(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I disagree with the majority’s calculation of damages. The truck was impounded on August 22, 1991, and Colton towed the truck from Wyoming on April 11, 1992, however, the majority glosses over the fact that the Wyoming authorities offered release of the truck in January 1992 if Colton would pay $1,000 storage fee and forfeit the South Dakota title so that a new Wyoming title could be issued. It is undisputed that the value of the truck when impounded was $22,000. Colton could not afford the $1,000 fee so he went to his creditor, Marquette Bank. Marquette Bank refused to extend Colton’s credit to pay the $1,000 and also refused to surrender the South Dakota title. So, from January until April, the dismantled truck endured the Wyoming winter. Decker should not be responsible for the diminution in value of the truck between January and April.
Colton’s proper remedy is recovering this loss from Marquette Bank. Forcing Decker to pay for the unreasonable delay caused by Marquette Bank’s actions is unjust. Colton had a duty to mitigate his damages, and any damages resulting from his failure to take reasonable steps to mitigate or prevent damages cannot be recovered from Decker. See Wieting v. Ball Air Spray, Inc., 84 S.D. 493, 173 N.W.2d 272 (1969). SDCL 57A-2-715(2) states in part: “(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller’s breach include: (a) Any loss ... which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise[.T (Emphasis added.) This loss could have been prevented by Marquette Bank’s releasing the title in a timely manner. Surrendering the title in order for a new, clearer and correct title to be issued was the logical step for *180Marquette Bank to take. Unfortunately, logic does not always play a part in today’s world.
The buyer’s right to recover for damages is not unlimited. Buyer must take reasonable steps to reduce or minimize his damages. 5 Ronald A. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-715:27 (1983); see also AES Technology Systems, Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933 (7th Cir.1978); Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir.1971); Baden v. Curtiss Breeding Service, 380 F.Supp. 243 (D.Mont.1974); Larrance Tank Corporation v. Burrough, 476 P.2d 346 (Okl.1970); LTV Aerospace Corporation v. Bateman, 492 S.W.2d 703 (Tex.Civ.App.1973). However, buyer will be excused from mitigation when his financial condition will not allow him to take mitigating steps. Nyquist v. Randall, 819 F.2d 1014 (11th Cir.1987); Lake Village Implement Company v. Cox, 252 Ark. 224, 478 S.W.2d 36 (1972); Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Ass’n of Seventh Day Adv., 14 Cal.App.3d 209, 92 Cal.Rptr. 111 (1971).
In this case, however, it was not buyer who refused to take mitigating steps, but buyer’s creditor, Marquette Bank, who refused to take the necessary steps. The general rule is that a bank is required to maintain a “duty of good faith and fair dealing toward its customers.” Garrett v. BankWest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 846 n. 9 (S.D.1990). Whether or not Marquette Bank acted in good faith is not at issue here, however, Decker should not be punished for the action or inaction of Marquette Bank. Therefore, we should remand in order for the trial court to assess the correct amount of damages.