these risks outweighs any interest the individual may have in engaging in sexual relations with children near the age of consent.” See 352 Md. at 683, 724 A.2d at 53. Once again the majority has confused the analysis. The issue this case presents is not whether the appellant has a constitutional right to engage in sexual relations with a teenager younger than he is. I agree with the majority, appellant has no such constitutional right. Rather, the issue is the appellant’s due process right to present a defense, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Bowers is inapposite to the present case.
Finally, the State cannot demonstrate, nor has it even attempted to show, that Maryland’s statutory rape law is the most narrowly tailored means to achieve the state’s interest in protecting children, while infringing upon as few due process rights as possible. And, when the state has open to it less drastic ways of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles fundamental liberties. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59, 94 S.Ct. 303, 308, 38 L.Ed.2d 260, 267 (1973) (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 343, 92 S.Ct. at 1003, 31 L.Ed.2d at 284-85). While some children may require the protection of strict liability, many others do not. There are reasonable options available to the State. Recognizing “the increased maturity and independence of today’s teenagers...,” see Perez v. State, 111 N.M. 160, 803 P.2d 249, 251 (1990), the Model Penal Code has developed an approach that limits strict liability to those cases of sexual relations involving children under ten years of age. See Garnett, 332 Md. at 610-11, 632 A.2d at 816-17 (Bell, J., dissenting). There are, in addition, other options utilized by other States, such as allowing the defendant to present a defense whenever the “victim” lies about his or her age. See id. at 606-11, 632 A.2d at 815-17 (Bell, J., dissenting).
*705Maryland’s sexual offense statutes protect some, but by no means all, children and punish only a few alleged perpetrators. Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, §§ 463 and 464A8 punish the defendant who is 17 years old or older and engages in sexual activity with a 13-year-old. Likewise, §§ 464B9 and 464C10 punish defendants who engage in sexual relations with a 14 or 15-year-old, when the defendant is four or more years older than his partner. These are the only statutes the Legislature has enacted to punish persons who engage in consensual sexual acts with underage partners. This statutory scheme demonstrates the following. First, the State is not as concerned about the sexual exploits of all children as it is those who are considered so immature that there can be little doubt that they are too young to give consent. In those cases, strict liability may well be appropriate. Second, the State has made arbitrary distinctions between persons engaging in sexual intercourse. The 18-year-old who has consensual sexual relations with a 14-year-old, reasonably believing him or her to be older, faces 20 years in *706prison, while the person who is 17 % years of age, who engages in the exact same conduct is guilty of no crime and, therefore, will face no punishment. The protection of those truly in need of strict liability protection certainly can be achieved short of putting at risk a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
The fact that a majority of the States11 hold that a defendant’s due process rights may be ignored when the charge is statutory rape, is not a compelling reason for this Court to do likewise; whatever other courts may do does not provide a justification for us to sanction the infringement upon a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. Due process simply is not determined by reference to the number of courts ruling a particular way. It is of little consequence to the appellant that he was not sentenced to 20 years in prison, see 352 Md. at 678, 724 A.2d at 50, because he will be forever branded with the stigma of being a child sex offender. Moreover, the applicable inquiry is not whether the appellant spent one day in jail or 20 years; if he did not receive a fair trial, his conviction should not be allowed to stand. Because, § 463(a)(3) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the applicable provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the appellant’s conviction should be reversed.
. That provision reads:
. Firearm is defined in § 5845(a) as "(1) a shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length; (2) a weapon made from a shotgun if such weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length.
"(b) Machinegun. The term ‘machinegun’ means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored -to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.”
. This gun is the civilian equivalent of the military M-16 rifle, but unless it has been modified it has a metal stop, which prevents it from firing repeatedly. The metal stop on the defendants’ gun had been filed away and the gun could be fired repeatedly. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 603, 114 S.Ct. at 1796, 128 L.Ed.2d at 614-15.
. As I pointed out in Garnett, fornication is not a crime in Maryland. See 332 Md. at 602-03, 632 A.2d at 812 (Bell, J., dissenting).
. For a discussion of irrebuttable presumptions, as violative of due process, see Garnett, 332 Md. at 616-20, 632 A.2d at 819-21 (Bell, J., dissenting).
. Although it does not address the due process issue, this case contains an excellent and detailed discussion of why the State must prove mens rea in a statutory rape case.
. The statute at issue in Bowers, stated:
“Georgia Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984):
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another...
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years...”
. That section provides:
"(a)Elements of offense.—A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the second degree if the person engages in a sexual act with another person:
(3) Under 14 years of age and the person performing the sexual act is four or more years older than the victim....”
. § 464B reads:
"(a)Elements of offense.—A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the third degree if the person engages in:
(3) Sexual contact with another person who is under 14 years of age and the person performing the sexual contact is four or more years older than the victim
. That section reads:
“(a) Elements of the offense.—A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the fourth degree if the person engages:
(3) Except as provided in § 464B (a)(5) of this subheading, in vaginal intercourse with another person who is 14 or 15 years of age and the person performing the act is four or more years older than the other person....”
. Justice Flanders of the Rhode Island Supreme Court reports that, ”[w]ith [People v.] Hernandez[ 61 Cal.2d 529, 39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal.1964)] and [the Model Penal Code of 1962] taking the lead, twenty three American jurisdictions, nearly half, now explicitly recognize some form of mistake of age defense.” State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 784 (1998) (Flanders, J., dissenting).