(dissenting).
The majority correctly lays out the applicable standard of review when it states:
The insurer bears the burden of showing that it has no duty to defend its insured.
*643To satisfy this burden, “[t]he insurer must show that the claim clearly falls outside of policy coverage.” “If, after considering the complaint, and when appropriate, other recorded evidence, doubt exists whether the claim against the insured arguably falls within the policy coverage, such doubts must be resolved in favor of the insured.” (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)
However, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s analysis. Although this is a case of first impression in South Dakota, numerous other jurisdictions have considered the exact contract language at issue. Consistent with the public policy behind Financial Responsibility Laws like South Dakota’s, a number of courts in other jurisdictions have held that “accident” or “caused by accident” should be interpreted from the standpoint of the injured party.* Hudson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1168, 1170 (Del.1990); Martin v. Chicago Ins. Co., 184 Ga.App. 472, 474-75, 361 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1987) cert. denied (Nov. 24, 1987); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151, 153 (1948); Tomlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Liability, 95 Wis.2d 215, 220-23, 290 N.W.2d 285, 288-89 (1980). See also Pennsylvania Nat’l. Mut. Cas. v. Miller Est., 185 N.J.Super. 183, 447 A.2d 1344 (1982).
“The primary purpose of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance is to compensate innocent victims who have been injured by the negligence of financially irresponsible motorists. Its purpose is not, like that of ordinary insurance, to save harmless the tortfeasor himself.... In order to accomplish the objective of the law, the perspective here must be that of the victim and not that of the aggressor.”
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neese, 254 Ga. 335, 338-40, 329 S.E.2d 136, 140 (1985) (quoting Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C. 285, 290-91, 134 S.E.2d 654, 659 (1964)).
We believe that viewing the policy language through the eyes of the injured party rings true with the legislative intent and public policy behind South Dakota’s Financial Responsibility Law. See Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Croyle, 479 N.W.2d 881, 884 (S.D.1992). This public policy mandates coverage for injured parties as a result of automobile collisions. Id.
The word “accident” and the South Dakota Financial Responsibility Law cover intentional acts.
Accepting the injured party’s point of view, an “accident” may result from an intentional act. “[T]he fact that injury is caused by an intentional act does not preclude it from being caused by accident if in that act something unforeseen, unusual and unexpected occurs which produces the result.” State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Treas, 254 Md. 615, 255 A.2d 296, 298 (1969) (quotations omitted). See also American Protection Ins. Co. v. Parker, 150 Ga.App. 732, 733-34, 258 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1979). If the action is “unforeseen and not caused by his own misconduct, it is, although an intentional assault, accidental as to [the victim].” Martin, 361 S.E.2d at 837 (citing American Protection, 258 S.E.2d at 542).
Martin’s injuries in this case were the result of an accident. Upon first driving out of the parking lot, Wertz threatened to go to the interstate and intentionally run into a semi truck to kill them both. As in the past, however, his threat did not come to pass. Wertz’ intentions obviously changed, culminating in sexual relations with Martin. Only after leaving Aberdeen for the second time, while being pursued by law enforcement, did the Wertz vehicle collide with Anderson’s semi. The trial court found Wertz acted intentionally. With regard to Martin’s viewpoint, the consequence of Wertz’ intentional or reckless behavior is irrelevant in that Martin was involved in a motor vehicle accident in which she was harmed.
The court in Martin held the word “accident,” as used in Georgia’s compulsory motor vehicle liability statute, included “intentional as well as unintentional injuries inflicted upon innocent persons by drivers whose liability would otherwise be covered by the policy.” 361 S.E.2d at 837. The court recog*644nized the public policy in that case, “enunciated in the advent of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance, that innocent persons who are injured should have an adequate recourse for the recovery of their damages.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 556, 557, 307 S.E.2d 499 (1983)).
Likewise, the Delaware Supreme Court in Hudson interpreted “accident” to include intentional injury caused to an innocent party. 569 A.2d at 1170. In Hudson, State Farm’s policy language is identical to that found in Wertz’ policy. In finding State Farm had a duty to the injured victim, the Hudson court recognized a nationwide shift in public policy regarding automobile liability insurance. It held that when the phrase “caused by accident” is ambiguous, “the ambiguity must be resolved against the insurer who drafted the policy.” Id. at 1171.
Given the public policy expressed in SDCL 32-35-2 and these decisions construing the same policy language, I would conclude that Martin’s injuries were caused by an “accident” when viewing the case from victim’s point of view. The majority’s decision renders innocent victims, Martin and Anderson, unprotected, which the public policy in South Dakota obviously finds unacceptable. I would affirm the trial court in this case.
See: Annotation, Liability Insurance: Assault as an "Accident, ’’ or Injuries Therefrom as "Accidentally" Sustained, within Coverage Clause, 72 A.L.R.3rd 1090 (1976).