dissenting.
ANALYSIS OF MAJORITY OPINION
Lack of Consent
The majority holds that the lack of Gomez’ consent to the adoption, in accordance with § 43-104, constituted a lack of jurisdiction by the county court. The majority therefore holds that the judgment was void. Section 43-104(3) specifies who must consent to an adoption. The classes from whom consent must be received are three: “both parents if living, the surviving parent of a child bom in lawful wedlock, or, subject to sections 43-104.02 to 43-104.06, the mother of a child bom out of wedlock . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) § 43-104(3). If the Legislature intended that biological fathers of children bom out of wedlock must give consent to adoption, then the statute could simply state that consent must be given by both parents if living. Section 43-104(3) does clearly provide an alternative, however, *924and directs the reader to §§ 43-104.02 through 43-104.06. Substitute consent as provided in § 43-105 is not applicable in this case.
In its holding, the majority refuses to consider §§ 43-104.02 through 43-104.06 as controlling in this case. After a careful reading of § 43-104(3), one must look to §§ 43-104.02 through 43-104.06 when consent is lacking from the unwed biological father.
Section 43-104.02 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Relinquishment or consent for the purpose of adoption given only by a mother of a child born out of wedlock pursuant to section 43-104 shall be sufficient to place the child for adoption and the rights of any alleged father • shall not be recognized thereafter in any court unless the person claiming to be the father of the child has filed with the Department of Social Services . . . within five days after the birth of such child, a notice of intent to claim paternity.
In the instant case, Gomez did not file a notice of intent to claim paternity within 5 days of the births of Kassandra and Nicholas. However, we held in In re Application of S.R.S. and M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 408 N.W.2d 272 (1987), that § 43-104.02 was unconstitutional as applied to the facts therein. The unwed father in that case shared a familial relationship with his children. We held:
[T]he 5-day filing requirement for unwed fathers [is] a legitimate means of attaining a worthy end, the rapid placement of newborns in families that could commit to raising them. However, the 5-day requirement secures no such result in cases such as this one, where the child is no longer a newborn and has already established strong ties with a father who has acknowledged and supported him. The effect of the requirement is to allow a mother to singlehandedly sever a relationship between father and child, no matter what the quality of that relationship is.
225 Neb. at 768-69, 408 N.W.2d at 278. Therefore, § 43-104.06 applies in the instant case, and consent, in conclusion, was not fatal to the jurisdiction of the county court.
*925Lack of DSS Certificate
The majority also argues that because Gomez did not timely file under § 43-104.02, the Savages were required to obtain a certificate from DSS stating that the biological father did not file a notice of intent to claim paternity. The problem with this analysis is that it incorrectly assumes Gomez was subject to the 5-day filing requirement in § 43-104.02(1). Section 43-104.04 states:
If a notice of paternity is not filed, within five days, the mother of a child born out of wedlock or an agent specifically designated in writing by the mother may request, and the Department of Social Services shall supply, a certificate that no notice of intent to claim paternity has been filed with the department ....
(Emphasis supplied.)
Gomez was not required to file a notice of intent to claim paternity within 5 days of the children’s respective births because he had formed a familial relationship, however superficial, with the children. Because Gomez was not required to timely file notice under § 43-104.02, it makes no sense to dismiss the instant action based on § 43-104.04, which directed Bechtold to file a certificate from the DSS stating that Gomez had not complied with § 43-104.02. The requirements of § 43-104.06(2), not § 43-104.04, are applicable to this case.
ANALYSIS OF COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION
The components of a series or collection of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter may be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature so that different provisions of the act are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. In re Application of City of Grand Island, 247 Neb. 446, 527 N.W.2d 864 (1995); In re Application of City of Lincoln, 243 Neb. 458, 500 N.W.2d 183 (1993) . If a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, the reviewing court uses the construction that will achieve the statute’s purpose and preserve the statute’s validity. State ex rel. Grape v. Zach, 247 Neb. 29, 524 N.W.2d 788 (1994). In my opinion, the Court of Appeals’ reading of §§ 43-104.02 through 43-104.06 did not accomplish the *926statutes’ purpose. The legislative purpose of §§ 43-104.02 through 43-104.06 is best preserved by reading the word “claimant” in those statutes as referring to biological fathers of children born out of wedlock who have a familial relationship to the children, not just those biological fathers of children bom out of wedlock who satisfy the 5-day filing requirement of § 43-104.02. The more expansive reading of the statute preserves the Legislature’s goal of providing a framework for an adoption proceeding after an unwed mother relinquishes her parental rights. See Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448, appeal dismissed 479 U.S. 805, 107 S. Ct. 49, 93 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1986).
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that § 43-104.06 did not apply, noted that this statute was entitled “Paternity claim; request for custody by claimant” (emphasis supplied) and that the language therein expressly referred to “the claimant.” Because §§ 43-104.02 through 43-104.06 were enacted collectively as part of 1975 Neb. Laws, L.B. 224, the Court of Appeals analyzed those statutory provisions together and held that a “claimant” is “one who is without a familial relationship” with a child. In re Adoption of Kassandra B. & Nicholas B., 3 Neb. App. 180, 191, 524 N.W.2d 821, 829 (1994). Simply put, the Court of Appeals held that § 43-104.06 applied to only an alleged father who filed a notice of intent to claim paternity within the first 5 days after the child’s birth, as required by § 43-104.02. Because Gomez did not timely file his notice of intent, the Court of Appeals held that he was not a “claimant” and that § 43-104.06 could not be used to terminate his parental rights.
In constming a statute, the court must look at the statutory objective to be accomplished, the problem to be remedied, or the purpose to be served and then place on the statute a reasonable construction which best achieves the purpose of the statute, rather than a construction defeating the statutory purpose. In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Bloomquist, 246 Neb. 711, 523 N.W.2d 352 (1994); Durand v. Western Surety Co., 245 Neb. 649, 514 N.W.2d 840 (1994). In §§ 43-104.02 through 43-104.06, the Legislature developed a procedure through which the biological father of a child born *927out of wedlock could protect his rights. A method to ensure that the father’s rights would be addressed is to file a notice of intent to claim paternity within 5 days after the birth of said child. Because Gomez shared a familial relationship with his children, our holding in In re Application ofS.R.S. and M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 408 N.W.2d 272 (1987), made the 5-day notice inapplicable to Gomez. In Gomez’ case, the familial relationship can be considered in lieu of the 5-day notice requirement. The familial relationship is an alternative to the 5-day rule in protecting the unwed biological father’s rights. The familial relationship accomplishes no more than that, however, and the Court of Appeals was incorrect in holding that the child should be automatically awarded to the biological father.
This court, quoting from Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1983), stated:
“[T]he mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.” The Court recognized the importance of familial bonds, stressing that “[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,’ [citation omitted] his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection . . . . ”
In re Application of S.R.S. and M.B.S., 225 Neb. at 768, 408 N.W.2d at 278.
Because Gomez had a familial relationship, it was essential that his rights be preserved as well they were. What the constitution ensured Gomez was that he would get his day in court. How else could a court determine whether or not Gomez demonstrated the full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood. Section 43-104.06, then, is the applicable statute to follow in this case, and, indeed, this is the statute invoked by Gomez.
Analysis Under § 43-104.06
The county court was correct in its decision to decide the case by applying § 43-104.06, which reads:
(1) If the claimant seeks to oppose any proposed *928relinquishment of a child by the mother and requests custody of the child, the court shall inquire into the fitness of the claimant, his ability to properly care for the child, and whether the best interests of the child will be served by granting custody to the claimant. Only upon the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child, and a finding that the claimant is a fit person, is able to properly care for the child, and that the child’s best interests will be served by granting custody to the claimant, shall custody be granted to the claimant.
(2) . . . upon relinquishment by the mother to a child placement agency licensed by the State of Nebraska, or upon a finding that the child’s best interests would not be served by granting custody to the claimant, together with the recommendation by the guardian ad litem, and a finding that termination of the rights of the mother and the father is in the best interests of the child, the court shall terminate the rights of the mother and father and confer such rights upon the licensed child placement agency to whom the relinquishment has been given.
Section 43-104.06 and the other adoption statutes do not provide any framework or guidelines for determining parental fitness and the best interests of the child. The county court referred to the guidelines provided in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Reissue 1993) of the juvenile code and to case law arising out of the juvenile code to conduct its analysis under § 43-104.06. The Court of Appeals determined that the county court did not have jurisdiction to terminate Gomez’ parental rights under the juvenile code.
The flaw in the Court of Appeals’ reasoning is that the county court did not invoke the juvenile code in terminating Gomez’ parental rights. Rather, the county court analyzed the case under the adoption statutes, and § 43-403.06(2), in particular. The Legislature instructed in § 43-104.06 that when the unwed biological father of a child challenged a proposed adoption, the court should inquire into the fitness of the claimant, his ability to properly care for the child, and whether the best interests of the child will be served by granting custody to the claimant. However, the Legislature failed to provide *929guidelines under which that analysis should be conducted. The county court properly looked to the case law and similar statutory provisions for guidance in deciding what criteria should be applied to make the determinations required by § 43-104.06.
Gomez Invoked § 43-104.06
The county court also properly applied § 43-104.06 in the case at bar because all the parties to this action invoked the provisions of the statute. The essential character of an action and relief sought, whether legal or equitable, is determinable from its main object, as disclosed by the pleadings. Scherbak v. Kissler, 245 Neb. 10, 510 N.W.2d 318 (1994). Neither party timely raised the issue of the unconstitutionality of § 43-104.06 in the lower courts. Gomez also did not file and serve separate written notice pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. of Prac. 9E (rev. 1992) with the Clerk of the Supreme Court that he was presenting a constitutional question. A litigant who invokes the provisions of a statute may not challenge its validity. State ex rel. Sileven v. Spire, 243 Neb. 451, 500 N.W.2d 179 (1993). In their petition to adopt Kassandra and Nicholas, the Savages invoked the adoption statutes. Likewise, by filing his notice of intent to claim paternity, Gomez invoked the adoption statutes. The record reflects that Gomez was well aware that by invoking § 43-104.06 he risked his parental rights’ being terminated. Neither party may now complain of the effect of the adoption statutes.
COUNTY COURT’S DECISION
The county court determined that Gomez was unfit to properly care for Kassandra and Nicholas and that it would be in the best interests of the children to award custody to K.E.S.I.L., thereby approving the Savages’ petition for adoption.
We review appeals in adoption proceedings for errors appearing on the record in the county court. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2733 (Reissue 1989). See, also, In re Guardianship of T.C.W., 235 Neb. 716, 457 N.W.2d 282 (1990). When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is *930supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Dillard Dept. Stores v. Polinsky, 247 Neb. 821, 530 N.W.2d 637 (1995); Dolan v. Svitak, 247 Neb. 410, 527 N.W.2d 621 (1995); Crawford v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 246 Neb. 319, 518 N.W.2d 148 (1994).
As noted previously, the county court properly looked to § 43-292 in the juvenile code for guidance in determining whether Gomez was an unfit parent for. the purposes of § 43-104.06. Consistent with § 43-292 and § 43-104.06, the county court could have terminated the biological father’s parental rights under § 43-104.06 if there was clear and convincing evidence that the children’s best interests would not be served by granting him custody. The relevant criteria listed in § 43-292 include: (1) the biological father has abandoned the children for 6 months or more immediately prior to the petition for adoption; (2) the biological father substantially and continuously or repeatedly neglected the children and refused to give the children necessary parental care and protection; (3) the biological father, being financially able, willfully neglected to provide the children with the necessary subsistence, education, or other care necessary for the children’s health, morals, or welfare; (4) the biological father is unfit by reason of debauchery, habitual use of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, or repeated lewd and lascivious behavior, which conduct is found to be seriously detrimental to the health, morals, or well-being of the children; or (5) the biological father is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of mental illness or mental deficiency, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period. The county court held that the first and fifth criteria were not applicable to Gomez.
Determination of Unfitness
The county court, in holding that there was clear and convincing evidence that the children’s best interests would not be served by placing them with Gomez, stated:
The evidence shows a pattern on the part of [Gomez] of taking no responsibility for the children or only taking responsibility when it suited him or under his terms *931emotionally and financially. . . .
The evidence shows a clear pattern of substance abuse, both legal and illegal, which [Gomez] has not addressed in a manner to satisfy this Court of his good intentions to refrain from the use of intoxicants or illegal substances.
At trial, Gomez admitted that he did not pay any of the financial costs for the births of the three children he fathered with Bechtold. Gomez testified that from the time he and Bechtold separated in August 1990 until he learned of Bechtold’s relinquishment in November 1991, he provided only approximately $500 in financial support and visited with the children approximately once a month. The record reflects that Gomez earned between $4,500 and $7,500 in 1991. Additionally, Gomez admitted that when he and Bechtold separated for approximately 4 months sometime after Kassandra’s birth but prior to Nicholas’ birth, he went to Kansas, provided no financial support, and never visited his children.
Gomez attempted to refute this evidence of neglect by testifying that he provided the children with clothing, toys, food, and school supplies when they visited him. Gomez testified that he took the children on family trips to the park and the zoo. He also testified that he provided the children with emotional support by telling the children they could always talk to him. Gomez stated that he did not give more money to Bechtold because he did not trust her.
Gomez admitted that he smoked marijuana in the past, but claimed that he had not done so since 1987. However, his oldest daughter testified that as recently as July 1993, she observed marijuana in Gomez’ residence and saw Gomez smoking marijuana.
Gomez also admitted that he had a problem with alcohol, though he had never sought any help for his drinking problem. Gomez thought he would be able to handle the problem without assistance. In January 1992, Gomez was twice arrested and pled guilty to two charges of driving while under the influence. Previously, in 1988 or 1989, Gomez was convicted of felony criminal mischief for stealing a car stereo and served a 30-day prison sentence. On another occasion, Gomez was ticketed after *932trying to kick out a door at the Omaha police station while under the influence of alcohol.
As noted above, our inquiry in the instant appeal is whether the county court’s decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. In summary, Gomez admitted to a. problem with alcohol abuse and testified that he still uses alcohol. The record reflects that Gomez has at least four criminal convictions, including one felony conviction for which he served jail time and two convictions of driving while under the influence. Gomez has consistently failed to provide Kassandra and Nicholas with more than de minimis amounts of financial and emotional support. I would hold that the county court properly found Gomez unfit.
Best Interests of Children
Having found Gomez unfit, the county court next addressed whether it would be in the best interests of the children to be placed with the Savages. The county court held:
The Court notes the professional opinions offered to the Court agreed on one prevailing issue: stability is a major concern in determining the best interests of these children.
The evidence clearly and unequivocally shows that until their relinquishment these children had no stability in their lives, being moved from place to place regularly; the claimant entering and leaving the home; lack of support, both financial and emotional, by the claimant; the mother of these children struggling to maintain some semblance of stability with her limited resources.
Since the relinquishment, these children have had a stable and nurturing environment, both emotionally and financially.
The county court determined that it would be in the best interests of the children to grant the Savages’ petition for adoption and to place Kassandra and Nicholas with the Savages. I agree. There is abundant evidence in the record to support the county court’s decision allowing the adoption.
Gerrard, J., joins in this dissent.