DISSENTING OPINION BY
Senior Judge FRIEDMAN.I respectfully dissent. The majority reverses the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) for affirming the decision of the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) based on principles governing a reinstatement petition when World Kitchen, Inc. (Employer) filed a modification petition. In my view, the Board properly understood that section 413(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act)1 authorizes a WCJ to take whatever action is appropriate based on the evidence, irrespective of the form of the petition. Lake v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Whiteford National Lease), 746 A.2d 1183 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000). Thus, I would not reverse the Board on this basis. Instead, for the reasons set forth below, I would vacate and remand for a reasoned decision.
Shannon Rideout (Claimant) suffered a work injury to her back in September 2005, and Employer paid her workers’ *349compensation benefits. On May 9, 2006, William Beutler, M.D., released Claimant to return to sedentary work. Employer provided Dr. Beutler with a video of various light-duty jobs, and Dr. Beutler approved those jobs for Claimant.
Claimant was to return to work on September 6, 2006, but she had a back spasm two hours prior to the start of work and called off pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).2 Employer filed a modification petition, alleging that Claimant failed to return to work in a light-duty position within her restrictions. Claimant did return to work on September 7, 2006, but, in the following days, Claimant occasionally left work early, arrived late or missed a work day because of back pain. In those instances, Claimant relied on her FMLA certification.
By letter dated November 3, 2006, Dr. Beutler approved a ten-hour work day and overtime on Saturdays for Claimant. Employer offered Claimant ten-hour work days on November 6, 7, 8 and 13. On three of those days, Claimant worked only eight hours, leaving early pursuant to her FMLA certification. On the remaining day, Claimant did not work at all, again relying on her FMLA certification.
The WCJ held multiple hearings on Employer’s modification petition. At the October 10, 2006, hearing, the WCJ asked Employer to explain its position.
Judge, our position is that [Cjlaimant was released to return to light duty work forty hours a week by Dr. Beutler and [Cjlaimant was provided with a job offer letter ... asking [Cjlaimant to return to work on September [6j. She didn’t return to work on that date....
The [Cjlaimant did return to work the next day, which was the 7th of September 2006.... And our position is that the work is available, we haven’t received any excuses from any doctor saying that she can’t work the forty hours a week, nor have we received any excuses for the days that she’s taken off work....
(R.R. at 21a.) The WCJ then asked Claimant’s counsel to explain Claimant’s position.
It appears that she should be able to do the work and she makes a good faith effort to do it and she gets there and there are times when she simply can’t function due to back pain and she goes home. They’re difficult situations to deal with, but we believe it’s not unreasonable for her to take off when she’s in severe pain and she does come and gives it her best effort when she feels better. And if that’s related to her work injury, then she’s entitled to partial benefits.
(R.R. at 23a.) After considering the evidence presented, the WCJ stated:
I thought there was little conflict in this case. Claimant did go back to work and was working. The jobs were appropriate. [Employerj followed the recommendations of the doctor. Claimant exercised her own [judgmentj. There had been partial indemnity paid. It’s not always clear if Claimant missed work because of the que system and the nature of the light duty jobs[,j namely that the amount of work in those jobs can vary. *350I didn’t think there were any issues with regard to indemnity.
(WCJ’s op. at 4.) Thus, the WCJ ordered as follows: “Compensation remains modified or suspended depending upon Claimants [sic] actual earnings.” (WCJ’s op. at 5.)
Employer appealed to the Board, which affirmed. In doing so, the Board commented that the WCJ implicitly believed Claimant’s testimony that her failure to work the entire time approved by Dr. Beutler was due to her work-related back injury. (WCAB’s op. at 5.) The Board also stated that Claimant’s testimony in that regard was sufficient to overcome Dr. Beutler’s expert medical testimony because, in a reinstatement proceeding, the causal connection between the original work injury and a claimant’s disability is presumed. (WCAB’s op. at 5) (citing Latta v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Latrobe Die Casting Co.), 537 Pa. 223, 642 A.2d 1083 (1994) (stating that a claimant’s testimony, if believed, is sufficient to support a reinstatement of benefits following a suspension)). The Board acknowledged that this is not a reinstatement case, but the Board believed that the presumption applied here. (WCAB’s op. at 5.)
I. Applicability of Reinstatement Rules
On appeal to this court, Employer argues that the Board erred in applying the rules governing reinstatement proceedings when Employer filed a modification petition under section 413(a) of the Act. I disagree.
This court has held that, when either party files a petition pursuant to section 413(a) of the Act, the WCJ may take whatever appropriate action is indicated by the evidence. Lake (approving the suspension of benefits when the employer filed only a termination petition); Fontaine v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Philip Fountain & Son), 739 A.2d 628 (Pa. Cmwlth.1999) (approving the suspension of benefits when the employer filed only a modification petition); Mader v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (USAir, Inc.), 669 A.2d 511 (Pa.Cmwlth.) (approving the suspension of benefits when the only petition before the WCJ was the claimant’s reinstatement petition), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 686, 679 A.2d 231 (1996). Thus, where an employer files a modification petition and the evidence indicates that benefits should be modified at times, suspended at times and reinstated at times, the WCJ may modify, suspend and reinstate benefits without the parties filing additional petitions.
Here, based on Claimant’s return to light-duty work, the WCJ ordered her benefits modified or suspended depending on her actual earnings, implicitly reinstating benefits during those periods when Claimant was absent from work without earnings. As the Board indicated, in order to reach such a result, the WCJ had to infer and believe from Claimant’s testimony that her absences were related to the work injury. Section 413(a) of the Act authorized the WCJ to consider the sufficiency of Claimant’s testimony in that regard. It was not necessary for the WCJ to wait until Claimant filed a reinstatement petition and repeated her testimony, as the majority holds.3 (See majority at 347-48.)
*351II. Reasoned Decision
Employer also argues that the WCJ’s decision is not a reasoned decision because the WCJ did not address, or even recognize, the indemnity issue presented by Employer’s modification petition, i.e., whether Claimant’s failure to work the light-duty jobs at various times was due to her work injury.4 I agree.
The WCJ did not specifically address the indemnity issue because the WCJ “thought there was little conflict in this case” and “didn’t think there were any issues with regard to indemnity.” (WCJ’s op. at 4.) The WCJ was incorrect.5 Although Employer and Claimant differed as to whether Claimant’s failure to work all of the time approved by Dr. Beutler was due to her work injury, the WCJ did not discuss the evidence presented on this issue or explicitly determine whether Claimant met her burden of proof.6 The WCJ simply stated that the reason why Claimant missed work is not always clear. If the WCJ had realized there was a dispute and examined the evidence, the WCJ might have reached a different conclusion than that assumed by the WCAB.
Accordingly, I would vacate and remand for a reasoned decision.
. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 772. Section 413(a) of the Act states that a workers' compensation judge may at any time modify, reinstate, suspend or terminate benefits upon petition filed by either party. Id.
. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. Section 102(a)(1)(D) of FMLA states that an eligible employee is entitled to twelve workweeks of leave during any twelve-month period because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the employee's position. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Such leave may be taken intermittently when medically necessary and when the employee’s physician provides sufficient certification. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a).
. Although Employer filed only a modification petition, the WCJ permitted Employer to suspend benefits if Claimant's actual earnings equal or exceed her pre-injury earnings. The majority remands for an order granting a modification of Claimant's benefits. Thus, under the majority's holding, Employer may not suspend Claimant's benefits if her earnings from the light-duty job equal or exceed her pre-injury earnings. The majority would *351require that Employer file a suspension petition.
.Section 422(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 834, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
All parties to an adjudicatory proceeding are entitled to a reasoned decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence as a whole which clearly and concisely states and explains the rationale for the decisions so that all can determine why and how a particular result was reached. The workers’ compensation judge shall specify the evidence upon which the workers’ compensation judge relies and state the reasons for accepting it in conformity with this section. When faced with conflicting evidence, the workers’ compensation judge must adequately explain the reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence. Uncontroverted evidence may not be rejected for no reason or for an irrational reason; the workers' compensation judge must identify that evidence and explain adequately the reasons for its rejection. The adjudication shall provide the basis for meaningful appellate review.
77 P.S. § 834.
. The majority appears to agree, stating that the "WCJ was mistaken in his belief that there were no issues as to indemnity.” (Majority at 347.) However, the majority then states that the WCJ decided the indemnity issue by finding that Employer made appropriate work available to Claimant. Id. This was not the indemnity issue presented to the WCJ. Claimant agreed that she should be able to do the work that Employer provided. (R.R. at 23a.) The real issue was whether Claimant's absences from work were related to her work injury, but the majority does not address that issue because Claimant did not file a reinstatement petition.
. If a claimant has periodic absences from work and the employer questions whether the absences are related to the work injury, the claimant has the burden of proving that causal relationship. YDC New Castle-PA DPW v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Hedland), 950 A.2d 1107 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008).