This is an unemployment compensation case involving multiple claims, for weeks in September and October of 1957, of several employees, consolidated as permitted by CLS 1961, § 421.33 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.535). The appeal here is by claimants from a circuit court order holding them disqualified from receiving benefits under the act (CL 1948, § 421.1 et seq. [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.501 et seq.] as amended) and reversing the contrary decision of the appeal board of the Michigan employment security commission.
Claimants were employees of plaintiff General Motors Corporation, in its Fisher No. 1 and its Buick plants in Flint, Michigan. In the manufacturing operations of those 2 plants parts were necessary which were made in its Fisher Body plant in Mansfield, Ohio. A strike was called at the Mansfield plant, authorized by the international union of which the employees in all 3 of the mentioned plants were members. This occasioned cessation of operations *139in the Mansfield, Ohio, plant, which resulted in a lack in the 2 Flint plants of parts manufactured in Mansfield which were necessary to the Flint manufacturing process, and this, in turn, caused the shutting down of the Flint plants and consequent unemployment of claimants. These facts gave rise to the question whether, as held by the circuit court, claimants were disqualified for benefits under section 29(1) (b) of the act (CLS 1961, § 421.29 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.531]).
The facts in this case are substantially like those in Park v. Employment Security Commission, 355 Mich 103, and decision therein might be considered to govern decision here, except for the one distinguishing feature on the facts which afforded the basis of the circuit court’s decision. That distinction is that here, as was not true in Park, the national contract in force between the union and the employer contained the following paragraph:
“The union has requested this national agreement in place of independent agreements for each bargaining unit covered thereby. Accordingly an authorized strike in one bargaining unit under this agreement which results in an interruption in the flow of material or services to operations in any other bargaining unit under this agreement, will be considered an authorized strike in any such affected bargaining unit.”
In Park a majority of this Court decided that the employees in a Michigan plant, shut down for lack of parts regularly manufactured in and furnished to the Michigan plant by a struck Ohio plant, were not disqualified from receiving benefits under said section 29(1) (b) of the act, which provides for such disqualification in case of unemployment due to a stoppage of work existing because of a labor dispute in the establishment in which claimant is or was last *140employed. This decision was based on a holding that the struck Ohio plant and the resultantly closed Michigan plant were not one or the same establishment, and, hence, the disqualification of that section did not apply. That would seem to cover the facts in the case at bar except for the mentioned provision of the union-management labor contract. Does it make the Parle decision inapplicable?
Claimants here contend that the noted contract provision cannot be considered valid if given the interpretation and effect given it by the circuit court which, they say, applied the disqualifying provisions of said section 29(1) (b) to the situation as if the 3 plants in question were part of one establishment. We do not think that a holding that the 3 plants, 1 in Ohio and 2 in Michigan, are part of 1 establishment is essential to the circuit court’s decision that claimants were disqualified. Rather, the decision is to be supported on the proposition that the meaning of the contract provision is that, under the facts here obtaining, the union had authorized and called a strike not only in Mansfield, but, as well, in the Flint plants. If that is the effect of said contract provision, is it valid under the statute? Claimants say not, because of the provisions of section 31 of the act (CL 1948, § 421.31 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.533]) which reads, in part, as follows:
“No agreement by an individual to waive, release, or commute his rights to benefits or any other rights under this act from an employer shall be valid. No agreements by an individual in the employ of any person or concern to pay all or any portion of the contributions of an employer, required under this act from such employer, shall be valid. No employer shall directly or indirectly make or require or accept any deduction from the remuneration of any individual in his employ to finance the contributions of the employer required from him, or require or *141accept any waiver of any right hereunder by any individual in his employ.”
The question, then, boils down to this, whether the quoted provision of the contract is violative of section 31 of the act and, hence, invalid and inoperative. If so, claimants may receive compensation. If not, they are disqualified therefor.
The language of the contract does not express a waiver of benefits as prohibited in section 31 of the act. Fairly construed, it provides that when the union authorizes a strike in one of the employer’s plants, causing an interruption of flow of materials to another one of its plants and of operations therein, with consequent layoff of union members who are employees in the latter, such layoff shall be considered as occasioned by an authorized strike in the latter, or, in short, that the union, under such circumstances, has authorized and extended the strike to the latter plant. It follows that, under section 29(1) (b) of the act, claimants stopped working in the Flint plants in the course of a labor dispute in the establishment, even as defined in Parle, in which they were then employed.
The appeal board adopted as a part of its decision the findings of fact of the referee that (1) there was a stoppage of work because of a labor dispute within the establishments in which claimants were employed, and (2) that the union and the employer, in agreeing on the noted provision of the contract, did not enter into “a collusive agreement that unemployment benefits be waived”. There were no proofs or showing contrary to those findings of fact. There was undisputed testimony that the labor dispute at the Ohio plant involved and included not only local issues there, but also demands for changes in the wages, hours or other conditions of employment of the employees of other plants of the employer, in*142cluding those of the 2 Flint plants (claimants herein) under the national agreement between the union and the employer. Those findings of fact are not, therefore, contrary to the great weight of the evidence. We may not, then, disturb them. See section 38 of the act (CLS 1961, § 421.38 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.540]); also, Miller v. F. W. Woolworth Company, 359 Mich 342, and cases therein cited.
To the extent that it might be reasoned that the findings are conclusions and applications of law, and I do not agree with such reasoning, applicable is the following from Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 US 282 (54 S Ct 692, 78 L ed 1260), quoted with approval in Peaden v. Employment Security Commission, 355 Mich 613, 629:
“ ‘The judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.’ ”
On the record presented here there is a reasonable basis for the conclusion that there was a labor dispute in the establishments in which claimants were employed because the union, under the agreement, automatically called a strike in and extended the labor dispute thereto under the circumstances of this case, and, hence, the agreement was not a collusive agreement that unemployment benefits be waived. There were none to be waived because the strike existed, by agreement, in the plants in which they had been employed. After all, an authorized strike is not a creature of the law, but, rather, of the call and action of the union. Such action brings about the strike. It is no violation of section 31 of the statute for the union to call the strike, regardless of whether it is called independently of or in pursuance of the agreement which provided that the union was doing precisely that, under the circumstances of this case.
*143The order of the circuit court is affirmed.
Kelly, J., concurred with Dethmers, J.