dissenting:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order of July 29, 1999, which found Appellant in direct contempt of court.
¶2 A court’s power to maintain courtroom authority is well-settled. Behr v. Behr, 548 Pa. 144, 695 A.2d 776 (1997). In Commonwealth v. Africa, 466 Pa. 603, 353 A.2d 855 (1976), the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he court must be able to control those appearing before it, and must be able to use its power summarily to avoid interference with the principal matter before the court.” Id. 466 Pa. at 623, 353 *58A.2d at 865. If the courts continually carve away at this power, the balance, dignity, and integrity of the courtroom may be in jeopardy. Commonwealth v. Martorano, 387 Pa.Super. 79, 563 A.2d 1193, 1200 (1989). Thus, “[w]hen reviewing the propriety of a contempt conviction, we place great rebanee upon the discretion of the trial judge, ... and are confined to a determination of whether the facts support the trial court’s decision.” In Re: A.J. Adams, 435 Pa.Super. 202, 645 A.2d 269, 271-272 (1994).
¶ 3 In the present case, a review of the record indicates that on June 15, 1999, the date scheduled for trial, the trial court conducted a waiver colloquy, and determined that Appellant knowingly, intebi-gently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. See N.T. 6/15/99 at 11-17 and Opinion filed 6/9/00, Att. “A”. Thereafter, Appellant, through his attorney, objected to the admission of certain prehminary hearing testimony and requested a continuance in order to seek case law on the matter. N.T. 6/15/99 at 30-36. The court then inquired of Reverend Georgia Smith, the complaining witness who was present in the courtroom, if she could return on a later date. Id. at 36. Reverend Smith repbed that she could return, but not in the month of August. Id. The case was rescheduled for the week of July 26, 1999.
¶ 4 When Appebant’s case was cabed to the courtroom at 3:50 p .m. on July 29, 1999, he indicated to the court that he had done “some homework on himself.” N.T. 7/29/99 at 7. Appebant proceeded to comment on Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100, and its effect on his case if he was not brought to trial within the given number of days. Id. at 8. He then stated, “I stib have two months that I can stib play with that, my due rights been violated.” Id. at 8-9. Fobow-ing a discussion with the court, Appebant requested a jury trial. Id. at 11-12. Thereafter, regarding Appebant’s late request for a jury trial, the court asked him when he previously had met with his attorney. Id. at 12. After Appebant responded that he had met with him on July 20th, the court inquired if, at that time, he told his attorney that he wanted a jury trial. Id. Appellant stated that he “was going to bring it to his [attorney’s] attention, but it slipped [his] mind at the time.” Id. at 13. Appebant’s trial was subsequently delayed until August 2, 1999.
If 5 Based on the foregoing facts adduced from the record, I find that Appellant’s dbatory tactics were inappropriate, Commonwealth v. Falana, 548 Pa. 156, 696 A.2d 126 (1997). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that “[a] contem-ner acts with wrongful intent if he knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful.” Id. 548 Pa. at 162, 696 A.2d at 129, citing United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 368 (7th Cir.1972) (citation omitted). This Court may infer Appebant’s intent from his conduct and the surrounding circumstances. See Falana, supra. Because Appebant should have reasonably been aware that his dbatory tactics were wrongful, I bebeve that Ap-pebant acted with the requisite intent. Fi-nahy, contrary to the Majority’s conclusion, Appebant’s conduct disrupted the proceedings in that the trial was continued to a later date.5 Martorano, 563 A.2d at 1197 (stating that “[c]onduct which interrupts and delays the proceedings may constitute conduct which obstructs the administration of justice”) (citation omitted).
¶ 6 The Majority fails to place reliance on the discretion of the trial judge. I find that the facts support the trial court’s decision, and, therefore, would affirm the trial court’s order of July 29, 1999 finding Ap-pebant in direct contempt of court.
. In its brief, the Commonwealth notes that when Appellant’s trial commenced on August 2, 1999, he attempted to withdraw his request for a jury trial. Commonwealth's Brief at 7.