dissenting.
The majority holds that where a defendant has been convicted of attempted murder and aggravated assault based upon a single act of shooting his victim, separate sentences may be imposed for each crime because aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder. Because I am convinced that aggravated assault is, in fact, a lesser included offense of attempted murder, I would hold that such crimes must merge for purposes of sentencing when they are based upon a single criminal act. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
*227The test for merger of offenses which is currently utilized in this Commonwealth was established by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Williams, 521 Pa. 556, 559 A.2d 25 (1989) and Commonwealth v. Weakland, 521 Pa. 353, 555 A.2d 1228 (1989). This test has been summarized by the Superior Court in the following manner:
Crimes will not merge for sentencing purposes unless one of the crimes is a lesser included offense of the other. Commonwealth v. Williams, 521 Pa. 556, 559 A.2d 25 (1989). To determine whether one offense is a lesser included offense of the other, we must determine whether the elements of violation A, the lesser, are included in violation B, the greater. Commonwealth v. Pemberth, 339 Pa.Super. 428, 489 A.2d 235 (1985). Crimes will merge where a defendant commits one act of criminal violence and that act is the only basis upon which he may be convicted of the other crime. Commonwealth v. Weakland, 521 Pa. 353, 555 A.2d 1228 (1989). If he commits multiple criminal acts beyond that necessary to establish the bare elements of the additional crime, then the crimes will not merge. Id.
Commonwealth v. Blassingale, 391 Pa.Super. 395, 402-403, 571 A.2d 426, 430 (1990). See also: Commonwealth v. Servich, 412 Pa.Super. 120, 134, 602 A.2d 1338, 1345 (1992); Commonwealth v. Yates, 386 Pa.Super. 282, 287-288, 562 A.2d 908, 911 (1989).
In the instant case, it is undisputed that appellant’s convictions for both attempted murder and aggravated assault were based upon a single act of criminal violence, to wit, his shooting Norma De Booth in the back of the neck. The majority holds, nevertheless, that because aggravated assault and attempted murder require proof of different intents, aggravated assault cannot be a lesser included offense of attempted murder and the two crimes cannot merge for purposes of sentencing.1 I am unable to agree with this analysis.
*228Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1), “[a] person is guilty of aggravated assault if he attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” A person is guilty of attempted murder, if, with a specific intent to kill another, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of an intentional killing. See: 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 310 Pa.Super. 39, 50-52, 456 A.2d 171, 177-178 (1983). After careful study of the elements of these offenses, I am convinced that aggravated assault is a crime which is invariably included in the. crime of attempted murder. Thus, when a defendant commits the crime of attempted murder he will, without further proof, commit also the crime of aggravated assault.
If the intent necessary to establish attempted murder is a specific intent to kill and the intent necessary for an aggravated assault is a separate intent to cause serious bodily injury, as the majority suggests, then the two crimes, in fact, are mutually exclusive. How, then, could appellant be convicted of both offenses? According to the majority’s rationale, appellant either intended to kill his victim or to *229inflict serious bodily injury upon her. I cannot accept the logic of the majority’s contention. It is clear to me, rather, that if one intends to kill another person, he also intends, of necessity, to inflict serious bodily injury upon that person.2 If my view is correct, then the intent to cause serious bodily injury would necessarily be included in and be subsumed by the specific intent to kill which is an essential element of the crime of attempted murder. The intent to cause serious bodily injury, I believe, is a necessary component of a specific intent to kill, and when a specific intent to kill has been proven, it is unnecessary to establish further that the actor intended to inflict serious bodily injury.
Unlike attempted murder, aggravated assault does not in all cases require proof of a specific intent to cause the proscribed harm. Instead, one may be convicted of aggravated assault as a result of a reckless infliction of serious bodily injury upon another. This leads to the second problem which I have with the majority’s analysis. If taken to its logical conclusion, the majority’s holding will, in effect, preclude the merger of lesser crimes of general intent into more serious specific intent crimes in all instances in which the crimes are based upon the same physical act. For example, if the element of specific intent to kill sets apart the crime of attempted murder from aggravated assault and precludes the two from merging, does the same analysis apply to the crimes of first degree murder and aggravated assault? It appears to me that under the majority’s holding, aggravated assault will not be a lesser included offense of first degree murder because of the differing intent requirements for the two offenses. Thus, if the majority’s holding is applied logically, a defendant can be sentenced separately for both aggravated assault and first degree murder every time a single physical act results in the intentional killing of another. Such a result, however, *230would be inconsistent with established law in this Commonwealth, as even the majority recognizes.
The law in this Commonwealth is clear that aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of murder. In Commonwealth v. Musselman, 483 Pa. 245, 247 n. 1, 396 A.2d 625, 625-626 n. 1 (1979), the Supreme Court observed that the crimes of aggravated assault and recklessly endangering another person are lesser included offenses of murder because “[t]he elements required to be proved on both charges are all necessary, though not sufficient, to establish the elements of murder.” The Supreme Court further observed in Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 498 Pa. 112, 119, 445 A.2d 92, 96 (1981), that “[i]t is clear that assault is a constituent element of all the grades of homicide and does not require the proof of a fact that the various grades of homicide do not.” See also: Commonwealth ex rel Moszczynski v. Ashe, 343 Pa. 102, 105, 21 A.2d 920, 921 (1941) (“Two crimes may be successive steps in one crime and therefore merge, as, e.g., ... assault and battery is merged into murder----”). Because aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of murder, therefore, it would seem to follow logically that aggravated assault is also a lesser included offense of attempted murder. Cf. Commonwealth v. Griffin, supra, 310 Pa.Super. at 53, 456 A.2d at 178 (“Recklessly endangering another is a lesser included offense of the crime of murder, Commonwealth v. Musselman, 483 Pa. 245, 396 A.2d 625 (1979), and it follows logically that it is also a lesser included offense of attempted murder.”).
Prior decisions which have considered the issue now before this Court have held that where convictions for aggravated assault and attempted murder are based upon the same criminal conduct the two offenses must merge for purposes of sentencing.3 Thus, in Commonwealth v. Shur*231galla, 371 Pa.Super. 244, 537 A.2d 1390 (1988), the Superior Court reasoned as follows:
Where the essential elements of one offense are also the essential elements of another offense, the lesser offense merges into the greater one. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 319 Pa.Superior Ct. 170, 465 A.2d 1284 (1983). In the instant case the Commonwealth and the trial court agree with appellant’s contention that the aggravated assault offense merges with the one for attempted murder. This Court also agrees that the offense merged as the one act of shooting the victim constituted the essential elements of both offenses. We hold that the offenses are merged in this case.
Id., 371 Pa.Super. at 247, 537 A.2d at 1391. See also: Commonwealth v. Ford, 315 Pa.Super. 281, 292-293, 461 A.2d 1281,1286-1287 (1983) (where same facts which established crime of attempted murder were also used to establish aggravated assault and recklessly endangering another person, the latter two crimes will merge with attempted murder for purposes of sentencing); Commonwealth v. Miranda, 296 Pa.Super. 441, 461-462, 442 A.2d 1133, 1143-1144 (1982) (conviction for aggravated assault merges with conviction for attempted murder where no additional facts are required to establish aggravated assault). Compare: Commonwealth v. Pifer, 284 Pa.Super. 170, 185, 425 A.2d 757, 764-765 (1981) (aggravated assault did not merge with attempted murder where each offense was based upon separate criminal acts of the defendant).
Because aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of attempted murder and because appellant’s convictions for these offenses were based upon a single criminal act, I *232would hold that appellant’s convictions merged for purposes of sentencing. By permitting appellant to be sentenced for both attempted murder and aggravated assault, the majority, under the circumstances of this case, has failed to follow the explicit holding of the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Weakland, supra, wherein the Court declared:
[W]e hold that if a person commits one act of criminal violence, and that act is the only basis upon which he may be convicted of another crime, the act will merge into the other crime. If, however, the actor commits multiple criminal acts beyond that which is necessary to establish the bare elements of the additional crime, then the actor will be guilty of multiple crimes which do not merge for sentencing purposes.
Id., 521 Pa. at 364, 555 A.2d at 1233 (emphasis added).
Under the facts of the instant case, the imposition of separate sentences for attempted murder and aggravated assault will also violate the constitutional guarantee against being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. “Among the protections embodied in the double jeopardy clauses of the Constitutions of the United States and this Commonwealth is the prohibition against ‘multiple punishment for the same offense at one trial.’ ” Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345, 347, 437 A.2d 385, 386 (1981), quoting Commonwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 169, 286 A.2d 638, 641 (1971). “Where consecutive sentences are imposed at a single trial, double jeopardy prevents the court from exceeding its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the ‘same offense.’ ” Commonwealth v. Tarver, 493 Pa. 320, 325, 426 A.2d 569, 572 (1981). See: Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977).
The means of determining whether there exists a single offense for purposes of the prohibition against multiple punishment is well settled:
“ ‘The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine *233whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ ”
Commonwealth v. Tarver, 493 Pa. at 325, 426 A.2d at 572, quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Under this test, if proof of one crime necessarily proves another, punishment for both crimes is forbidden. See Commonwealth v. Tarver, supra; Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1975).
Commonwealth v. Houtz, supra, 496 Pa. at 348, 437 A.2d at 386-387 (footnote omitted).
When this test is applied to the facts of the instant case, it becomes apparent immediately that appellant’s single act constituted both aggravated assault and attempted murder. Both offenses were established by precisely the same act. That act was the shooting of the victim in the back of the neck. Once the Commonwealth established appellant’s guilt of attempted murder, no other proof was necessary to convict him also of aggravated assault.
‘As is invariably true of a greater and lesser included offense, the lesser offense ... requires no proof beyond that which is required for conviction of the greater---The greater offense is therefore by definition the “same” for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it.’
Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, supra, 498 Pa. at 119, 445 A.2d at 96, quoting Brown v. Ohio, supra, 432 U.S. at 168, 97 S.Ct. at 2226-2227, 53 L.Ed.2d at 195-196.4
The final reason the majority has given in support of its holding that aggravated assault does not merge with at*234tempted murder is that the legislature has attached the greater penalty to aggravated assault, making it a felony of the first degree, while grading attempted murder as a felony of the second degree. Frankly, I am unpersuaded by this argument. In Commonwealth v. Nelson, 452 Pa. 275, 305 A.2d 369 (1973), Justice (now Chief Justice) Nix, writing in a concurring and dissenting opinion, observed that “[t]he test of which crime merges with another is not dependent upon a comparison of their respective maximum penalties but whether the lesser crime is that which is a necessary ingredient of the greater.” Id., 452 Pa. at 281, 305 A.2d at 372 (footnote omitted). I agree. Moreover, I find this reasoning to be similarly applicable under the test for merger established by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Williams and Commonwealth v. Weakland. That test requires a court to focus upon the elements of the crimes to determine whether one is a lesser included offense of the other and to determine further whether the convictions arose from the same factual predicate. The Williams-Weakland merger analysis simply does not focus upon which offense has been given the greater penalty by the legislature. Therefore, I am of the opinion that it is fallacious to reason that aggravated assault cannot merge into attempted murder merely because the legislature has attached a greater penalty to the crime of aggravated assault.
Under the facts of the instant case, appellant has been sentenced twice for the same offense. Because in my judgment such a result is forbidden by both the doctrine of merger and the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, I respectfully, but vigorously, dissent. I would reverse and remand for resentencing.5
McEWEN, DEL SOLE and BECK, JJ. join in this Dissenting Opinion.. Specifically, the majority reasons as follows:
*228[A]n actual killing includes the actual infliction of serious bodily injury. However, when dealing with the attempt to commit murder or the attempt to commit an aggravated assault, each crime is a "specific intent" crime because the result specifically intended is either a completed murder or a completed aggravated assault. Therefore, when considering the separate mental states needed to support a conviction for these two inchoate crimes, it becomes evident that the "specific intent" elements of attempted aggravated assault and attempted murder are different — a specific intent to kill is not a specific intent to commit serious bodily injury. To conclude otherwise vitiates the concept of "a specific intent." Thus, under the current merger test set forth in Leon Williams, attempted aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder because both crimes require a different specific intent to bring about a different specific result. An intent to inflict serious bodily injury is separate and distinct from an intent to kill and, therefore, cannot be wholly subsumed within the intent to kill element of attempted murder. Given the distinct mental state elements of these two crimes, aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder and merger of these two crimes is not appropriate.
Majority Opinion at p. 224.
. Serious bodily injury is defined in the Crimes Code as “[bfodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301 (emphasis added).
. The decision of a panel of the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Fuller, 396 Pa.Super. 605, 579 A.2d 879 (1990) is not precedent for the majority’s holding that aggravated assault and attempted murder cannot merge. The issue before the Court in Fuller was whether the criminal information had been properly amended and not the legality *231of the sentence imposed. Therefore, the discussion of merger was unnecessary to the decision in Fuller, and, hence, was dictum. Moreover, as the majority of this Court correctly ascertains, the Fuller Court was incorrect when it concluded that the word “attempt”, as used in the aggravated assault statute, did not have the same meaning as in defining the inchoate crime of attempt. Because such reasoning was the Fuller Court’s basis for concluding that aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense of attempted murder, I must conclude that such dictum was erroneous and should be overruled.
. Even where two crimes constitute the same offense under the Blockburger test, however, separate sentences for each offense would be permissible if there were a clear legislative intent that separate punishments be imposed. See: Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983); Commonwealth v. Bostic, 500 Pa. 345, 456 A.2d 1320 (1983). I can discern no clear legislative intent to impose separate sentences for attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions when they are based upon a single act by the defendant.
. I agree with the majority that appellant is not entitled to a new trial.