CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
KLEIN, J.:¶ 1 I agree with the majority that the trial court properly determined that Teeter was not subjected to an illegal arrest, and, therefore, properly denied his motion to suppress. However, under the circumstances of this case, I do not believe that it is permissible to impose the tripling of the minimum of Teeter’s sentence by applying the “school bus stop” enhancement. Therefore, I join in part and dissent in part.
¶ 2 Defendant Jeffrey Teeter received a mandatory sentence for the attempted sale of drugs; his sentence was increased three times more than it would have been otherwise because the court found that his conduct fell within the provisions of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6314(b)(4), which triples the penalty if a defendant “committed the offense on a school bus or within 500 feet of a school bus stop.”
¶ 3 It certainly makes sense to provide an additional penalty if a defendant sells drugs on a school bus or in the vicinity of a *900school bus stop where children might be gathered as they get on or off of a bus. At the same time, it accomplishes no valid end and makes no legal or common sense if a sentence is tripled under these circumstances where:
no one could realize this was a bus stop because there was no sign indicating such;
it was 9:30 at night; and
school had ended for the year.
All of these circumstances demonstrate that section 6314(b)(4) is ambiguous as applied to Teeter. Therefore, I believe that to triple the sentence under these circumstances not only distorts legislature’s intent, but also poses serious Federal due process problems.
¶4 The majority accurately states the law, which raises the issue of substantive due process, but then does not follow this law. I fully agree with the following statement found on page 6 of the majority opinion:
A defendant does have a substantive due process right to be free from vague and overbroad sentencing statutes. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 572 Pa. 283, 815 A.2d 563 (2002); Commonwealth v. Bell, 537 Pa. 558, 645 A.2d 211 (1994); Commonwealth v. Burnsworth, 543 Pa. 18, 669 A.2d 883 (1995). This due process right is connected to the right to be free from arbitrary or discriminatory sentencing. Bell at 567 n. 9, 645 A.2d at 216 n. 9. When faced with such a challenge, courts must define the allegedly-vague word or phrase to determine its meaning, in keeping with the apparent intent of the General Assembly (as discussed infra) Burnsworth.
¶ 5 However, I strongly disagree with the majority when it states in the same opinion:
As discussed infra, we conclude the phrase “school bus stop” is unambiguous under the facts presented at sentencing in the case sub judice. A plain meaning reading of Section 6314(b)(4) yields no ambiguity within the statute and reveals a legislative intent to regulate sentences for drug offenses committed near places used as school bus stops.
¶ 6 There is an adage used when instructing young lawyers that when a lawyer says something is “clear,” it is usually unclear or clear the other way. That adage applies when saying that the location at the end of a driveway where this drug sale was intended to take place is near what must unambiguously be considered a “school bus stop.”
¶ 7 The context of the phrase “school bus stop” in section 6314(b)(4) is instructive. The statute defines the prohibited location as “on a school bus or within 500 feet of a school bus stop.” The intent appears to be to impose the tripled penalty if young children are around the place of the sale, not if they might have been there hours or days before. One would think that a sale near the bus stop is akin to sale on the bus, so that if the sale takes place just after the children disembark from the bus or while they are waiting to get on the bus the enhancement applies. This makes sense. But in those circumstances, a defendant would necessarily be aware that there is a school bus stop and could not complain if the sentence is enhanced. However, under the circumstances here, there is no way the defendant could know that the school bus ever stopped at the end of the driveway. That is beyond the fact that at the time of the sale, which occurred during the summer months at 9:30 in the evening, it would have been extremely unlikely that any children were close by.
*901¶ 8 Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly against the Commonwealth.1 In this particular case, the drug sale was made at the end of a residential driveway, 92 feet from the street. There was no sign marking the end of this driveway as a school bus stop. The time was 9:40 p.m. School had closed for the summer recess earlier that week. There was no indication at all at the time of this intended sale that school buses stopped at the bottom of the driveway. Sometimes a school bus stop location is clear, for example, if the stop is marked, if there are children gathered and waiting, and if it is during the day while school is in session and the stop is marked. However, considering all of the circumstances in this case, it is unfair to apply the enhancement where whether this is or is not a school bus stop is unclear, particularly since there is no notice to anyone that this is a school bus stop. Therefore, under the rule of lenity, I do not believe it can be said with any clarity that this is a school bus stop.
¶ 9 I also disagree with the Commonwealth that the cases dealing with the “school zone” sentencing enhancement control this situation. The cases interpreting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317,2 a different statute, but one also aimed at limiting drug exposure to minors, may be summarized as follows:
In Commonwealth v. Campbell, 758 A.2d 1231 (Pa.Super.2000), this Court held that the term “playground” encompassed “play areas” in “semiprivate housing complexes and apartment building complexes.” In reaching this conclusion, we rejected the argument of the defendant, as well as the trial court, that the term “playground” only referred to a “school-related” playground. Id. at 1235.3
In Commonwealth v. Drummond, 775 A.2d 849 (Pa.Super.2001) (en banc), appeal denied, 567 Pa. 756, 790 A.2d 1013 (Pa.2001), this Court rejected the argument that the legislature, in establishing a 1000-foot “drug free zone” around schools, had intended to include only public areas accessible by school-aged children. Therefore, we held that the “drug free school zone” included a private apartment within 1,000 feet of a school. Id. at 857.
*902¶ 10 The above-referenced cases essentially hold that when construing the plain meaning of terms such as “playground,” “school,” or “within,” a defendant is not entitled to the narrowest meaning of those terms. Moreover, we have consistently refused to interpret section 6317 in a manner that would be inconsistent with the manifest intentions of the legislature and its overarching policy goals of protecting children from the dangers attendant to the drug trade.4 However, a close reading of the case law interpreting section 6317 reveals that this Court was never squarely confronted with the question of whether an ambiguous term or phrase should be applied narrowly or expansively. There is a difference between identifying a building as a school or equipment as that of a playground and identifying an unmarked location as a “school bus stop.”5
¶ 11 In the present case, the phrase “school bus stop” is susceptible to several reasonable interpretations. The evidence at trial clearly showed that there was no marking showing that this was a school bus stop at this location. Further, the testimony of a witness for the Commonwealth, a school bus driver for the Chestnut Ridge School District, opined that, because school had recessed for the summer, no school bus stop existed within 500 feet of the place of appellant’s intended delivery of the controlled substances to a mi*903nor. Consequently, the record here presents ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase “school bus stop,” since as applied, its existence could depend upon variables such as (1) a point in time, (2) a point upon real property, or (3) a combination of the two. Put differently, the existence of a “school bus stop” may depend wholly upon the time of day or year, depending on whether school is in session, or upon a point of real property where a school bus might stop on a given day, irrespective of the aspects inherent in the term “school.”6 Moreover, the location of school bus stops frequently changes, both from year to year and sometimes during the course of a school year. Thus, I believe that the phrase “school bus stop” is ambiguous. Cf. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 743 A.2d 460, 465 (Pa.Super.1999), (“We will consider the language of the statute ambiguous only where it will bear two or more meanings”), appeal dismissed, 563 Pa. 187, 758 A.2d 1177 (2000).
¶ 12 Since the phrase “school bus stop” is ambiguous in the context of the record before this Court, I believe that the ambiguity raised must be resolved in favor of Teeter. The so-called “rule of lenity” is a rule that ensures “fairness to persons subject to the law by requiring penal statutes to give clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand, as to what actions would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be.” See Commonwealth v. Reaser, 851 A.2d 144, 149 (Pa.Super.2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Pursuant to the principle of fair notice, the rule of lenity further provides that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of a penal statute must be resolved in favor of lenity.” Id. (Internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 583 Pa. 478, 879 A.2d 185, 195-96 (2005). Here, the ambiguity presented in the text of section 6314(b)(4) precludes a finding that Teeter received fair notice that his conduct would expose him to a tripling of his additional minimum criminal sanction merely because the delivery of a controlled substance was to occur within 500 feet of the unmarked real property on which a school bus occasionally stopped at a time different that in which the drugs were intended to be sold.
¶ 13 I believe the phrase “school bus stop,” as applied in this instance, is ambiguous, and, based upon the principles and canons prohibiting the imposition of criminal punishment upon defendants due to unreasonably vague penal statutes, the application of the mandatory minimum prescribed by section 6314(b)(4) cannot stand.
¶ 14 In summary, while I agree with the majority that the motion to suppress was properly denied, I disagree that the tripling of the minimum sentence because of the school bus stop enhancement applies in this case and accordingly dissent from that part of the Opinion.
. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1) (oftentimes called the "Rule of Lenity.”).
. Section 6317 states in relevant part:
(a) General rule. — A person 18 years of age or older who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of a violation of section 13(a)(14) or (30) of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, shall, if the delivery or possession with intent to deliver of the controlled substance occurred within 1,000 feet of the real property on which is located a public, private or parochial school or a college or university or within 250 feet of the real property on which is located a recreation center or playground or on a school bus, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least two years of total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title, The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act or other statute to the contrary....
[[Image here]]
If the sentencing court finds that the delivery or possession with intent to deliver was to an individual under 18 years of age, then this section shall not be applicable and the offense shall be subject to section 6314 (relating to sentencing and penalties for trafficking drugs to minors).
18 Pa.C.S. § 6317(a) (footnote omitted).
. See also Commonwealth v. Bongiorno, 905 A.2d 998 (Pa.Super.2006) (holding that area in residential apartment complex containing a merry-go-round and safety chips was a playground); Commonwealth v. Brice, 856 A.2d 107 (Pa.Super.2004) (holding that poorly-equipped basketball court where children “routinely play” constituted a playground).
. Underlying our interpretation of the mandatory minimum provisions of Section 6317 is the oft cited rationale set forth by this Court in Commonwealth v. Campbell, 758 A.2d 1231 (Pa.Super.2000):
We agree that section 6317 is a penal statute; however, strict construction of the statute, in conjunction with a common usage interpretation of the term "playground,” supports our interpretation. It is our finding that the General Assembly's goal and purpose was to protect the children of our communities from the ravages and evils of the illegal drug trade that pervades our country. Through the enactment of section 6317, it attempted to fortify the barrier that segregates the places where our children frequent from the illegal drug scene. A strict reading of the statute exemplifies the General Assembly's intent. The statute protects our children “within 1000 feet of the real property on which is located a public, private or parochial school or a college or a university." 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317 (emphasis added). Furthermore, it protects our children on their way to and from school on their “school bus.” Id. (emphasis added). Finally, it protects our children in the places where they routinely play. The General Assembly did not choose to limit this protection solely to school play areas or municipal facilities, but chose to reinforce the purpose of the statute by including all areas "within 250 feet of the real property on which is located a recreation center or playground." 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317. (Emphasis added).
Id. (Emphasis in original).
. While I recognize the expansive interpretation of section 6317 in the aforementioned cases, I would also point out that application of an enhancement under section 6314 differs significantly from one under section 6317. To begin with, section 6314 requires the presence, or at least the intended presence, of a minor for the provision to apply at all. By contrast, section 6317 is designed to protect children from all the attendant harms of the drug trade, Drummond, supra at 857, whether or not a minor is present. Section 6314 is concerned with the actual accessibility of drugs to minors; section 6317 specifically does not apply to actual or intended drugs sales to minors. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317(a). The Drummond Court recognized this important distinction between sections 6314 and 6317, stating:
We note further the enactment of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6314 (Sentencing and penalties for trafficking drugs to minors). This section applies when the sale is actually to a minor. The existence of this section, along with the reference to its applicability in § 6317, further supports our findings that accessibility to the drugs by minors is not a factor detrimental to the application of the provisions of section 6317. Rather a separate provision exists to address that offense.
Id. at 857 n. 7 (emphasis added).
. It bears remarking further that the legislature, in enacting sections 6314(b)(3) and 6317(a), clarified and plainly intended to disregard the temporal aspects of the term “school,” as it connotes structures and buildings, by proscribing the actual or intended delivery of controlled substances “within 1,000 feet of the real property " on which a "school” is located. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3314(b)(3), 6317(a) (emphasis supplied). Textual evidence of a similarly intended expansive interpretation of the term "school” is noticeably absent from the bare reference to a "school bus stop” in section 6314(b)(4). See Pa.C.S.A. § 6314(b)(4).