dissenting:
¶ 1 I respectfully disagree with the majority regarding suppressing the evidence obtained that Appellee, Thomas Bradley, was driving under the influence. The majority has determined that Superintendent Joseph Daly acted as an instrument of the state outside the scope of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953 when encountering Appellee, Thomas Bradley. I cannot agree.
¶2 The majority correctly set forth the standard of review and the requirements under the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act.10 However, the majority appeal’s to overlook the key principles governing statutory interpretation. In relevant part, the statute provides:
(a) General rule — Any duly employed municipal police officer who is within this Commonwealth, but beyond the territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction, shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this Commonwealth or otherwise perform the functions of that office as if enforcing those laws or performing those *362functions within the territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction in the following cases:...
(5) Where the officer is on official business and views an offense, or has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort to identify himself as a police officer and which offense is a felony, misdemeanor, breach of the peace or other act which presents an immediate clear and present danger to persons or property.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953(a)(5).
¶ 3 Our object is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b); Commonwealth v. Burnsworth, 543 Pa. 18, 24, 669 A.2d 883, 886 (1995). In attempting to ascertain the meaning of a statute, we must consider the intent of the legislature and examine the practical consequences of a particular interpretation. Commonwealth v. Davis, 421 Pa.Super. 454, 618 A.2d 426, 428 (1992), appeal denied, 535 Pa. 630, 631 A.2d 1004 (1993). We presume the legislature did not intend a result that is absurd and unreasonable. Id. In construing legislative intent, this Court may look to the occasion and necessity of a statute, the circumstances in which it was intended, the mischief to be remedied, the object to be attained by the law, former law on the same subject and the consequences of a particular interpretation. Id.
¶4 It is undisputed that based on the conduct viewed, Appellee could have been stopped by a party with proper jurisdiction, i.e., either a private citizen or an on-duty police officer. The majority asserts, however, that an off-duty police officer acting outside his jurisdiction has no authority to take action either as a private citizen or as a police officer. I simply cannot agree that such a result was intended by the legislature when enacting this provision. See Commonwealth v. Gommer, 445 Pa.Super. 571, 665 A.2d 1269 (1995)(finding that under similar circumstances, State Police Officer could conduct official police business, despite being off-duty, where safeguards that attach to a driver being pulled over by on-duty police officer were present). Clearly, a finding to the contrary would be absurd and unreasonable.
¶5 Further, the plain meaning of the statute governs. The statute provides that an officer who has probable cause to believe that a certain delineated offense has been committed, may enforce the laws of the Commonwealth. The statute does not indicate whether the officer must be on-duty at the time. We cannot find that such a requirement is mandated. Under these circumstances, I would find the trial court erred and reverse. Because the majority concluded otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
. As an initial matter, I must note my agreement with the dissenting opinion of my distinguished colleague, Judge Popovich. I agree with his determination that Superintendent Daly acted as a private citizen in all respects throughout his encounter with Appellee. Even if Superintendent Daly was not acting as a private citizen, however, I write separately to voice my concerns over the majority's interpretation of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act.