NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 25 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALANNA U.N. TAYLOR, No. 22-35724
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:21-cv-05884-MLP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Michelle L. Peterson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 23, 2023**
Portland, Oregon
Before: BENNETT, VANDYKE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Alanna Taylor appeals the district court’s decision affirming the denial of
Taylor’s application for disability benefits. We review the district court’s judgment
de novo and “set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
evidence or is based on legal error.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d
1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009).
To establish a disability for purposes of the Social Security Act, a claimant
must establish an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which … has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “In order to determine whether a claimant meets this
definition, the ALJ employs a five-step sequential evaluation.” Molina v. Astrue,
674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1502(a).
In this case, the ALJ found that Taylor was not disabled at step five because
Taylor could perform work available in the national economy. The ALJ gave limited
weight to the medical opinion of David Morgan, Ph.D., gave limited weight to
Taylor’s own testimony, and did not expressly consider the lay witness testimony of
Taylor’s partner. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the ALJ
applied the correct legal standards and its decision is supported by substantial
evidence, we affirm.
1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Morgan’s
medical opinion. First, the ALJ explained why it found that Dr. Morgan’s medical
opinion was unsupported and inconsistent. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792
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(9th Cir. 2022) (“[A]n ALJ cannot reject a[] . . . doctor’s opinion as unsupported or
inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.”);
20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)–(c). The ALJ explained that it found part of Dr. Morgan’s
medical opinion was unsupported because the limitations therein were based on
unexplained checkboxes, a sufficient reason for rejecting a medical opinion. Molina,
674 F.3d at 1111–12. The ALJ also explained that Dr. Morgan’s opinion was
inconsistent with Dr. Morgan’s own mental examination, another reason to reject
Dr. Morgan’s opinion.
Second, the ALJ discounted the opinion because the assessed debilitation
would last less than twelve months, not satisfying the statutory duration period. 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (impairment only counts as “disability” if it “has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months”). This too is
a reason for discounting Dr. Morgan’s medical opinion.
Because the ALJ explained why it found that Dr. Morgan’s medical opinion
was unsupported and inconsistent and because that explanation is supported by
substantial evidence, the ALJ “reasonably rejected” Dr. Morgan’s opinion. See
Woods, 32 F.4th at 787, 792–93; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)–(c).
2. The ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial
evidence for discounting Taylor’s subjective testimony. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53
F.4th 489, 497 (9th Cir. 2022). First, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding
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that Taylor’s subjective testimony with regard to the degree of Taylor’s anxiety and
depression symptoms conflicted with the objective medical evidence in the record.
See id. at 498; Carmickle v. Soc. Sec. Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008).
Second, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discount Taylor’s
testimony regarding Taylor’s impairments related to sleep and fatigue. There was
no mention in the treatment record of “sleep attacks,” Taylor’s visit to a sleep center
found Taylor had “only mild obstructive sleep apnea,” and Taylor’s claimed
“persistent intense fatigue” conflicted with Taylor’s statements to a nurse, over a
period of several months, that Taylor was sleeping well at night and had no sleeping
pattern disruption. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 496–99; Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d
1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). Third, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding
that Taylor’s symptoms improved with medication. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)
(ALJ may consider evidence concerning claimant’s medications); Orteza v. Shalala,
50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ may consider effectiveness of medications).
Finally, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Taylor’s testimony as
to the severity of the symptoms conflicted with Taylor’s admitted levels of activity.
See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039; Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir.
2021).
3. While the ALJ did not address the lay testimony of Taylor’s partner, any
error in the failure to address this testimony is harmless because that testimony
4
echoed Taylor’s complaints of debilitating symptoms and the ALJ gave legitimate
reasons for discounting Taylor’s subjective testimony. See Molina, 674 F.3d at
1122.
4. Because the ALJ did not err in discounting the above evidence, the ALJ
also did not err in declining to incorporate the limitations suggested by that evidence
into its assessment of Taylor’s residual functional capacity (RFC) or in using that
RFC to pose a hypothetical to the vocational expert. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261
F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
AFFIRMED.
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Alanna Taylor v. Kilolo Kijakazi
Combined Opinion