(concurring). I am in accord with the result and the reasoning in the majority opinion, but because of the striking similarity in the legal and factual equations involved, I feel compelled to cite Temple v. Storch Trucking Co., 3 N. J. 42 (1949), not mentioned in the majority opinion, and to observe the particular applicability of the dissenting opinion.
In that case compensation was denied, although both the Bureau and the County Court came to the. conclusion that the strain to which the decedent was subjected on the morning in question was unusual and not that ordinarily exerted by a truck driver in the usual course of his employment.
The dissenting opinion stressed the point thal “this was a determination of fact which should not be lightly disturbed upon appeal unless there was no evidence to justify or warrant the finding so made.”
It set forth the unexpected hazards there encountered and the unizsual exertion by the decedent which warranted an award to him.
*616I voted to reverse and grant compensation there for the same reasons which apparently presently impel the majority of the court to decide likewise in the pending case.
Heher, Wachenfeld, Jacobs and Brennan, JJ., concurring in result.
For reversal — -Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Heher, Oliphant, Wachenfeld, Burling, Jacobs and Brennan — 7.
For affirmance — None.