dissenting.
Because the Majority ignores the fact that credibility is for the trial court to determine, I respectfully dissent.
Generally, an appeal nunc pro tunc is granted only where the appellant establishes extraordinary circumstances involving fraud or a breakdown in the court’s operations. Cook v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 543 Pa. 381, 671 A.2d 1130 (1996). *374However, this rule has been liberalized to include the non-negligent conduct of an appellant’s attorney as possible grounds for permitting an appeal nunc pro tunc. Id.; see also Bass v. Commonwealth, 485 Pa. 256, 401 A.2d 1133 (1979); Tony Grande, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Rodriguez), 71 Pa.Cmwlth. 566, 455 A.2d 299 (Pa.Cmwlth.1983).
Here, Lajevic’s attorney stated that he filed the appeal late because he had become unexpectedly ill and was hospitalized and, thereafter, was confined to his home. Crucially, the trial court accepted this explanation as credible. However, the Majority, exceeding this court’s limited scope of review, disregards this credibility determination merely because the record does not contain any independent evidence to substantiate Lajevic’s attorney’s explanation. Specifically, the Majority points out that Lajevic’s attorney “failed to state the exact time frame of said illness and did not submit any medical records that would have verified it.” (Majority op. at 372.) However, Lajevic’s attorney did state that he was hospitalized with pneumonia in March and that he was incapacitated for a month.1 (Hearing Transcript 9/20/96 at 7.) In addition, there is no requirement that an appellant’s counsel produce medical records to verify an illness. In fact, there is no indication that medical records were produced in Bass.2 Furthermore, it is conceivable that Lajevic’s attorney did not see the need to secure such documentation as he relied on DOT’S consent to the delayed filing.3
Lajevic’s attorney’s illness is certainly the type of non-negligent conduct which our supreme court has recognized as a grounds for permitting an appeal nunc pro tunc. Because Lajevic’s attorney provided a credible explanation to establish that the late filing was due to his non-negligent conduct, I do not believe that this court may conclude that the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law in allowing the appeal nunc pro tunc. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s order.4
SMITH and KELLEY, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.
. This time period largely encompasses the period during which the appeal should have been filed. Thus, the Majority's statement that Lajevic’s attorney was ill during the "month preceding” the final filing date, (Majority op. at 372), is misleading.
. Bass states that the attorney’s secretary testified that she was ill and that, during her illness, she was treated by a physician. However, there is nothing to indicate that the secretary produced medical records to verify the illness. We recognize that this does not mean that courts necessarily will accept an explanation of an illness without medical documentation; anyone who fails to document one’s illness does so at one’s own risk.
. Although the Majority emphasizes that DOT denied consenting to the extended period for filing the appeal, the trial court believed Lajevic’s attorney.
. I note that DOT does not challenge the trial court’s decision on the merits.