The defendants in these consolidated cases appeal from declaratory judgments rendered by the Superior Court (York County) in favor of the Town of York, plaintiff in both cases. The Superior Court declared that separate proposed real estate developments of defendants Fred H. Baldwin, Jr., Baldwin and L. John DiPalma, and Patrick Cragin, all in the Town of York were subdivisions within the meaning of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(1) (Supp.1987). We vacate the judgments as to all defendants.
This case involves three development proposals in the Town of York. Baldwin and DiPalma received approval from the York Zoning Board of Appeals under provisions of the Town zoning ordinance and growth control ordinance for a proposed rental apartment building containing twelve units. Baldwin received similar approval for the conversion of a farmhouse and bam into a ten-unit condominium. Building permits were refused for both projects by the code enforcement officer. Cragin applied to the Town’s code enforcement officer for a permit to construct and operate a twenty-unit motel. The code enforcement officer refused to issue the permit because “the town attorney feels it is a subdivision.”1
The Town brought an action under M.R. Civ.P. 80B and 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5951-5963 (1980), seeking a declaratory judgment that the projects were subdivisions within the provision of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(1). After separate amended complaints were filed against defendants,2 the Superior Court directed that the cases be decided by declaratory judgment and ordered the parties to file motions for summary judgment. On those motions the Superior Court ruled that each of the proposed developments was a subdivision within the meaning of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956. Cragin appealed, as did Baldwin and DiPalma, and the cases were consolidated before this Court.
30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(1) provides in pertinent part:
A subdivision is the division of a tract or parcel of land into 3 or more lots within any 5-year period, ... whether accomplished by sale, lease, development, buildings or otherwise. ...
In determining whether a tract or parcel of land is divided into 3 or more lots, the first dividing of such tract or parcel, unless otherwise exempted herein, shall be considered to create the first 2 lots, and the next dividing of either or said first 2 lots, by whomever accomplished, unless otherwise exempted herein, shall be considered to create a 3rd lot. ...
For the purposes of this section, a tract or parcel of land is defined as all contiguous land in the same ownership. ...
Section 4956(2) authorizes municipalities to review and approve proposed subdivision plans.
*934In ruling that each of the projects constituted a subdivision, the Superior Court relied on the language of section 4956(1) that a subdivision can be accomplished by “development, buildings or otherwise,” the Legislature’s increasing regulation of development in the State, and the purpose of the statute to control development. The court concluded that subdivision occurs when the use of the land is divided functionally.
Such an interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the statute and to our decisions in Town of Arundel v. Swain, 374 A.2d 317 (Me.1977) and Planning Bd. of the Town of Naples v. Michaud, 444 A.2d 40 (Me.1982). The statute provides that a subdivision is created when there is a “division of a tract or parcel of land into 3 or more lots.” Although the statute deals comprehensively with methods of division (i.e., “sale, lease, development, buildings or otherwise”), the remaining language of the statute and our prior rulings require the splitting off of a legal interest to another and the division of a “parcel of land” into lots. In Swain, because no division of a legal interest of sufficient dignity was split off, we found no subdivision. The subdivision found in Michaud was premised upon the splitting off of a legal interest and the creation of lots even though the precise boundaries of those lots were ill defined. Assuming that the three projects in this case may arguably involve splitting off a legal interest,3 we hold that the division of a structure, as distinguished from the division of a parcel of land into lots, does not result in the creation of a subdivision under section 4956(1). The term “land” in its broadest sense may include interests in a structure, but in defining a subdivision as involving the creation of “lots” from a “parcel of land”, the statute refers unmistakably to an interest on the ground.4
The Town argues that the Legislature has demonstrated its intent to include all functional divisions within the meaning of section 4956 by enacting additional regulatory devices for controlling development. See, e.g., 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 4807-4807-G (minimum lot size law); 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 681-689 (land use regulation). Although the degree of regulation may have increased, the language of section 4956(1) remains unchanged. It is for the Legislature to determine whether a functional definition of “subdivision” is needed to effectively regulate land development in Maine.
The entry is:
Judgments vacated.
Remanded to the Superior Court for entry of judgment for the defendants.
NICHOLS, ROBERTS, SCOLNIK and CLIFFORD, JJ., concurring.
. Cragin appealed the denial to the Zoning Board of Appeals. The Board has not acted upon the appeal pending the outcome of this litigation.
. An additional defendant was named in the complaint. That defendant has not appealed the Superior Court judgment.
. We intimate no opinion whether the motel operation planned by Cragin would involve the "splitting off of a real estate interest of greater dignity than the interest a transient camper has in his campsite." Michaud, 444 A.2d at 42.
. Our interpretation is further confirmed by the statutory prohibition of sale or conveyance from a subdivision "unless at least one permanent marker is set at one lot corner of the lot sold or conveyed.” 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(4).