Zalevsky v. CASILLO

Dissenting Opinion by

Mr. Justice Roberts:

In my view, the term “doing business” is merely descriptive, and should be equated with such minimal contacts with this Commonwealth so that the maintenance of a suit in our courts would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Cf. Empire Steel Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 823, 366 P. 2d 502 (1961); Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P. 2d 437 (1958) (both construing statutory provision); W. H. Elliott & Sons Co., v. Nuodex Products Co., 243 F. 2d 116 (1st Cir. 1957) (discussion of New Hampshire statute); Notes, 10 Hastings L.J. 206 (1958).

Under, the' circumstances of this case, therefore, in which no one disputes that appellant was “doing business” within the Commonwealth at the time the alleged negligence upon which this action is predicated *301occurred, I am unable to conclude that appellant ceased “doing business” within the meaning of Pa. K. C. P. 2077(a)(2) and 2079(b), so long as he has continued to utilize the partnership for the collection and remission of amounts due and owing him and has, thus, not fully terminated his relationship with the Commonwealth.