dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I believe that it was error for the majority to characterize an officer performing his lawful duties as a trespasser for tort liability purposes. Police officers routinely enter upon private property while performing their official duties of protecting the public. Thus, they are entitled to a higher degree of care than that owed to an ordinary trespasser.
I believe that this Court should adopt section 345 of the Second Restatement of Torts which protects police officers in the performance of their duties without subjecting landowners to an unreasonable standard of care. Section 345 provides:
§ 345 PERSONS ENTERING IN THE EXERCISE OF PRIVILEGE
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the liability of a possessor of land to one who enters the land only in the exercise of a privilege, for either a public or a private purpose, and irrespective of the possessor’s consent, is the same as the liability to a licensee.
(2) The liability of a possessor of land to a public officer or employee who enters the land in the performance of his public duty, and suffers harm because of a condition of a part of the land held open to the public, is the same as the liability to an invitee.
The effect of the rule is “to subject the possessor of land to a liability toward such privileged persons which is identical with that to which he is subject under the rules stated in §§ 341 and 342 to licensees.” Id., Comment (b). Firemen and policemen entering under authority of law, without any elements of business dealing, are commonly held to stand on the same footing as licensees. Id., Comment (C).1
*176The adoption of section 345 would protect officers while providing prudent limits to a landowner’s duty. First, the rule stated in subsection (1)2 applies only where there is entry pursuant to a privilege to enter.3 Second, the subsection does not impose an unreasonable duty of care on landowners, requiring them only to warn the visitor of dangerous conditions on the land of which the landowner is aware or should be aware and which the visitor may be expected not to discover or appreciate. “One explanation for this lies in the fact that firemen and policemen are likely to enter at unforeseeable times, upon unusual parts of the premises, and under circumstances of emergency, where care and preparation for their visit cannot reasonably be expected.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 345, Comment (c). Finally, under Comment (d), in order for the possessor to be liable for failure to warn a person who enters under a privilege arising without the landowner’s consent, the possessor must know or have reason to anticipate that the visitor is upon the land, or will enter it in the exercise of his privilege, and that he will be endangered by a condition on the land. Id., Comment (d). Thus, section 345 provides heightened protections for law enforcement officers and firemen without subjecting landowners to liability for unforeseeable events.
Here, it is not disputed that the officer was a uniformed officer employed by the Haverford Township Police Department when he crossed the lot in question at 705 Haverford Road in order to secure the rear of the property located at 711 Haverford Road. The officer was acting as part of a team of uniformed and undercover officers serving a search warrant for drugs on the occupants of 711 Haverford Road. It is also *177undisputed that the officer was injured while crossing the lot in question after tripping over old chicken wire fencing obscured by weeds and brush, causing him to fall knees first onto an exposed concrete block. Pursuant to section 345, Officer Rossino should be granted licensee status because he was performing his lawful duties at the time of the injury.4 The issue of whether the appellees breached their duty to the officer is a fact question that should have been resolved by the jury. See Carrender v. Fitterer, 503 Pa. 178, 469 A.2d 120 (1983) (whether danger was known or obvious to possessor of land rendering possessor liable to invitee is a fact question for the jury unless reasonable minds could not differ.) Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of appellees.
NEWMAN, J., joins this dissenting opinion.. A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to a licensee by a condition on the land if (1) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to the licensee and should expect that the licensee will not discover or realize the danger; and (2) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensee of the condition and the risk involved; and (3) the licensee *176did not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342.
. Here, the liability of the landowner would be evaluated under section 345(1) because the officer was not injured on land open to the public, and thus, subsection (2), which requires a higher duty of care in instances when the land is open to the public, is not applicable.
. The Comments to the rule provide that one may be privileged to enter land in the possession of another without the possessor’s consent for the purpose of advancing or protecting his own interests or those of the public. Restatement (Second)of Torts § 345, Comment (a).
. The trial court in the instant matter reasoned that a defendant property owner would owe the plaintiff officer or fireman a heightened duty only if the plaintiff entered the property in response to the defendant's call for assistance. However, section 345 contains no requirement that a police officer must be entering the property subject to the police activity on that property in order to be granted licensee status. Rather, section 345 requires only that the officer be acting “in the exercise of a privilege, for either a public or private purpose, and irrespective of the possessor's consent.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 345(1).