(dissenting).
I am of the opinion that under M. S. A. 447.045, subd. 4, the ordinance is valid. This section provides that, if the voters of any city of the fourth class which operates one or more municipal liquor stores, at a general or special election, vote in favor of contributing from the profit in the city liquor dispensary fund toward the construction, equipping, and maintenance of a community hospital within city limits, the council may appropriate not to exceed $200,000 from such profit for such purpose; and that, to give effect thereto, certificates of indebtedness in anticipation of such profits and payable therefrom may be issued by the city. It would appear that under this subdivision there is ample authority for enactment of the challenged ordinance by the electors of Two Harbors. It was submitted to the council by the requisite number of electors pursuant to Charter of Two Harbors, c. II, § 16. Thereunder, a special election was called to vote upon it, although it is clear that such an election could have been called under § 447.045, subd. 4, regardless of charter provisions. It was adopted by a majority of electors. It did not authorize contributions from liquor dispensary profits in excess of the $200,000 statutory limitation. The hospital to be constructed or maintained thereunder was to be within the city and open to all city residents on equal terms.
It is true § 447.045 makes no reference to appropriations for private, nonprofit hospital corporations, leaving designation of the recipient optional with local electors or councils. The principle that contribution of public funds to such an organization for hospital purposes may be validly undertaken is supported by a number of decisions. Legat v. Adorno, 138 Conn. 134, 83 A. (2d) 185; Finan v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 154 Md. 563, 141 A. 269; Le Bourgeois v. City of New Orleans, 145 La. 274, 82 So. 268. As was said in Kentucky Bldg. Comm. v. Effron, 310 Ky. 355, 358, 220 S. W. (2d) 836, 837, “It is well settled that a private agency may be utilized as the pipe-line through which a public expenditure is made, the test being not who receives the money, but the character of the use for which it is expended.” See, also, Opinions Attorney General, *505No. 1001-A, May 5, 1948 (charitable hospital of Sauk Centre, operated on a nonsectarian basis, controlled by religious order), and No. 1001-A, December 18, 1951 (Northwestern Hospital Association of Thief River Falls, private nonprofit corporation). Based on the foregoing factors and in line with the authorities cited, it seems conclusive that the ordinance here challenged is valid.
Of course, the city council must make the ultimate appropriations and determine the method of raising the funds through the issuance and sale of certificates of indebtedness, payable from profits of the dispensary as provided in § 447.045, subd. 4. Likewise, it must determine the conditions under which a designated beneficiary shall receive the contribution so there will be no opportunity for waste or diversion of public funds and to insure performance of the obligations imposed on the recipient. Its authority in this respect arises not only by virtue of Charter of Two Harbors, c. VII, § 18, but under the language of § 447.045, subd. 4, as well. Specific questions relative to such matters, however, are not presented in this appeal since the only question for determination here is whether the ordinance as enacted is valid. It being entirely consistent with the provisions of § 447.045 and adopted by the voters in direct conformity with the procedure called for therein, it should be upheld.