(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the clear and unambiguous language of the Prevailing Wage Act (PWA), coupled with the statutory requirements for receipt of Debt Service Equalization Aid (DSEA), leave no doubt that Independent School District 206’s construction of the new junior high school building was financed at least in part by state funds within the meaning of the PWA.
Minn.Stat. § 177.41 (1994) reads as follows:
It is in the public interest that public buildings and other public works be constructed and maintained by the best means and highest quality of labor reasonably available and that persons working on public works be compensated according to the real value of the services they perform. It is therefore the policy of this state that wages of laborers, workers, and mechanics on projects financed in whole or part by state funds should be comparable to wages paid for similar work in the community as a whole.
(Emphasis added.)
In this case, we are asked to decide whether the District’s receipt of DSEA payments from the state, triggered by the junior high school construction project, resulted in the *806project being financed in whole or part by state funds. To make that decision, we must determine the meaning of the term “financed” as it is used in the statute. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 851 (1993 ed.) defines “finance” as follows: “1: to raise or provide funds or capital for * * * 2: to provide with necessary funds in order to achieve a desired end.” See Needles v. Kansas City, 371 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Mo.1963) (using Webster’s New International Dictionary to define “finance”). See also The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language 352 (1989 ed.) (defining “finance” as: “to raise the money for”).
When interpreting a statute, we must give effect to the intention of the legislature. Peterson v. Haule, 304 Minn. 160, 170, 230 N.W.2d 51, 57 (1975). We are required to construe technical words according to their technical meaning and other words according to their common and approved usage and the rules of grammar. Minn.Stat. § 645.08 (1994). When the language of a statute, so construed, is not ambiguous, we must apply the statute’s plain meaning. McCaleb v. Jackson, 307 Minn. 15, 17 n. 2, 239 N.W.2d 187, 188 n. 2 (1976). There is no need for judicial construction when a statute is clear and unambiguous. Arlandson v. Humphrey, 224 Minn. 49, 54-55, 27 N.W.2d 819, 823 (1947). Indeed, where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no place for such construction.
The court, engaging in statutory construction, concludes that the PWA is penal in nature and, therefore, must be interpreted narrowly. However, because the language of the PWA is clear and unambiguous, the court should not engage in statutory construction. Id. Further, the section of the PWA which we are concerned with, Minn.Stat. § 177.41, is a remedial provision and is not penal in nature. The penal provision of the PWA is found in section 177.43, subd. 5. ‘Where a statute contains remedial and penal provisions, the former are to be construed liberally and the latter strictly.” State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 269, 95 N.W.2d 6, 11 (1959). Thus, if the court is to engage in statutory construction, section 177.41 should be construed liberally.
Under any reading of the PWA, the DSEA payments received by the District from the state provide funds for the junior high school construction project. To conclude otherwise, one would have to conclude that the property tax (debt service levy) levied on the district’s property to pay for the junior high school construction project was not a part of the project’s financing. Based on the steps taken by the district, that conclusion cannot be reached. The District raised the money for the junior high school construction project through an integrated plan to sell and repay bonds. The bonds were to be repaid by the money raised from the debt service levy. Minn.Stat. § 124.97 (1994). The debt service levy was the only source available for repaying the bonds and, without it, the bonds could not have been sold and the junior high school would not have been built. As a result of the debt created by the project, the District receives DSEA payments in lieu of money it would otherwise have to raise through the debt service levy. Absent receipt of the DSEA payments, the District would have had to increase its debt service levy to repay the bonds. Therefore, the DSEA payments the District receives, in lieu of money raised through the debt service levy, provide funds for the District to repay the bonds with the result that the junior high school construction project was financed in part by state funds.
The court contends that “the term ‘financed’ * * * contemplates a direct relationship between the funding and the project” and that funds not available at the time the project’s costs are incurred cannot constitute financing. However, there is nothing, either in the common and approved definition of the word “finance” or in the PWA, which states, suggests, or requires that the funds needed to finance a project covered by the PWA be available at the time the construction costs are incurred. Even if that requirement is imposed, it is clear that the DSEA payments financed the school construction project. The voters of the District approved the sale of the bonds for the junior high school construction project on April 28, 1992, and on May 18, 1992, pursuant to the resolution providing for the sale of the bonds, the Dis*807trict levied the necessary property tax for repayment of the bonds.1 The bonds were issued and sold in June of 1992. Construction contracts for the junior high school building were not awarded until April 1993. Thus, the entire finance package, including the levying of property taxes triggering the District’s entitlement to DSEA payments, was in place and available for use well before any bids on the project were accepted and before any construction costs were incurred. This represents a direct relationship between the funds raised for the project and the project itself.
The best evidence that the District’s receipt of DSEA payments from the state constitutes part of the financing for the new junior high school building is found in the District’s resolution awarding the sale of the bonds for the project. That resolution requires “all taxes levied pursuant to this resolution * * * and all monies received for, or appropriated to the payment of the Bonds and interest thereon shall be paid into the [District’s] Debt Redemption Fund.”2 According to the District’s superintendent, Dr. Cassell, the District receives DSEA in lieu of money raised by its debt service levy and must use the DSEA as it would the money raised by its debt service levy. Minn.Stat. § 475.61, subd. 1 (1994) requires a school district to place money raised by a debt service levy, and all “other revenues pledged for the payment” of the bonds, in its debt redemption fund. Thus, proceeds from the debt service levy approved by the District’s voters and all DSEA payments received by the District in lieu of the debt service levy are required to be placed in the debt redemption fund for repayment of the bonds.
The court analogizes the situation presented in this ease to the homeowner who finances the construction or acquisition of a new residential home with a loan from a commercial lender and repays that loan from various sources, including the homeowner’s salary or wages. The purpose of the analogy is to suggest that it is unreasonable to conclude that the homeowner’s salary/wages financed the home’s construction/acquisition and that it is equally unreasonable to conclude that the DSEA payments received by the District financed the junior high school construction project. The problem with this analogy is that the two situations are not analogous. In the case of the homeowner, the employer pays the salary/wages and the employee/homeowner may use the salary/wages for any purpose. While the salary/wages may be used to repay the commercial lender, it may also be used for food, clothing, entertainment, transportation, or anything else the homeowner chooses. The District has no such choice. The District is required by school board resolution and by Minn.Stat. § 475.61, subd. 1, to place the DSEA payments it receives into its debt redemption fund to be used solely for the purpose of repaying the bonds issued as a result of the school construction project.
The court also compares the DSEA statute enacted in 1991 with the Financial Assistance Limitations Act (FALA) enacted in 1990, and concludes that the legislature did not intend the DSEA statute to implicate the PWA because the DSEA statute, unlike FALA, does not expressly require recipients of money under its provisions to comply with the Act. This argument is unpersuasive. In essence, the court contends that because the legislature did not expressly require compliance with the PWA in the DSEA statute, this court must find the PWA inapplicable. The argument could just as easily be made that because the legislature did not expressly permit noncompliance with the PWA in the DSEA statute, the PWA must be applicable.
*808The court suggests that application of the PWA on the basis of DSEA creates an anomalous situation in which the relatively poor school districts receiving DSEA are subject to the PWA, but wealthy school districts, ineligible to receive DSEA, are not subject to the PWA. When interpreting a statute, we must presume the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (1994). Though it might be argued that application of the PWA on the basis of DSEA has an unusual effect upon poor school districts, this effect is not necessarily absurd or unreasonable. It is not this court’s place to decide whether policy set by the legislature is good or bad. The legislature has stated the clear public policy that “public buildings and other public works be constructed and maintained by the best means and highest quality of labor reasonably available and that persons working on public works be compensated according to the real value of the services they perform,” and that “laborers * * * on projects financed * * * in part by state funds” be paid the prevailing wage. Minn.Stat. § 177.41 (1994). It is for the legislature, not this court, to decide the public policy of this state. The legislature has done so here.
. The District levied a tax for each levy year, beginning with levy year 1992 and ending with levy year 2011, sufficient to repay its annual obligation on the bonds. Each of the levies was irrevocable.
. Resolution for the sale of General Obligation School Building Bonds, Series 1992A, § 5.01, Minutes of Independent School District No. 206 School Board Meeting (June 8, 1992). The debt service fund (the debt redemption fund) is the account of money and investments held by the school district, and may only be used to pay for the redemption of its issued bonds. Minn.Stat. § 475.51, subd. 6 (1992); Reporting Standards Comm., Minn. Dep't of Educ., Manual for the Uniform Financial Accounting and Reporting System for Minnesota Schools III — 6 (1981 ed.).