concurring:
As I agree that the issue on which the majority reverses is controlled by this Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Wilson, supra, and Commonwealth v. Aultman, supra, I concur in the result reached by the majority. But I do so under protest and with strong reservations about the absurdity of such a result.
As set out by the majority, In the Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, supra, the supreme court declined to find a common law privilege for communications between PAAR personnel and persons seeking PAAR’s assistance. *22The court recognized the important interests involved—society’s interest in promoting such communications and its concurrent interest in the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice system. The court then tipped the balance in favor of the rights of the accused thereby creating only a qualified privilege which allowed that statements by the complainant that bear on the facts of the alleged offense, which are contained in the rape crisis counselor’s file, are subject to disclosure to the defendant. The remainder of the file was to remain confidential. Implicit in this decision was a recognition that because only a qualified privilege of confidentiality was recognized, it was subject to being balanced against a defendant’s confrontation rights. However, also implicit in this decision, although not specifically recognized, was that the privilege itself effectively is destroyed by any in camera review by the trial court in making its determination of whether such statements exist. As noted by Justice Larsen, in dissent, in PAAR:
A breach of this right of privacy occurs when the information is transmitted to another, whether or not that person (recipient) promises not to further transmit the information to others. It is knowledge of private and personal matters by another that is offensive—not that the knowledge may or may not continue on a course of travel to yet another eager ear.’ In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 490 Pa. 143, 415 A.2d 73, 79 (1980) (from dissenting opinion of Justice Rolf Larsen). This breach is no less severe because an inspection of the confidential communication has been made in camera. Under the procedure required by the majority, the confidential disclosures would be made available to the trial court, and at that moment, the confidence is broken, the trust in the relationship is shattered. And, the more sensitive the nature of the communication, the greater the need for protection.
In re PAAR, supra, 494 Pa. at 60-61, 428 A.2d at 149 (emphasis added).
*23It was in response to the PAAR holding, that the legislature that same year established an absolute privilege concerning confidential communications between a rape victim and a sexual assault counselor by enacting 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1:
§ 5945.1 Confidential communications to sexual assault counselors
(a) Definition.—As used in this section the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:
“Rape crisis center.” Any office, institution or center offering assistance to victims of sexual assault and their families through crisis intervention, medical and legal accompaniment and follow-up counselling. “Sexual assault counselor.” A person who is engaged in any office, institution or center defined as a rape crisis center under this section, who has undergone 40 hours of training and is under the control of a direct services supervisor of a rape crisis center, whose primary purpose is the rendering of advice, counseling or assistance to victims of sexual assault.
“Victim.” A person who consults a sexual assault counselor for the purpose of securing advice, counseling or assistance concerning a mental, physical or emotional condition caused by a sexual assault.
“Confidential communications.” Information transmitted between a victim of sexual assault and a sexual assault counselor in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the victim is aware, does not disclose the information to a third person other than those who are present to further the interests of the victim in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or an accomplishment of the purposes for which the sexual assault counselor is consulted. The term includes all information received by the sexual assault counselor in the course of that relationship.
*24(b) Privilege.—A sexual assault counselor has a privilege not to be examined as a witness in any civil or criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim to the counselor or as to any advice, report or working paper given or made in the course of the consultation.
The purpose of the privilege enunciated in § 5945.1 is to protect the rape victim’s privacy interests, promote the societal interest in rehabilitating victims, encourage the reporting of the crime of rape, and monitor the institutions with which rape victims must deal. See New Privilege for Communications made to a Rape Crisis Center Counselor, 55 Temple L.Q. 1124 (1982).
Now some nine years later, this court has limited this legislatively created privilege by deciding, as we do today, that § 5945.1(b) only grants a sexual assault counselor a privilege not to be called to testify in a court proceeding without the consent of the victim, and that this privilege does not extend to the file, working papers or records specifically generated as a result of the confidential relationship between counselor and victim. The incongruity of this interpretation was reflected upon by the trial court herein when it read the plain meaning of § 5945.1 to indicate that “it makes little sense that a statute designed to grant a privilege of confidentiality for any communication between a rape victim and a counselor would not further protect the records or reports made by that counselor in the course of his or her counselling efforts.” Trial court opinion, 7/10/89 at 16. The issue as decided by this court effectively allows a defendant to obtain through the back door what is barred by the front. To hold that § 5945.1 is only testimonial in nature, we have usurped the purpose and function of the statute. The irony of this interpretation, is that as a practical matter, and strategically, it may be far more beneficial to a defendant to make use of cold statements, reports, and written impressions of the victim without being required to receive the testimony of a live witness-counselor whose version and interpretation of these *25statements, reports and impressions would be skewed in favor of the victim. In point, why would you want the counselor, if you can have the records.
Our majority holding today, like those that came before it, renders the relationship between the rape victim and the counselor “ineffective either because a person is deterred from entering into it or because the person is frightened into non-disclosure during its course.” In Re PAAR, supra, 494 Pa. at 36-37, 428 A.2d at 136-37 (Larsen, J. dissenting). Rape crisis counseling often acts as the trauma center for rape victims where counselors must react quickly to treat the physical and emotional injuries of rape, so that long term treatment may take place. The compelling public interest in allowing the rape crisis counseling to occur is not to build a case for the prosecution, but rather to deal with the trauma of violent assault and begin the healing process. In fact, this treatment is quite often anything but a search for the truth. Of necessity, the nature of the counselling will be at times torturous, self accusatory and even self destructive—such is the nature of the healing process. In enacting an absolute privilege of confidentiality to shield this healing process the legislature recognized that the interest being served was the rehabilitation of the victim and not the vindication of the interests of society which is the aim of prosecution.1 Put in this context, these are not competing interests, but rather mutually exclusive ones. To say that they can be balanced is to deny they are mutually exclusive.
The current state of the law is reflective of the inadequate legal response to a rape victim’s needs and interests. It seems ironic at this moment in time, some nine years after PAAR was decided, to be harkening back to Justice Larsen’s dissent, joined in by Justice Flaherty, which advocated the need for a broad interpretation of the privilege *26between counselor and victim. The rationale presented in that dissent could not be elaborated more eloquently on herein, and therefore, I incorporate it by reference. In re Paar, supra, 494 Pa. at 34, 428 A.2d at 135 (Larsen, J. dissenting).
In sum, the dissent noted that in the not too distant past, rape was treated very differently than other crimes in society in that focus was placed not just on the defendant but on the victim, as well. Rape victims were very often stigmatized in our society. In order to circumvent a false accusation of rape, the law of this Commonwealth at one time referred to the rape complainant as the “prosecutrix”, required corroborating evidence, and special jury instructions concerning the victim’s emotional vulnerability. Id. Moreover, the laws of this state had required prompt reporting of a rape, reasonable resistance by the victim, and even though it was not permissible to scrutinize a rape victim’s prior sexual history, a learned defense counsel was always permitted to raise a question of the victim’s reputation in the mind of the jury. Id. Such laws were premised on the myth surrounding rape that the victim got what she wanted. Accordingly, often times the legal structure degraded the victim all over again, in the courtroom, in responding to the initial assault. After having evolved socially and legislatively to the point of codifying an absolute privilege concerning confidential communications between a rape victim and a sexual assault counselor, to now take a step back in time is not only offensive, but should be repugnant to an enlightened society.
I see no sufficient reason, and no decision of this court has provided a policy basis, for distinguishing between the records of a rape crisis counselor and those of a psychiatrist or psychologist. In this court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Kyle, supra, relied upon by the trial court, we held that the file of a psychologist was privileged absolutely from disclosure to the defendant in a rape case.2 The wording of *27the privilege addressed in Kyle read very much the same as 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5944. Confidential Communications to licensed psychologists.
No person who has been licensed under the act of March 23, 1972 (P.L. 136, No. 52), to practice psychology shall be, without the written consent of his client, examined in any civil or criminal matter as to any information acquired in the course of his professional services in behalf of such client. The confidential relations and communications between a psychologist and his client shall be on the same basis as those provided or prescribed by law between an attorney and client.
Amended February 20, 1990, to include psychiatrists, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5944, Confidential communications to Psychiatrists or Licensed Psychologists. Recognizing that this privilege was testimonial in nature, the court in Kyle, reasoned that the real interest sought to be protected by the privilege was the confidential communications between the client and psychologist; therefore, the psychologist’s records which memorialized such communications were subject to the privilege as well.3
The Kyle court also rejected the defendant’s request for in camera review of the file by the trial court and reaffirmed that an absolute privilege by definition may not be subject to a balancing test.
*28Finally, appellant argues that without even an in camera inspection of the file by the court, it cannot be determined whether any statements made by the victim would be helpful to the defense. We decline to compromise what we have determined is an absolute privilege from disclosure. As we noted above, the purpose of the psychologist-client privilege is to aid in the effective treatment of the client by encouraging the patient to disclose information fully and freely without fear of public disclosure. We deem this purpose and the underlying considerations to be of paramount concern. Subjecting the confidential file to in camera review by the trial court (as well as the appellate courts and staff members) would jeopardize the treatment process and undermine the public interests supporting the privilege. Simply stated, an absolute privilege of this type and in these circumstances requires absolute confidentiality.
Commonwealth v. Kyle, supra, 367 Pa.Super. at 505, 533 A.2d at 131. I would submit that this same cogent reasoning applies to the privilege enacted to protect the confidential communications to sexual assault counselors.
I could, I think, make a persuasive argument on solid grounds of statutory interpretation that the language of § 5945.1 is at the very least, ambiguous, and that we must therefore look to the intent of the legislature; (1 Pa.C.S. § 1921) and in so doing we must accept that the legislature did not intend a result that is absurd. (1 Pa.C.S. § 1922). A resulting interpretation would posit that the privilege exercised by the counselor is twofold: not to be examined as a witness in any civil or criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim; and, a privilege as to any advice, report or working paper given or made in the course of consultation. This reading would of course bring the records in question in this case within the purview of the privilege and also would speak in a more rationale way to the intent of the legislature in designing the privilege in the first instance. After all, in PAAR the rape crisis *29counselor was found in contempt not for refusing to testify—but for failing to release her records to the court.
As the statute already has been subject to a different interpretation by this court, I recognize that I am bound by that reading. However, a statute defining an absolute privilege should not be ambiguous; therefore, I call upon the legislature to set about to clarify the statute and to reaffirm its recognition of the needs and interests of the rape victim in our society. For at present, the privilege it sought to establish through 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1 as a safe haven for the healing process of victims of violence has now become an island unto itself to which no victim dare return.
As of this writing, the supreme court has accepted review in both the Wilson and Aultman cases relied upon by this court. It is hoped that these cases may provide a vehicle for our highest court to reinstate the intent of our legislature, and to once again create a healing environment in our Commonwealth for victims of violence. However, until such time as this should occur, sexual assault counselors would be wise to advise their clients that anything they say can and will be used against them in a court of law.
. In the event that a counselor would reveal confidential information to a prosecutor or in any active way use the relationship with the alleged victim to further the aims of the prosecution, then the privilege is breached and the defendant is entitled to take advantage of that breach.
. But see Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989), wherein, the supreme court held that psychotheraputic records of a *27minor victim of sexual assault in the possession of a hospital were subject to review by the defendant under the rights of confrontation and compulsory process as defined in Article 1, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. However, these records already had been subject to in camera review by the trial court and therefore presumably were no longer subject to any privilege. The issue of the privileged nature of the records was raised by the dissenting opinion, however, this issue was never addressed by the majority.
. The reasoning in Kyle also is applicable as to any number of other statutory privileges, which are testimonial in nature, and provide protection from disclosure of confidential information. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 5929, Physicians not to disclose information, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5943, Confidential communications to clergymen, and 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945, Confidential communications to school personnel.