dissenting:
Appellant’s petition for appointment of an arbitrator averred that he “is an insured under policies of insurance issued by respondents”, that he “was severely injured in a motor vehicle collision on July 2, 1977”, and that “disputes have arisen with regard to whether or not an uninsured motorist was involved in said collision and whether said uninsured motorist caused injuries to the petitioner”.1 Appellee, Commercial, answered Appellant’s petition by denying that an uninsured motorist was involved in the accident.2 These are the only allegations which the court below should have considered, and they are the only allegations which this Court should consider in determining whether the court below properly denied Appellant’s petition to compel arbitration.
Properly perceived, the instant case involves a single, rather simple issue: whether a trial court must appoint an arbitrator where a party avers that (1) he is insured under automobile liability policies containing uninsured motorist clauses which provide for arbitration of disputes arising thereunder; (2) he was injured in an automobile accident and a dispute has arisen between him and his insurers as to whether his injuries were caused by an uninsured motorist; and (3) despite a demand for arbitration by the insured, the insurance carriers deny that an uninsured motorist was involved and therefore refuse to arbitrate. In view of the issue, and the pertinent allegations as set forth above, I conclude that the court below erred in denying Appellant’s petition.
*185The court below candidly acknowledges that “on the face of it Petitioner’s demand for arbitration seems justified since by their terms the insurance issues involved seem to fall within the class or (sic) questions arbitrable under both policies”. T.C. Slip Op. at 5. Nevertheless, the court “refused to refer this dispute to arbitration and directly resolved the substantive issue of coverage”. Id. at 12. Why? What compelling considerations mandated such an extraordinary result?
In justification and explanation of its conclusion, the lower court pronounces that it discovered, apparently lurking behind “the face of Petitioner’s demand for arbitration”, an issue which it considered “important and novel and one of pure law”, to wit:
to what extent automobile casualty insurers writing business in Pennsylvania and thus required to afford uninsured motorist protection to their insured can be held to create a fund for settlement as to acts of an insured motorist where a catastrophic accident renderes (sic) the $15,000/30,000 liability coverage required by the financial responsibility laws and actually maintained inadequate to compensate all victims for all losses.
Id. at 5. The court further opines that the novelty and importance of this issue is such that:
[JJustice and certainty require [it] to be adjudicated uniformly by the Courts of Pennsylvania, not decided privately by numerous ad hoc arbitration panels subject only to the most limited scope of judicial review.
Id. at 5.
The majority, in affirming the trial court, also casts aside the issue posed by Appellant’s petition and substitutes, in its stead, one it would rather address. The majority frankly concedes that Appellant’s petition “alleged only that appellant was insured under policies containing uninsured motorist coverage, that he had been severely injured in a motor vehicle collision, that a dispute had arisen as to whether an uninsured motorist was responsible, and that appellees had not complied with his demand for arbitration.” At 714. *186The majority proceeds, however, to discuss “additional facts” set forth in Appellant’s memorandum of law and subsequent pleadings, Id. at 714-715; impermissibly considers the policy definition of “uninsured automobile” and the Insurance Commissioner’s regulations relating thereto, Id. at 716; approves the lower court’s impermissible threshold determination that “no uninsured automobile (was) involved”, Id. at 716; reasons therefrom that “it is apparent” that Appellant’s claim “is but another way of saying that the Commissioner’s regulations are contrary to the statute”, Id. at 717; and concludes thereby that this case is within the rule which allows courts to assume jurisdiction “only where the claimant attacks a particular provision of the [uninsured motorist] clause itself as being contrary to a ... legislative . . . mandate. ..”. United Services Automobile Association Appeal, 227 Pa.Super.Ct. 508, 516, 323 A.2d 737, 741 (1974).
The exegetic alchemy, engaged in by both the lower court and the majority, was necessitated by their respective avowed acknowledgment of the applicable law:
the rule, to which all cases conform, is that where the application or construction of the uninsured motorist clause is at issue the dispute is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrators.
Id., 227 Pa.Super. at 516, 323 A.2d at 741 (emphasis added). Absent the transformations effected by the majority and the lower court, the issue posed by the “pleadings” is whether Appellant had been involved in an accident with, and had been injured by, an uninsured motorist.3 This is an issue which involves the application or construction of the uninsured motorist clause and is therefore within the exclusive *187jurisdiction of the arbitrators. United Services, supra. Since the lower court’s conclusion is to the contrary and the majority affirms, I dissent.
The court below, relying upon Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968) and Wilbert v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company, 254 Pa.Super.Ct. 217, 385 A.2d 987 (1978), determined that it had authority to “reserve” the issue, as articulated by the court, from “an otherwise broadside reference of uninsured motorist issues to arbitrators.” T.C. Slip Op. at 6. The majority relies on United Services, supra, as well as on Wilbert, in support of its conclusion that the court, rather than arbitrators, had jurisdiction. None of these cases supports the foregoing conclusions.
In Blumling, the insurer brought a declaratory judgment action which sought, in part, to determine that the tortfeasor who caused Blumling’s injury was not an uninsured motorist. As to this issue, as is apparent from the Opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) O’Brien, and as subsequently expressly noted by the Chief Justice in Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company v. Medycki, 431 Pa. 67, 71, 244 A.2d 655, 657 (1968): “No question was raised as to the arbitrability of the issue.” (emphasis added).4
In Wilbert, the insured petitioned for declaratory judgment, arguing that an exclusion in the uninsured motorist clause “was in violation of the Uninsured Motorist Act and the rules and regulations adopted and promulgated by the Insurance Commissioner pursuant to the Act.” Id., 254 Pa.Super.Ct. at 220, 385 A.2d at 989. It was this contention which caused this Court to note:
Generally, a case turning on the application or construction of an uninsured motorist clause is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitration system. (Citation omit*188ted.) However, the lower court’s adjudication of necessity reached [as ours must reach] Appellees’ claim that a particular provision of the clause is contrary to a constitutional, legislative, or administrative mandate. For this reason the case was properly before the lower court.
Id., 254 Pa.Super. at 220, n.3, 385 A.2d at 989, n.3.
In United Services, the insured appellees sustained personal injuries when an unknown motorist swerved his car in front of theirs, causing them to hit a third car. Appellees submitted their case to arbitration on the theory that the unknown motorist’s vehicle was a “hit-and-run” car. Since there was no allegation of any contact between appellees’ car and the swerving car, and since the insurance policy defined a “hit-and-run” car as one causing injury “arising out of physical contact”, the arbitrators found in favor of the insurance company. Appellees’ petition to vacate the award was granted by the lower court and the insurance company appealed, challenging, inter alia, the jurisdiction of the court below. This Court, in affirming, articulated the rule relied upon herein by the majority, noting, however, that appellees had alleged that one of the policy’s terms offended a mandate of the state legislature; appellees “attacked the ‘physical contact’ requirement in appellant’s policy as being repugnant to the Uninsured Motorist Coverage Act”. Id., 227 Pa.Super.Ct. at 511, 517, 323 A.2d at 739, 741. No similar allegations have been made in the case at bar.
The instant case differs from Blumling in that arbitrability has been raised as an issue, and it differs from Blumling, Wilbert and United Services in that none of the parties has attacked the uninsured motorist clauses of Appellees’ policies as being contrary to a legislative or administrative mandate. Rather, as averred in Appellant’s petition, the dispute between Appellant and Appellees is whether the tortfeasor, who caused Appellant’s injuries, was an “uninsured motorist”. The validity of Appellant’s averment is borne out by the pleadings, the briefs filed and the oral arguments presented by the parties. Appellant contends that the tortfeasor who caused Appellant’s injuries was an *189“uninsured motorist,” and Appellees contend that he was not. As has already been noted, and as will be illustrated in the discussion below, such a dispute may neither be considered nor resolved by the courts, but is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrators where, as here, the parties have agreed to arbitrate disputes arising under the uninsured motorist coverage.5 Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company v. Medycki, 431 Pa. at 69, 244 A.2d at 656.
In reaching its contrary conclusion, the majority overrules three prior decisions of this Court, Hart v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 288 Pa.Super.Ct. 53, 431 A.2d 283 (1981); Gordon v. Keystone Insurance Company, 277 Pa.Super.Ct. 198, 419 A.2d 730 (1980) and Mapp v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 268 Pa.Super.Ct. *190404, 408 A.2d 850 (1979), holding that Hart and Gordon relied on Mapp and that Mapp was wrongly decided. At 717. The majority’s analysis of Mapp seeks to distinguish the cases on which it relied. As to one of those cases, Grange Mutual Casualty Company v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Company, 438 Pa. 95, 263 A.2d 732 (1970), the majority takes refuge in a non-existent distinction.
The majority characterizes Grange Mutual as a case wherein our Supreme Court “ordered arbitration of the purely factual issue of whether that driver (of the ‘other’ automobile) had the insured’s permission” to drive the automobile in question. I believe this is a mischaracterization. In Grange Mutual, one Oren E. Parker was injured by an automobile owned by J. R. VanAken and operated by F. D. Whitt, Jr. Appellant, Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Company, (P.M.A.) insured VanAken and appellee, Grange Mutual, insured Parker under a policy containing uninsured motorist coverage. Parker made claim against P.M.A., which disclaimed coverage on the ground that Whitt did not have VanAken’s permission to operate the car. Parker then demanded arbitration in connection with his claim against his own carrier, Grange Mutual, for uninsured motorist benefits. Grange Mutual thereupon filed a petition for declaratory judgment to have the court declare that Whitt was not an uninsured motorist within the meaning of its policy. P.M.A. filed preliminary objections, raising a question of jurisdiction, which the lower court dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the issues were matters for arbitration and not for a declaratory judgment proceeding in the courts.
Although the Supreme Court did point out that the jurisdictional question involved an issue of fact, it did not merely order arbitration of that factual issue, as the majority herein asserts. Rather, it concluded that all the issues were for arbitration and it dismissed the petition for declaratory judgment. That the presence of an issue of fact was not a dispositive consideration is demonstrated by the Court’s cita*191tion of Allstate Insurance Company v. Taylor, 434 Pa. 21, 252 A.2d 618 (1969).
In Allstate, the insurance carrier appellee had denied uninsured motorist coverage to appellant because it contended he was not a resident of his father’s household and therefore not an “insured” under the policy. When appellant sought to have the dispute arbitrated, Allstate filed a petition for declaratory judgment. All of the facts necessary for a determination of appellant’s status were developed in testimony before the court below. Id., 434 Pa. at 22, 252 A.2d at 619. Nevertheless, in reversing the lower court’s decree holding that appellant was not a resident of his father’s household, the Supreme Court held that “(t)he dispute between the parties, having arisen under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy, should have been settled by arbitration”. Id., 434 Pa. at 22, 252 A.2d 619.
The foregoing analyses of Grange Mutual and Allstate are especially significant in connection with the majority’s very brief and somewhat cryptic attempt to distinguish National Grange Mutual Insurance Company v. Kuhn, 428 Pa. 179, 236 A.2d 758 (1968). The very brevity of the majority’s discussion, as compared with its painstaking analysis of Mapp, is instructive and particularly noteworthy inasmuch as both Hart and Gordon, as well as numerous other cases decided by the Supreme Court and this Court,6 have relied upon National Grange. Acknowledging that in National Grange the Supreme Court ordered arbitration where the *192dispute was whether a motorist was insured or not, the majority states: “However, there is no indication that that determination depended on anything but factual questions.” At 717. The converse, of course, is equally true; there is no indication that the determination did depend on the resolution of factual questions. Neither statement, however, is pertinent since, as Allstate demonstrates, courts may not assume jurisdiction simply because the operative facts have been brought to its attention.
In National Grange, Kuhn, a passenger in a vehicle operated by an insured of National Grange, was injured as the result of a collision with an automobile operated by one Doyle. Kuhn demanded arbitration, in accordance with the policy provisions,7 in order to obtain uninsured motorist benefits. National Grange thereupon filed a complaint in equity seeking to enjoin arbitration “on the theory that the issue of whether Doyle was, in fact, an uninsured motorist is not an arbitrable issue within the terms of the insurance policy.” Id. 428 Pa. at 181, 236 A.2d at 758. (emphasis added) In reversing the preliminary injunction granted by the lower court, our Supreme Court stated:
*193[C]ourt proceedings should not be read into the agreement to arbitrate. We believe that the policy language expresses the agreement of the parties to submit the “matter or matters” in dispute between them, relative to the protection against uninsured motorists provision of the policy, to determination by arbitration. The arbitration clause, in our view, indicates that the parties contemplated one method, and one method only, for the resolution of disputes under this coverage. That method was arbitration and all such disputes should be so decided.
Id. 428 Pa. at 185, 236 A.2d at 760-761 (emphasis added).
The arbitration provisions in the Concord policy are indistinguishable from those in the National Grange policy.8 Although the arbitration provision in the Commercial policy is somewhat different, the operative language expressly provides for arbitration where the parties disagree whether the insured “is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile.” Consequently, whether the operator of the other vehicle was an “uninsured motorist”, is an arbitrable issue.9
The majority errs, in my opinion, because it reaches a conclusion which follows syllogistically from an erroneous premise: that courts may assume jurisdiction in a case arising under an uninsured motorist clause merely because the insurer opposes arbitration on the ground that one of the requisite elements for invoking the uninsured motorist coverage is missing. In order to test the validity of this premise, it is necessary to refer to the coverage provision.
*194The company will pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle because of bodily injury . . . sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile ; provided, for the purposes of this coverage, determination as to whether the insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover such damages ... shall be made ... by arbitration, (emphasis added)
See n.5, supra.
In the instant case, the insurers have targeted the “uninsured automobile” requirement; they contend this element is lacking, in that the tortfeasor’s automobile was insured, and they argue, therefore, that there is nothing to arbitrate. The majority agrees, despite the fact that such reasoning defies both law and logic. It necessitates a threshold determination10 that the tortfeasor’s automobile was insured, even though the law is clear that such a determination is within the exclusive jurisdiction of arbitrators. Moreover, in sanctioning such reasoning, this Court permits the insurance carrier to unilaterally abrogate arbitration as the means of dispute resolution in virtually all uninsured motorist claims.11
Suppose, for example, that upon being presented with a claim arising under the uninsured motorist coverage, an insurance carrier denies the claim and, in support of its position, targets one of the other required elements. The carrier might aver: (1) that the claimant is not an insured (as in fact alleged by Commercial in the instant case); (2) that the claimant is not the legal representative of the insured; (3) that the claimant is not legally entitled to *195recover damages; (4) that the party responsible was neither the owner nor operator of an uninsured automobile; (5) that the claimant did not sustain bodily injury; (6) that the bodily injury was not caused by accident; or (7) that the accident did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured automobile.12
In each such instance, under the view urged by Appellees, adopted by the lower court and affirmed by the majority, the court would consider and decide the threshold “missing element” issue interposed by the insurance carrier in response to a Petition seeking to compel arbitration. If the court concluded that the carrier’s contention was meritorious, the Petition would be denied.13 This result not only flies in the face of precedent,14 but it permits an insurance carrier, by the mere introduction of an issue as yet premature, to evade its contractual undertaking to submit uninsured motorist disputes to arbitration. This despite the fact that our appellate courts have affirmed and reaffirmed that all disputes arising under the uninsured motorist coverage are covered by the arbitration agreement. Allstate Insurance Co. v. McMonagle, 449 Pa. 362, 296 A.2d 738 (1972); *196Pennsylvania General Insurance Co. v. Barr, 435 Pa. 456, 257 A.2d 550 (1969); Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co. v. Medycki, supra 431 Pa. at 69, 244 A.2d at 656; Henderson v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., supra; Hartford Insurance Group v. Kassler, 227 Pa.Super.Ct. 47, 324 A.2d 521 (1974).15 In Medycki, our Supreme Court stated:
It is an oversimplification to assert that the denial of coverage by appellant (insurer) ipso facto removes the uninsured motorists clause from the policy and with it the arbitration provision . . .
Id., 431 Pa. at 72, 244 A.2d at 657.
There are additional compelling reasons for refusing to recognize an exception, such as created by the court below and approved by the majority, to the principle that all disputes which arise under an uninsured motorist clause must be arbitrated where the application or construction thereof is at issue. First, such an exception constitutes an unwarranted and impermissible judicial rewriting of the insurance contract inasmuch as the parties have indicated, by the inclusion of an arbitration clause, that they contemplated one method, and one method only, arbitration, for the resolution of disputes under this coverage. National Grange Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kuhn, 428 Pa. at 185, 236 A.2d at 761 (1968). Second, whereas arbitration spares the courts the burden of much unnecessary litigation, United Services, 227 Pa.Super.Ct. at 515 n.6, 323 A.2d at 740 n.6, such an exception will open the doors to numerous challenges to arbitration, needlessly burdening already overcrowded court dockets. Finally, arbitration promotes a prompt and final resolution of litigation, a consequence which is advantageous to both the insurer and the insured. As was noted by Mr. Justice Roberts in Runewicz v. Keystone Ins. Co., 476 Pa. 456, 464, 383 A.2d 189, 193 (1978), (Roberts, J., concurring):
Arbitration is too valuable a friend of the Court to be treated so lightly. See County of Allegheny v. Allegheny *197County Prison Employees Independent Union, supra (Roberts J., dissenting); Bole v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 475 Pa. 187, 193, 379 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1977) (Roberts, J., dissenting, joined by Nix, J.). As Mr. Chief Justice Burger has stated:
“The notion that most people want black-robed judges, well-dressed lawyers, and fine paneled courtrooms as the setting to resolve their disputes is not correct. People with problems, like people with pains, want relief, and they want it as quickly and inexpensively as possible.”
Warren Burger, “Our Vicious Legal Spiral,” 16 Judges’ Journal 23, 49 (Fall, 1977).
I deplore the unfounded disparagement, by the lower court,16 of arbitrators who, usually without compensation, and always at some personal sacrifice, give of their time and expertise in order to render an important public service. There is no justifiable basis for presupposing that arbitrators will wrongly decide the question of law once it is properly placed before them. National Grange Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kuhn, supra, 428 Pa. at 185, 236 A.2d at 761.
Yet another factor attracted the unwarranted attention of the lower court; the limited scope of judicial review of an arbitrator’s award.17 Although this consideration, at least in part, prompted the result reached by the court below, it ought not to have. Such an assertion has been expressly rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
[W]e are now no more impressed by appellant’s argument relative to the limited scope of review of the arbitrator’s *198award than we were when a similar argument was made in National Grange, supra. If arbitration is the format in which the parties have agreed to settle their dispute, then they must be content with such a settlement.
Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co. v. Medycki, supra 431 Pa. at 72, 244 A.2d at 657.
Finally, under the majority view, insurance carriers are permitted to engage in the most egregious form of forum shopping. They may either choose to go to arbitration or, by prematurely contending that a requisite element for the invocation of uninsured motorist coverage is absent, opt in favor of judicial resolution of the dispute. Such a result is not merely undesirable; it is also unlawful since it “renders) the parties agreement to arbitrate disputes nugatory.” Hartford Insurance Group v. Kassler, supra. 227 Pa.Super.Ct. at 50, 324 A.2d 522.
Having concluded that the court below erred in denying the petition to compel arbitration, I deem it improper and inappropriate to consider the merits of the question whether “uninsured” means “underinsured.”
I would therefore reverse the Order of the lower court and remand for the appointment of an arbitrator.
. Attached to Appellant’s petition were the arbitration provisions of both the Concord Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter “Concord”) and Commercial Union Insurance Company (hereinafter “Commercial”) policies, which will be discussed infra.
. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I do not suggest “that the lower court should have considered only the averments of Appellant’s position.” At 715, note 3.
. This question, contrary to the characterization of the lower court, is neither novel nor one of pure law. Grange Mutual Casualty Company v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Company, 438 Pa. 95, 263 A.2d 732 (1970); National Grange Mutual Insurance Company v. Kuhn, 428 Pa. 179, 236 A.2d 758 (1968); Hart v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 288 Pa.Super.Ct. 53, 431 A.2d 283 (1981); Gordon v. Keystone Insurance Company, 277 Pa.Super.Ct. 198, 419 A.2d 730 (1980); Mapp v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 268 Pa.Super.Ct. 404, 408 A.2d 850 (1979).
. The second contention raised in Blumling, that the “other insurance” provision in the uninsured motorist clause “violates the intendment of the uninsured motorist law” Blumling, supra, 429 Pa. at 393, 241 A.2d at 114, was clearly within the jurisdiction of the court. United Services, supra.
. The Concord Mutual policy provides for arbitration, inter alia, as follows:
Damages for Bodily Injury Caused by Uninsured Automobiles: The company will pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called “bodily injury”, sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile; provided, for the purposes of this endorsement, determination as to whether the insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover such damages, .. . shall be made by ... arbitration.
If any person making claim hereunder and the company do not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile . .. then either party may, upon written demand of either, select a competent and disinterested arbitrator. The two arbitrators so named shall select a third arbitrator or if unable to agree thereon within 90 days, then either party may make application to a judge of a court of record in the county and state in which such arbitration is pending for appointment of a third arbitrator. The arbitrators shall then hear and determine the question or questions so in dispute, ... (emphasis added)
The Commercial policy, to the extent it is reproduced in the record, provides for arbitration, inter alia, as follows:
If we and a covered person disagree whether that person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle or do not agree as to the amount of damages, either party may make a written demand for arbitration. (emphasis added.)
. Allstate Insurance Co. v. McMonagle, 449 Pa. 362, 296 A.2d 738 (1972); Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co. v. Martin, 436 Pa. 374, 260 A.2d 804 (1970); Great American Insurance Co. v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 436 Pa. 370, 260 A.2d 769 (1970); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 434 Pa. 21, 252 A.2d 618 (1969); Merchants Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 433 Pa. 250, 248 A.2d 842 (1969); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Medycki, 431 Pa. 67, 244 A.2d 655 (1968); Hart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 288 Pa.Super.Ct. 53, 431 A.2d 283 (1981); Gordon v. Keystone Ins. Co., 277 Pa.Super.Ct. 198, 419 A.2d 730 (1980); Sudders v. United National Insurance Co., 217 Pa.Super.Ct. 196, 269 A.2d 370 (1970); Smith v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp., 217 Pa.Super.Ct. 31, 268 A.2d 200 (1970); Bankes v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Pa.Super.Ct. 162, 264 A.2d 197 (1970).
. The arbitration clause in the National Grange policy provided for arbitration, inter alia, as follows:
Protection Against UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE The Company will pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured highway vehicle; provided, for the purposes of this coverage, determination as to whether the insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover such damages ... shall be made ... by arbitration.
Arbitration If any person making claim under the Uninsured Motorists Coverage and the company do not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle because of the bodily injury to the insured, or do not agree as to the amount of payment which may be owing thereunder, then, upon written demand of either, the matter or matters upon which such person and the company do not agree shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, ... Id., 428 Pa. at 182, 236 A.2d at 759. (emphasis added)
. The Concord arbitration clause provides that the “arbitrators shall ... hear and determine the question or questions so in dispute.” (emphasis added) The phrase in the National Grange policy, “matter or matters upon which such person and the company do not agree”, (emphasis added), is certainly no more inclusive and is virtually identical language. Hart v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 288 Pa.Super.Ct. at 58, 431 A.2d at 286.
. It is significant that in distinguishing National Grange, Commercial does not argue that its arbitration clause is less inclusive than the arbitration clause in National Grange. Rather Commercial Union argues only that the issues in National Grange involved relatively minor legal issues or mixed questions of law and fact.
. It is immaterial whether this determination derives from facts which are admitted or are in dispute.
. The majority’s decision is contra the general policy favoring arbitration of contractual differences. Waddell v. Shriber, 465 Pa. 20, 348 A.2d 96 (1975); Mendelson v. Shrager, 432 Pa. 383, 248 A.2d 234 (1968). See Hart v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., supra; Wolfv. Baltimore, 250 Pa.Super.Ct. 230, 378 A.2d 911 (1977).
. The examples cited in the text constitute an extensive, but less than exhaustive, list of contentions which can be raised by insurers under the rationale employed by the majority. Each involves an element essential to the application of the uninsured motorist clause and is, therefore, for the arbitrators. United Services Automobile Ass’n Appeal, 227 Pa.Super.Ct. 508, 323 A.2d 737.
. In the instant case, the majority, after reviewing the insurance policies, the pleadings and the briefs, concludes that the driver of the “other” vehicle was not an “uninsured motorist” as defined in the policies. Only after reaching that conclusion is the majority able to postulate that Appellant’s petition was based on a challenge to the validity of the uninsured motorist clause in his insurance policy and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the court. Such reasoning cannot justify judicial usurpation of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.
. Miller v. Allstate Insurance Company, 238 F.Supp. 565 (1965); Gordon v. Keystone Insurance Company, 277 Pa.Super.Ct. 198, 419 A.2d 730 (1980); Grange Mutual Casualty Company v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association Insurance Company, 438 Pa. 95, 263 A.2d 732 (1970); Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company v. Medycki, 431 Pa. 67, 244 A.2d 655 (1968); Henderson v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 292 Pa.Super.Ct. 333, 437 A.2d 411, (1981).
. In Hartford, Judge Hoffman, speaking for this Court, en banc, pointed out that such cases rest “upon the exclusion, by agreement, of court proceedings as a vehicle for the resolution of disputes.” Id. 227 Pa.Super. at 50, 324 A.2d 522.
. “The consequences of this issue are too important ... to permit private dispositions willy nilly and potentially without correct reference to the law as enacted by the Legislature or interpreted by the Courts.”
T.C. Slip Op. at 6.
. This clearly is an important question of pure law which justice and certainty require to be adjudicated uniformly by the Courts of Pennsylvania, not decided privately by numerous ad hoc arbitration panels subject only to the most limited scope of judicial review.
T.C. Slip Op. at 5.