dissenting.
In August 2002, defendant Raheem Means faced two separate sets of criminal charges. The first set of charges resulted from defendant, then a twenty-three-year-old man, engaging in sexual relations with a thirteen-year-old runaway; the second arose from a robbery at gunpoint of five victims. Seeking a consolidated disposition, defendant negotiated a plea agreement: in exchange for the State recommending a thirteen-year term of imprisonment subject to a mandatory period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, defendant would plead guilty to one count of third-degree child endangerment, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a); five counts of first-degree robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; one count of third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and one count of second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). On August 16, 2002, when defendant first appeared to enter his pleas, the trial court advised defendant that the sentence to be imposed would be a ten-year term of incarceration, subject to NERA. Defendant pled guilty according to the terms of that plea agreement.
At sentencing on November 16, 2002, the State sought to withdraw its consent to defendant’s guilty plea because the father of the minor child with whom defendant had sexual intercourse objected to the plea deal. The trial court granted the State’s oral motion to vacate the plea. Several months later, on May 2, 2003, defendant was offered — and he accepted — a new plea deal: in exchange for a fifteen-year term of imprisonment also subject to NERA, defendant was to plead to one count of third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3; one count of third-degree child endangerment, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a); three counts of first-degree robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; one count of third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); one count of aggravated assault, in violation of N.J.SA. 2C:12-l(b)(4); *624and one count of fourth-degree unlawful possession of hollow-point bullets, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)(1). Later that same day, defendant entered his guilty pleas without reserving any objection to the earlier vacated plea agreement, and was sentenced in accordance with that plea deal.
As of the February 5, 2004 sentencing following his second plea hearing, defendant had made no application to withdraw his plea, causing the trial court to note that it was “not aware of any filing of any motion, by the defendant, to withdraw his guilty pleas.” It was only after the trial court explained that it was willing to address an oral motion to withdraw that defendant’s counsel stated that defendant “wishe[d] to withdraw his pleas.” Tellingly, the basis defendant advanced for his request to withdraw his guilty pleas was not the reason that animates the majority. Instead, defendant’s desire to vacate his pleas was motivated by his claim that his lawyer had lied to him, had withheld evidence from him, and had failed to defend him vigorously. The trial court handily rejected all of defendant’s claims, finding that defendant’s pleas were knowing and voluntary, and were entered into after defendant understood the charges against him, after he understood the maximum penalties he faced, and after he was represented by “competent counsel[.]” The trial court concluded:
He admitted all of the charges. He entered the pleas freely and voluntarily, after voluntarily waiving his rights to a jury trial, his right to confront [ ] witnesses against him and his right not to incriminate himself. He was not threatened or forced. And, as I’ve said, there was a factual basis established for the entry of the pleas. He understood about all the penalties that would be imposed. And I find, after my review of the transcript, that I’m not persuaded otherwise.
On appeal, defendant — for the first time — sought to vacate his guilty pleas on the basis that he was entitled to the benefit of the first plea deal he struck. By an order, the Appellate Division rejected that argument and affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence.
Blending constitutional precepts with principles of contract law, the majority concludes that it was error for the trial court to vacate defendant’s August 16, 2002 guilty pleas, which resulted, as *625the majority describes, in defendant “actually receiv[ing] a custodial sentence five years greater than he would have under the first plea agreement.” Ante, 191 N.J. at 615, 926 A.2d at 331 (2007). Because defendant’s claims are procedurally barred and the majority’s reasoning disregards the proper standard of review, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Our jurisprudence in respect of the preclusive nature of guilty pleas is clear: “ ‘Generally, a defendant who pleads guilty is prohibited from raising, on appeal, the contention that the State violated his constitutional rights prior to the plea.’ ” State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 470, 874 A.2d 546 (2005) (quoting State v. Crawley, 149 N.J. 310, 316, 693 A.2d 859 (1997)). There are but “three exceptions to the general rule of waiver.” Id. at 471, 874 A.2d 546. They are: (1) the right “to appeal the denial of a Fourth Amendment-based motion to suppress evidence[,]” ibid.; (2) the right “to appeal the denial of admission into a pretrial intervention program[,]” ibid.; and (3) the right to preserve an issue for appellate review but only upon the entry of a conditional guilty plea as provided in Rule 3:9 — 3(f), ibid. The operative concept is plain: if a defendant’s “plea was unconditional and [defendant] did not preserve the issue[,]” then defendant has “waived his right to contest” the question he did not preserve. Ibid. We recently reaffirmed the primacy of those principles. State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 417 n. 1, 921 A.2d 954 (2007).
Defendant does not raise a Fourth Amendment search or seizure question and, as a result, the first exception to the guilty plea waiver rule does not apply. Further, as this case does not involve any application for admission to a pretrial intervention program, the second exception also does not lie. Thus, defendant’s complaint concerning his earlier vacated plea deal can be heard if and only if defendant preserved the issue by entering a conditional plea pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f). However, because defendant did not preserve the question of the propriety of the *626trial court vacating his August 16, 2002 guilty pleas, the substantive claim on which the majority relies simply is not before us; it has been waived.
Rule 3:9 — 3(f) specifically provides that “[wjith the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty reserving on the record the right to appeal from the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.” If defendant was so inclined, he could have sought to preserve for appellate review his vacated plea agreement. In that event, the State would have had a fair opportunity to gauge whether, in light of defendant’s desire to protract his case by preserving issues for appeal, the State remained willing to continue the bargain it and defendant had brokered. Yet, that is precisely what defendant did not do. Instead, on May 2, 2003— nine months after first entering his guilty pleas and six months after those guilty pleas and plea agreement were vacated — defendant entered new guilty pleas in exchange for a new, agreed-upon disposition. After its colloquy with defendant, the trial court concluded that defendant “understands the nature of the charges[, h]e has admitted the charges and he enters the pleas freely and voluntarily.” The trial court specifically found that defendant “has voluntarily waived his rights to a jury trial, his right to confront witnesses against him and his right not to incriminate himself.”
The trial court found that defendant had been represented by competent counsel. As noted, defendant did not preserve any issue in respect of his earlier, vacated plea deal and, instead, entered unconditional guilty pleas in exchange for a longer term of incarceration. In those circumstances, the better course lies in hewing to the long-standing precept that maintains that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea operates as a waiver of all claimed deficiencies save for those preserved by defendant or by operation of law. See, e.g., R. 3:5 — 7(d) (providing that “[djenial of a motion [to suppress] may be reviewed on appeal from a judgment of conviction notwithstanding that such judgment is entered follow*627ing a plea of guilty”). To hold otherwise defeats the proper goal of finality that lies at the core of all plea bargaining: it will have the unintended effect of permitting defendants to negotiate a guilty plea, yet lie in wait to spring what should have been waived issues in an unending quest to better the deal they negotiated. That effect will upend the carefully balanced structure of plea bargaining and cast a pall of chaos on a process geared towards certainty. For those reasons, it should be rejected. In sum, as the question of defendant’s vacated August 16, 2002 pleas was preserved neither by defendant nor by operation of law, the issue is waived.
II.
Even if defendant’s appeal in respect of his vacated August 16, 2002 guilty pleas is not procedurally barred, he nevertheless is entitled to no relief. As explained by the trial court when it granted the State’s motion to vacate defendant’s August 16, 2002 pleas, “the Prosecutor’s Office[ ] requested that the plea offer be withdrawn before sentencing.” The trial court noted that “[t]he basis of [the] request was that [the assistant prosecutor] had made his offer without talking to the victims (or in the case of endangering the welfare of a child, speaking with the victim’s father).” The State asserted before the trial court that “the Prosecutor’s Office require[s] prior consultation with the victims [and the assistant prosecutor] confirmed, for the first time, that this had not been done in this case.” The trial court concluded that because “the plea offer had been made without consulting with the victims, and since [defendant] had not yet been sentenced, [the trial court] signed an order vacating the pleas and reinstating the not guilty pleas.”
In the majority’s view, the undisputed fact that defendant’s victims — five robbery-at-gunpoint victims and a thirteen-year-old girl with whom he had had sexual intercourse — had not been consulted on the terms of defendant’s plea agreement is too slender a reed to sustain vacating defendant’s plea agreement. *628Ante at 622, 926 A.2d at 335. According to the majority, defendant is entitled to the contractual basis of the bargain in his first plea agreement. Ibid. I cannot agree.
No doubt, due process considerations inform many determinations of whether a plea is to be vacated. Those include the parallel concerns that the process “assure a defendant that in entering into a plea bargain he will not thereby become entrapped” and that “after the agreement has received final judicial sanction, it will be carried out according to its terms." State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 322, 294 A.2d 57 (1972). The rationale for those concerns is straightforward: “Only if it is generally believed that performance on the part of the State will not disappoint a defendant’s reasonable expectations will plea bargaining become and remain a truly effective device in criminal administration. Aside from this pragmatic necessity, essential fairness dictates the same result.” Ibid. It is for those reasons that it is now black-letter law that if the trial court seeks to impose a sentence in excess of the one bargained for, a defendant is permitted to withdraw his plea. Ibid, (explaining that “if the sentencing judge feels that justice will not be done were he to impose the sentence to which the parties have agreed and which the prosecutor recommends, the defendant may then also withdraw his plea”).
Those considerations, however, must be juxtaposed against equally compelling concerns. Rule 3:9-3(e) makes clear that the interests of justice standard governs whether to vacate a guilty plea prior to the imposition of sentence, an analysis that requires a balance of various competing considerations: the reasonable expectations of the defendant and the State, the defendant’s constitutional interests, and the independence and discretion of sentencing courts. See, e.g., State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433, 443 — 47, 558 A.2d 1312 (1989) (outlining relevant and competing concerns in plea bargaining). This case starkly illustrates the clash between a defendant’s constitutional and contractual interests, and those rights provided both constitutionally and statutorily to victims in New Jersey.
*629In 1985, the New Jersey Legislature adopted the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-34 to -49, which, among other things, granted crime victims the right “[t]o be informed about the criminal justice process[,]” N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36(b). It further provides that, at a minimum, the State must consult with a crime victim, through the medium of a victim impact statement, “prior to the prosecutor’s accepting a negotiated plea agreement containing recommendations as to sentence[.]” N.J.S.A. 52:4B-44(b)(20). The provisions of the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights are implemented in part by the Attorney General’s Standards to Ensure the Rights of Crime Victims, which require that crime victims be notified of any “negotiated plea[,]” pt. 2, § I.B, at 12-13 (April 28, 1993), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/3victims. pdf, and that “the views of victims of violent crime should be brought to the attention of the court on ... plea agreements, [and] sentencing.” Id. at pt. 2, § II.I, at 21.
More importantly, on November 5,1991, the people of the State of New Jersey amended the Constitution to adopt a “Victim’s Rights Amendment.” The Constitution now requires that “[a] victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system.” N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 22. It also mandates that “[a] victim of a crime shall not be denied the right to be present at public judicial proceedings except when ... properly sequestered” and that “[a] victim of a crime shall be entitled to those rights and remedies as may be provided by the Legislature.” Ibid.
In striking the balance required between those competing considerations — defendant’s rights versus his victims’ rights — the majority concludes that defendant’s rights must take precedence, and, therefore, notwithstanding the uncontradicted fact that defendant’s victims had not been heard in respect of his August 16, 2002 plea deal, that plea agreement should not have been vacated. Because relegating victim’s rights to a constitutional backwater renders them illusory, I cannot agree.
*630We have made clear that “[t]he withdrawal of a guilty plea is within the broad discretion of the trial court[,]” State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 135, 835 A.2d 1231 (2003), a standard that is breached only if the “decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis,” Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571, 796 A.2d 182 (2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And, nothing in those proceedings — during which, based on considerations of the victims’ rights, the trial court granted the State’s motion to vacate defendant’s plea — even approaches an abuse of that broad discretion. The trial court’s reasons for vacating defendant’s August 16, 2002 pleas were cogent, reasonable, and consistent with the Victim’s Rights Amendment to our Constitution and the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights. Under those circumstances, “if a judge is satisfied that the State has made an honest mistake in determining the terms of a plea offer, there is no reason why the State should not be permitted to withdraw the offer, provided the application is made before the date of sentence.” State v. Veney, 327 N.J.Super. 458, 461, 743 A.2d 888 (App.Div.2000). That logic should be our guide and, if it is, then the same result should obtain here.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
For reversal/reinstatement/remandment — Chief Justice ZAZZALI, and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, and HOENS — 6. For affirmance — Justice RIVERA-SOTO — 1.