concurring in result.
I agree with the majority that we harmonize statutes to avoid conflicts, but we do not read the statutes to create conflicts in order that we might harmonize them. E.g., Burlington Northern v. State, 500 N.W.2d 615 (N.D.1993). I see no conflict between sections 26.1-13-14, 26.1-13-15, and section 26.1-13-16, NDCC. Section 26.1-13-14, NDCC, is a general statute which includes vehicles. Section 26.1-13-15, NDCC, is a statute dealing with territorial limits of policies covering all types of insurance on property. Its reference to covering “vehicles” while temporarily removed from the premises of the insured is an exception to the previous provision in that section which prohibits county mutuals from insuring property beyond the mutual’s authorized territory of operation. Neither it nor section 26.1-13-14, NDCC, refers to vehicles normally operated or intended to be operated on roads or streets nor should they be so read.
More significantly, if there is a conflict the special statute supersedes the general statute. E.g., Matter of Estate of O’Connell, 476 N.W.2d 8 (N.D.1991) [In construing statutes, specific provisions prevail over general provisions relating to same subject matter, absent manifestation of legislative intent to contrary], Not only does section 26.1-13-15, NDCC, refer generally to “vehicles” in a territorial sense, whereas section 26.1-13-16, NDCC, refers to motor vehicles normally operated or intended to be operated on roads or streets, section 26.1-13-16, NDCC, limits only liability contracts whereas sections 26.1-13-14 and 26.1-13-15, NDCC, refer to all types of property insurance. Section 26.1-13-16, NDCC, is clearly a special statute that prevails notwithstanding any conflict, real or imagined, with sections 26.1-13-14 and 26.1-13-15, NDCC. I do not agree, therefore, that when read together the county mutual is authorized to issue liability insurance on motor vehicles normally operated or intended to be operated on streets and highways even when used incidental to a farming operation.
Nevertheless, I agree the policy, by the exclusion to the exclusion, covers automobiles used on the premises or the way immediately adjoining the premises, and this accident apparently happened while Sandra was on her way to a nearby field.
Furthermore, I agree with the majority that the county mutual cannot claim that the provisions in its insurance policy providing liability coverage for motor vehicles on the premises or ways immediately adjoining the premises is invalid because it was without power to include that provision in its policy under section 26.1-13-16, NDCC.
I concur in the result.