(concurring in part and dissenting).
I concur with the majority that this court may properly consider arguments raised in Work Connection’s motion for reconsideration before the ULJ, but I respectfully dissent with the majority’s affir-mance of the ULJ’s eligibility decision.
The majority begins by stating that “[rjelator employer appeals from the award of unemployment-insurance benefits to respondent employee, arguing that the employee who relies on public transportation is not available for employment throughout the labor market area as required by Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e) (2006).” But Work Connection does not make this argument. Work Connection argues that Bui is not eligible for unemployment-insurance benefits because he lacks transportation throughout his labor market area. Citing Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a), (e), Work Connection argues that whatever Bui’s mode of transportation, public or otherwise, he “must have transportation throughout the labor market area to be considered ‘available for suitable employment,’ ” i.e., “ready and willing to accept suitable employment in the labor market area.” Work Connection argues that Bui’s lack of transportation, whatever modes are lacking, is a restriction that is self-imposed or imposed by circumstances and, as such, a restriction that renders Bui unavailable for suitable employment. Id. In short, Work Connection argues that because Bui lacks “transportation throughout the labor market area,” he cannot be considered to be “available for suitable employment,” and therefore cannot be eligible for unemployment benefits under the plain meaning of the statute. Id.
The ULJ, in his Order of Affirmation, noted that “Bui would have public transportation to a reasonable number of locations in the labor market area” and that he “would be available for employment at any location which is on a bus line” and that “[tjherefore, it cannot be said that Bui is not available for employment in the labor market area.” This conclusion conspicuously omits the word, “throughout,” ignoring the plain language of Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e), which provides that “[a]n applicant must have transportation throughout the labor market area to be considered ‘available for suitable employment.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
The majority frames the eligibility issue as “whether Bui was available for employment and thus eligible for unemployment benefits despite his reliance on public transportation.” But “available for employment” is not a phrase found in the applicable statutes. The issue is whether Bui was available for suitable employment under Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a), (e). “Available for suitable employment” is defined by the legislature in Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a):
“Available for suitable employment” means an applicant is ready and willing to accept suitable employment in the labor market area. The attachment to the work force must be genuine. An applicant may restrict availability to suitable employment, but there must be no other restrictions, either self-imposed or created by circumstances, temporary or permanent, that prevent accepting suitable employment.
(Emphasis added.) In addition, “[a]n applicant must have transportation throughout the labor market area to be considered *74‘available for suitable employment.’ ” Id., subd. 15(e) (emphasis added).
The majority decides that the meaning of the term “throughout” is ambiguous and that whether an applicant has transportation throughout a labor market area depends on an applicant’s specific circumstances. Relying on this construction of “throughout,” the majority determines that because of “Bui’s access to and willingness to use public transportation,” “this meets the requirement of having ‘transportation throughout the labor market area’ as required by MimuStat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e).” I disagree.
The unemployment-benefits statutes are unambiguous. First, they contain no allowable restrictions for availability to suitable employment on the basis of reliance on public transportation or reliance on any specific mode of transportation. Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a). Second, the use of the term “throughout” in MinmStat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a), (e), is unambiguous. As noted by the majority, the plain meaning of “throughout,” as it appears as a preposition in section 15(e), is the dictionary definition, “[i]n, to, through, or during every part of; all through.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1436 (4th ed.2000). “Throughout” is not reasonably subject to more than one interpretation; therefore, it is not ambiguous. The majority concludes that the definition of “throughout” urged by Work Connection is not appropriate because Work Connection relies on a dictionary definition of “throughout” in its adverb form: “[i]n or through all parts; everywhere.” The distinction between the definitions of “throughout” as an adverb and a preposition is insignificant and, in this case, whichever definition is used, the ULJ reached his decision completely ignoring the presence of the word “throughout” in Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e), when he concluded that:
Bui would have public transportation to a reasonable number of locations in the labor market area. He would be available for employment at any location which is on a bus line. Therefore, it cannot be said that Bui is not available for employment in the labor market area.
(Emphasis added.)
Using the definition of “throughout,” as a preposition, and applying that definition in this case, the issue is whether Bui had transportation “in, to, through, or during every part of’ or “all through” his labor market area. If reliance on public transportation does not provide access to “every part of’ Bui’s labor market area, or “all through” his labor market area, Bui does not have “transportation throughout the labor market area” and therefore is not “available for suitable employment” under Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a).
While I am mindful that the public policy in chapter 268 urges us to narrowly construe disqualification provisions, I see no reason to apply a different standard to an employee declining the offer of new employment because of lack of transportation than the standard applied by the Minnesota Supreme Court to an employee leaving a job he already has because of a lack of transportation. In Hill v. Contract Beverages, Inc., 307 Minn. 356, 240 N.W.2d 314 (1976), the supreme court denied unemployment benefits to an employee who could no longer get to his employment because of a shift change unilaterally imposed by his employer. In support of its conclusion, the supreme court said:
When relator originally accepted the employment on the third shift, he had no knowledge that he would be able to obtain transportation from some person on that shift or any other shift. Relator *75accepted the employment before he obtained the transportation upon the expectation that he could find a fellow employee who would provide his transportation. Fortunately, he found transportation on his assigned shift, but the fact that such transportation was not available on another shift cannot be attributed as a fault of the employer. In the absence of contract or custom imposing an obligation of transportation upon the employer, transportation is usually considered the problem of the employee.
Id. at 358, 240 N.W.2d at 316 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Here, like Hill, when first hired, Bui did not tell Work Connection about his lack of transportation or dependence on public transportation. In fact, he both rode the bus and biked to the employment from which he was terminated. That employment was approximately four miles from Bui’s home. He then declined Work Connection’s offer of full-time employment that was approximately six miles from his home because the employment was beyond the bus line. The employment Bui declined was well within Bui’s labor market area. See Preiss v. Comm’r of Economic Security, 347 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Minn.App.1984) (concluding that a drive of 22 miles does not render an available position unsuitable).
The majority states that “[t]he effect of Work Connection’s argument would be to exclude from unemployment benefits those who rely on mass transit to get to work.” I disagree; this purported effect is exaggerated. The effect of not applying the plain meaning of MinmStat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e), as written, is to shift the burden of transportation from employees to employers in violation of clear statutory language and judicial precedent.
The legislature could have provided that applicants who are dependent on public transportation are deemed to have transportation throughout the labor market, see MinmStat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e), or that applicants may restrict their availability to only that employment accessible by public transportation, see id., subd. 15(a), but it has not done so. For this court to construe subdivision 15(a) and (e) to include that language is, in effect, to modify the statute, and that is unauthorized. See State v. Fleck, 281 Minn. 247, 252, 161 N.W.2d 309, 312 (1968) (It must be assumed that, had the legislature desired to expand upon 627.01, it would have effectuated this desire by amending that section.). We must presume that when the legislature enacted section § 268.085, subdivision 15, it acted with full knowledge of previous statutes, agency rules, and existing case law. See Minneapolis E. Ry. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 247 Minn. 413, 418, 77 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1956) (quoting rule that when legislature enacted statutes it was presumed to have in mind all existing laws relating to the subject matter). Under MinmStat. 268.085, subd. 15(e), Bui was required to have transportation throughout the labor market area, and Bui failed to satisfy that requirement. Therefore, he was not available for suitable employment and is not eligible for unemployment benefits.
I would reverse the ULJs decision finding Bui eligible for unemployment-insurance benefits when he declined the full-time employment offered to him by Work Connection.