¶ 1 The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s Order suppressing evidence in this case in which Appellee Thomas Bradley (“Bradley”) was prosecuted for driving under the influence. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731. We affirm.
¶2 Bradley was arrested on May 30, 1996 for driving under the influence of alcohol. He filed a pre-trial Motion to Suppress claiming that his arrest was illegal and that, therefore, all evidence against him obtained following that arrest should be suppressed. The trial court granted the Motion to Suppress. The Commonwealth requested that the trial court reconsider its suppression ruling, but the trial court denied that request. The Commonwealth then filed this timely appeal.1
¶ 3 Joseph Daly (“Daly”), the Superintendent of the police department of Lower Mer-ion Township, testified at Bradley’s suppression hearing that, on May 30, 1996, he was off-duty and was in Haverford Township driving to his home. Daly stated that, at 10:05 p.m., he observed in front of hiro an automobile, driven by Bradley, swerve into the opposite lane of traffic. Daly testified that he was concerned for other motorists on the road; therefore, he called the Haverford Township Police Department on his car radio. Daly said that he followed Bradley and continually updated the Haverford Township Police Department concerning Bradley’s location and direction of travel.
¶ 4 Daly testified that he then saw Bradley make two more exaggerated turns, drive on the wrong side of the highway, and nearly strike a telephone pole. Daly said that, when Bradley pulled into a church parking lot and stopped, Daly parked his car in front of Bradley’s. According to Daly, he then walked to Bradley’s vehicle, opened the door, turned off the engine, and took Bradley’s keys. Daly testified that, after Bradley asked Daly what the problem was, Daly told Bradley that he was an off-duty police officer and that Haverford Township police officers were coming to the scene. Daly then told Bradley to sit there and not to cause any trouble. Daly kept Bradley under observation while waiting for the Haverford Township police officers to arrive. When Haver-ford Township police officers, Cheryl Williams and Charles Moore, arrived, Daly gave Bradley’s keys to Officer Williams and told her of his observations.
¶ 5 Officer Williams testified at the suppression hearing that, when she approached Bradley’s car, she detected a strong odor of *353alcohol and noticed that Bradley’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy and that Bradley’s speech was slow and slurred. Officer Moore testified that he conducted field sobriety tests on Bradley, which tests Bradley failed. Officer Williams then placed Bradley under arrest.
¶ 6 Bradley testified that he had had four alcoholic drinks on the evening of May 30, 1996. He stated that, as he was driving that night, he noticed that a car following him appeared to have on its high beams. Bradley said that he pulled into a church parking lot, thinking that a friend was following him. Bradley stated that, after the car that had been following him stopped in front of him, the driver approached Bradley, told Bradley that he was an off-duty police officer, and grabbed Bradley’s keys. Bradley testified that he thought he was under arrest by a Haverford Township undercover police officer.
¶ 7 Daly’s written statement, prepared at the request of the Haverford Township Police Department, was consistent with the testimony that Daly gave at the suppression hearing. In that statement, Daly indicated that, “[f]rom my 26 years of police experience, it was ... my opinion that the operation of the vehicle was consistent with that of someone under the influence of drugs or alcohol.”
¶ 8 At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court determined that Daly had arrested Bradley illegally. On that basis, the trial court suppressed all evidence obtained after the arrest. The Commonwealth contends on appeal that, for the following reasons, the trial court erroneously granted Bradley’s Motion to Suppress: (1) Daly acted as a private citizen and, therefore, legally arrested Bradley; and (2) Daly acted legally, even if not acting as a private citizen, because the interaction between Daly and Bradley was nothing more than a “mere encounter.”
¶ 9 When reviewing an order granting a suppression motion, “we must consider only the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses and so much of the evidence of the prosecution as, read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted.” Commonwealth v. Francis, 700 A.2d 1326, 1328 (Pa.Super.1997). If the evidence of record supports the trial court’s findings, then an appellate court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn from them are erroneous. Id.
¶ 10 When a police officer acts under color of state law outside his jurisdiction, his actions are deemed unlawful pursuant to the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act.2 Com*354monwealth v. Price, 543 Pa. 403, 672 A.2d 280 (1996); Commonwealth v. Brandt, 456 Pa.Super. 717, 691 A.2d 934 (1997), appeal denied, 549 Pa. 695, 700 A.2d 437 (1997). In such circumstances, the exclusionary rule applies,3 and any evidence obtained as a result of the officer’s actions must be suppressed. Brandt, 691 A.2d at 939. The exclusionary rule applies even if the police officer acts in good faith or the police officer’s actions would have been lawful if performed within the proper jurisdictional limits. Id.
¶ 11 In its first argument, the Commonwealth does not dispute that Daly acted outside his proper jurisdiction. Nor does the Commonwealth dispute that, if Daly, acting under color of state law, arrested Bradley, then Daly acted without authority under the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act. Rather the Commonwealth contends that Daly, assuming that he arrested Bradley, acted legally because he acted, not under color of state law, but as a private citizen.
¶ 12 Our Supreme Court has determined that a law enforcement officer acts under color of state law if, “in light of all the circumstances, [the officer] must be regarded as having acted as an ‘instrument’ or agent of the state.” Price, 543 Pa. at 410, 672 A.2d at 283 (quoting Corley, 507 Pa. at 548, 491 A.2d at 832). In Price, an FBI agent had stopped the defendant after the defendant had failed to stop his vehicle at a stop sign and had swerved into oncoming traffic. 543 Pa. at 406, 672 A.2d at 281. The agent had used the police lights and siren on his unmarked vehicle to stop the defendant, identified himself to the defendant as an FBI agent, and showed the defendant his badge. Id., 672 A.2d at 281. In addition, after smelling the odor of alcohol emanating from the defendant, the agent told the defendant to remain seated in his vehicle. Id., 672 A.2d at 281. Local police officers then came to the scene and arrested the defendant on a charge of driving under the influence, a misdemeanor offense. Id., 672 A.2d at 281.
¶ 13 The Court in Price first noted that, pursuant to a federal statute, an FBI agent, if acting in a law enforcement capacity, is not authorized to make an arrest for a misdemeanor offense without a warrant. See id. at 407, 672 A.2d at 282 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3052). Thus, the Court stated that, because the agent had arrested4 the defendant for a misdemeanor offense without a warrant, the arrest could have been legal only if the agent acted as a private citizen. See Price, 543 Pa. at 407-08, 672 A.2d at 282. The Court then held that, because the agent had used the lights and siren on his car and showed his FBI badge, the agent had engaged in conduct which “could be fairly attributed to the state.” Id. at 411, 672 A.2d at 284. The Court therefore concluded that the arrest was illegal and all evidence obtained thereafter should have been suppressed. Id. at 413, 672 A.2d at 285.
¶ 14 Earlier, in Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 477 Pa. 93, 383 A.2d 838 (1978), our Supreme Court determined that an off-duty auxiliary police officer, outside his proper jurisdiction, acted “as a police officer,” not as a private citizen, when he found packages of marijuana in a car belonging to the defendant on the property of the defendant’s grandmother. Id. at 101, 383 A.2d at 842. Apparently, the officer had been looking for a friend of his on the property when he stumbled upon the car and found the packages inside. Id. at 96, 383 A.2d at 839. The officer then took one package to his police department and then to state police barracks where it was determined that the package contained marijuana. Id. at 96-97, 383 A.2d at 839-40.
*355¶ 15 The Court noted that the officer, if acting as a police officer, was “without authority” under the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act to search the defendant’s car. Id. at 101, 383 A.2d at 842. The Court then ruled that the officer “was acting as a police officer when he removed the package and turned it over to the police” both because the officer had testified that the packages looked suspicious to him based on information he had received at his police station concerning the manner in which marijuana typically is packaged, and also because the officer had taken the package to the police station to be opened. Id. at 100-01, 383 A.2d at 841-42. The Court thus determined that the evidence obtained by the officer should have been suppressed. Id. at 102, 383 A.2d at 842-43.
¶ 16 We have reviewed the record in this case and conclude that the evidence presented at Bradley’s suppression hearing supports the suppression court’s factual findings. Furthermore, based on the applicable law that we have recited, we hold that the suppression court correctly determined that Daly acted illegally with regard to Bradley’s arrest.
¶ 17 Daly stated that, based on his twenty-six years of experience as a police officer, he had concluded that Bradley was driving while intoxicated. Moreover, Daly’s actions after reaching that conclusion {e.g., maintaining radio contact with the Haverford Township Police Department, following Bradley, stopping in front of Bradley’s car, identifying himself as a police officer, taking Bradley’s keys, and ordering Bradley to remain in the car while waiting for additional police officers to arrive) are consistent with those of a police officer who has been trained to conduct traffic stops and deal with intoxicated drivers. Thus, we conclude that Daly “acted as an ‘instrument’ of the state,” not as a private citizen, with respect to Bradley’s arrest. See Price, 543 Pa. at 410-11, 672 A.2d at 283-84. The suppression court, therefore, properly suppressed evidence obtained after Bradley’s arrest.
¶ 18 In its second argument, the Commonwealth contends that, even if Daly acted under color of state law, his actions with respect to Bradley were legal because Bradley voluntarily stopped his car and, thereafter, Daly only briefly detained Bradley until the Haverford Township police officers arrived, obtained evidence of Bradley’s intoxication, and then arrested Bradley. In essence, the Commonwealth argues that Daly engaged in only a “mere encounter” with Bradley, which did not constitute a seizure of Bradley within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
¶ 19 We first note that contact between an individual and a police officer can be characterized as a mere encounter, a noncustodial or investigative detention, a custodial detention, or a formal arrest. See Commonwealth v. Peters, 434 Pa.Super. 268, 642 A.2d 1126, 1129 (1994), appeal denied, 538 Pa. 668, 649 A.2d 670 (1994). A mere encounter with a police officer does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, triggers no constitutional protections. Peters, 642 A.2d at 1129. Investigative and custodial detentions, and formal arrests, however, are seizures implicating constitutional rights. Id.
¶ 20 In this case, we conclude that, even if Daly did not “arrest” Bradley as the suppression court determined, the evidence supports a conclusion that Daly at least engaged in an investigative detention of Bradley. An investigative detention occurs when a police officer temporarily detains a person by means of physical force or a show of authority for investigative purposes. Id.
¶21 Our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 552 Pa. 484, -, 715 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1998), recently set forth the test to distinguish between an investigative detention and a mere encounter as follows: “[T]he pivotal inquiry is whether, considering all the facts and circumstances [surrounding an interaction between a police officer and an individual], a reasonable [individual] would have thought he was being restrained” by the police officer. Id.5 If so, then an investiga*356tive detention has occurred. See id. If not, then a mere encounter has occurred. Id.
¶ 22 “The line between a mere encounter and an investigative detention cannot be precisely defined because of the myriad of daily situations in which policemen and citizens confront each other on the street.” Id. at -, 715 A.2d at 1120-21 (quotations omitted). In Mendenhall, for example, a police officer left his proper jurisdiction to render aid and assistance at the scene of a vehicle accident. Id. at -, 715 A.2d at 1118. Once there, the officer told the defendant, who apparently had been involved in the accident with his truck, to “stick around” until state police officers arrived. Id. at -, 715 A.2d at 1118-19. While waiting for the state police officers, the defendant'entered his truck and attempted to place several keys into the ignition. Id. at -, 715 A.2d at 1119. The officer “did not attempt to restrain the defendant from trying to start his vehicle or otherwise restrict the defendant’s movements in any other way.” Id. at -, 715 A.2d at 1119.
¶ 23 The Supreme Court determined that the police officer’s actions constituted only a mere encounter with the defendant and not an investigative detention for the following reasons: “[Njothing in the record, aside from [the][o]fficer ... telling the defendant to ‘stick around,’ evidenced an exercise of force or demonstration of authority that would [have] indicatefd] to a reasonable person that [he or she was] not free to leave. Rather, the fact that the defendant freely moved in and out of his vehicle strongly suggests that a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would [have felt] free to leave.” Id. at - - -, 715 A.2d at 1120-21.6
¶ 24 Applying the test specified in Men-denhall to this case, we conclude that a reasonable person in Bradley’s circumstances would have felt restrained by Daly’s actions. Daly, by parking his car in front of Bradley’s, telling Bradley he was an off-duty police officer, taking Bradley’s keys, and telling Bradley to “sit there” and not cause any trouble, demonstrated authority such that a reasonable person would have thought that he or she was not free to leave the scene. See id. at -, 715 A.2d at 1120.
¶ 25 We conclude, therefore, that at least an investigative detention occurred in this ease. Accordingly, Bradley was protected from an illegal detention by the Fourth Amendment. Because Daly acted under col- or of state law and without authority under the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act, he could not have detained Bradley legally. Thus, any evidence obtained after the illegal detention properly was suppressed by the trial court.
¶ 26 , Order affirmed.
¶ 27 POPOVICH and JOYCE, JJ. file Dissenting Opinions.
¶ 28 ORIE MELVIN, J. joins Judge POPOVICH’s Dissenting Opinion.
. In an appeal of a suppression order, the Commonwealth is required to certify in its notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution. Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). In this case, the Commonwealth did not make that certification in its original Notice of Appeal filed on December 4, 1996. However, the Commonwealth filed an Amended Notice of Appeal, which contained the required certification.
. The Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act limits the authority of a police officer to make arrests and perform police functions outside his or her primary jurisdiction unless certain enumerated exceptions occur:
(1) Where the officer is acting pursuant to an order issued by a court of record or an order issued by a district magistrate whose magisterial district is located within the judicial district wherein the officer’s primary jurisdiction is situated, or where an officer is otherwise acting pursuant to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, except that the service of an arrest or search warrant shall require the consent of the chief law enforcement officer, or a person authorized by him to give consent, of the organized law enforcement agency which regularly provides primary police services in the municipality wherein the warrant is to be served.
(2) Where the officer is in hot pursuit of any person for any offense which was committed, or which he has probable cause to believe was committed, within his primary jurisdiction and for which offense the officer continues in fresh pursuit of the person after the commission of the offense.
(3) Where the officer has been requested to aid or assist any local, State or Federal law enforcement officer or park police officer or otherwise has probable cause to believe that the other officer is in need of aid or assistance.
(4) Where the officer has obtained the prior consent of the chief law enforcement officer, or a person authorized by him to give consent, of the organized law enforcement agency which provides primary police services to a political subdivision which is beyond that officer’s primary jurisdiction to enter the other jurisdiction for the purpose of conducting official duties which arise from official matters within his primary jurisdiction.
(5) Where the officer is on official business and views an offense, or has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort to identify himself as a police officer and which offense is a felony, misdemeanor, breach of the peace or other act which presents an immediate clear and present danger to persons or property. *354(6) Where the officer views an offense which is a felony, or has probable cause to believe that an offense which is a felony has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort to identify himself as a police officer.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953 (West 1982 and West Supp.1998). The Commonwealth agrees that none of the exceptions listed in Section 8953 apply in this case.
. The exclusionary rule derives from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Brandt, 691 A.2d at 939; see also Commonwealth v. Corley, 507 Pa. 540, 491 A.2d 829 (1985).
. The Court apparently assumed that the agent, and not the local police, actually “arrested” the defendant.
. See Mendenhall, 552 Pa. at -, 715 A.2d at 1120 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) ("[A] person has been ‘seized’ within the *356meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”)).
. The Court further reasoned that, because a driver has an affirmative duty under the Motor Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3746, to remain at the scene of an accident, the officer’s direction to the defendant to remain until the police arrived did not "in and of itself, turn the encounter into an investigative detention.” Mendenhall, 552 Pa. at - - -, 715 A.2d at 1120-21.