dissenting.
The majority today has sub silentio departed from the clear precedent in this area and reverses the judgment of sentence for a trial ruling that was unquestionably in accord with the prevailing law at the time it was made. In reaching its result, which grants a new trial to appellant, *134the majority ignored the dastardly nature of the crime1 and disregarded the overwhelming evidence of appellant’s guilt. I therefore am compelled to register my dissent.
I am well aware that due process mandates a fair trial regardless of the malevolence of the crime or the strength of the case against the accused. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). However, the due process clause, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require the result reached today. The United States Supreme Court has stated that a claimed violation of the right to a fair trial because of allegedly prejudicial pre-trial publicity can be sustained only where there is a showing of actual prejudice to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible or where the coverage is so “inherently prejudicial” that prejudice will be presumed. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975). In discussing those instances where prejudice will be presumed, the Court exercised great care in attempting to prevent this category from being expanded beyond those instances where the pre-trial media coverage was so extensive, so sustained, so pervasive and included highly inflammatory and prejudicial information that a climate had been created (and an insufficient time had elapsed for the taint to have dissipated) 2 in which a fair trial was impossible. Murphy v. Florida, supra; Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963).3
*135The majority predicated its holding on the grounds that the record before us reflected facts that would justify a finding that the prejudice should be presumed, notwithstanding the concession that the instant news articles were not of the “excessively emotional type.” The majority also ignored the fact that only 32 veniremen were required to be called to complete the selection of the first 12 jurors. The entire selection process (including the selection of two alternates) consumed only three hours. Of the panel questioned, 11 were excused for cause and only six were peremptorily challenged by the defense.4
It is equally clear that this record fails to establish from the totality of the circumstances that appellant’s trial was not fundamentally fair. At most the record shows that members of the panel, from which the jury was selected, were exposed to articles that referred to appellant’s prior criminal record and admission of guilt.5
*136The United States Supreme Court in Murphy v. Florida, supra, observed:
The constitutional standard of fairness requires that a defendant have “a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751. Qualified jurors need not, however, be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.
“To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror’s impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” Id., at 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751.
At the same time, the juror’s assurances that he is equal to this task cannot be dispositive of the accused’s rights, and it remains open to the defendant to demonstrate “the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality.” Ibid.
*137[1b] The voir dire in this case indicates no such hostility to petitioner by the jurors who served in his trial as to suggest a partiality that could not be laid aside. Some of the jurors had a vague recollection of the robbery with which petitioner was charged and each had some knowledge of petitioner’s past crimes, .
Id. 421 U.S. at 799-800, 95 S.Ct. at 2036 (footnote omitted).
Further, the Murphy Court distinguished between the rule prescribed by them for the Federal System in Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L. Ed.2d 1250 (1959) and the constitutional requirements which are binding upon the States. Murphy v. Florida, supra 421 U.S. at 797-98, 95 S.Ct. 2031. Although Marshall, held that persons who have learned from news sources of a defendant’s prior criminal record are presumed to be prejudiced, the Murphy Court made it clear that this restriction represented an exercise of its supervisory powers and was not applicable to the States. The constitutional standard remains whether the defendant was tried by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors. In the instant case the jurors testified as to their ability to put aside any opinion as to appellant’s guilt, which may have been formed as a result of the pretrial exposure and render a verdict based solely on the evidence. There is nothing in the entire voir dire transcript that would reasonably cause one to question their sincerity or their capacity to decide the cause impartially. Hence, there is no foundation to support a claim for a violation of due process under the Federal Constitution.
Turning to State law it is equally clear that the trial court’s denial of the request to change venue was not violative of Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, or contrary to prior case law. It is now well settled in this Commonwealth “that the accused who claims that the denial of a request for a change of venue has denied him his right of a fair trial must demonstrate the *138prejudice that has been created by the failure to grant that request.” Commonwealth v. Hoss, 469 Pa. 195, 201, 364 A.2d 1335, 1338 (1976). See also, Commonwealth v. Pierce, 451 Pa. 190, 195, 303 A.2d 209, 212 (1973). This requirement of showing an identifiable prejudice.is relieved only in extreme situations. For the most part out decisions have followed federal guidelines in determining situations where prejudice may appropriately be presumed.6 See, Commonwealth v. Hoss, supra; Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 361 A.2d 282 (1976); Commonwealth v. Pierce, supra.
In an effort to support its position the majority attempts to find a parallel between the instant factual situation and that presented in Pierce. Even a cursory consideration of the two cases forces the conclusion that the two matters are not comparable. In Pierce the Court was concerned not only with the presence of inherently prejudicial publicity but more importantly the source of that publicity. A close analysis of Pierce reveals that the determinative factor in the decision was the participation of the police and prosecutor in the dissemination of the inflammatory and prejudicial publicity. In the instant case the police and the prosecutor in no way contributed to the information appearing in the pre-trial articles. The record conclusively establishes that the contents of the articles were based on the independent research of representatives of the news media, press coverage of the preliminary hearing, and information supplied by members of appellant’s family.
Another crucial distinction between the two cases concerns the nature, quality and extent of the pre-trial news coverage. In Pierce there was, in addition to the reporting by the printed media, extensive radio and television coverage of the incident and the subsequent arrest of the *139defendant. We noted that “a great deal of publicity about Pierce was emotionally charged and inflammatory, and clearly pointed to his guilt.” 451 Pa. at 192, 303 A. 2d at 211. Typical of the suggestive nature of the reporting in Pierce was an article entitled, “Two Youths Re-enact Media Street Attack,” which included a large photograph of the defendant at the scene of the crime, in the custody of police, “pointing” to where the victims’ bodies fell. In contrast, the nature of the publicity in the instant case is not so emotional or suggestive as to be comparable to that in Pierce, and it thus falls far short of being “inherently prejudicial.” It clearly defies reason to “presume”, on the basis of the record before us, that the jury was biased.
In my judgment, the pre-trial news coverage in this case was even less pervasive, less inflammatory and therefore less prejudicial than that discussed by this Court in Commonwealth v. Kichline, supra; Commonwealth v. Hoss, supra; Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Pa. 253, 328 A.2d 507 (1974); and Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 318 A.2d 680, appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1065, 95 S.Ct. 651, 42 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974). In each of these cases we upheld the trial court’s refusal to grant a change of venue because we could not conclude that the publicity was so inherently prejudicial as to deny the appellant a fair trial. In view of such consistent and longstanding precedent, I find the majority’s determination that the instant publicity was presumptively prejudicial to be inexplicable.
Finally, it is apparent that the majority is attempting by its holding to adopt the Marshall rule of the Federal System for this Commonwealth. Assuming there may be some merit in embracing a per se rule that persons who have learned from news sources of a defendant’s prior criminal activity should be presumed to be prejudiced, the result should not be accomplished by applying it to a court ruling denying a requested change of venue that *140was made prior to the announcement of the new principle. In my judgment, in the event such a practice is to be embraced, it should be accomplished either by rule or in a decision where its application is made prospective.
Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of sentence.
. The victim was an 11-year-old girl, who left her home on the morning in question to report for her duties as a member of the school’s safety patrol. She was a student at Garfield School, Lebanon County, a school for children who cannot compete in the normal school situation. Her mutilated body was subsequently discovered and it was ascertained that death had been caused by multiple wounds and the inhalation of fumes.
. The bulk of the publicity appeared at the time of the arrest and the selection process commenced approximately four months later.
. The Supreme Court has also presumed prejudice in instances where, in addition to the inflammatory pre-trial publicity, the dig*135nity and the objectivity of the trial has been disrupted “to accommodate the public appetite for carnival.” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036. See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965). There is no suggestion in this record that the decorum of the courtroom during the trial was in any way disturbed.
. It is significant to note that although appellant is challenging the denial of the request to change venue, he has not raised an objection in this appeal to the failure of the court to grant his challenge for cause. It is also of importance to recognize that in Irvin v. Dowd, supra, where the Supreme Court felt relief should be given, the Court was there concerned with instances where the accused had also challenged the jurors for cause, but were forced to accept them because they had exhausted their peremptory challenges and possessed no other means to remedy their complaint. See also, Rideau v. Louisiana, supra. It is difficult to understand how a party can object to the acceptance of a juror where that party possessed peremptory challenges and failed to exercise them. Cf., Commonwealth v. Shadduck, 168 Pa.Super. 376, 77 A.2d 673 (1951).
Commonwealth v. Hoss, 469 Pa. 195, 203-204, 364 A.2d 1335, 1339-40 (1976).
. Any harm that may have been created by the inclusion of appellant’s admission of guilt in the pre-trial news coverage was de minimis under the facts of this case. The statements in the press *136which concerned the admission were derived from the testimony offered by the Commonwealth during the preliminary hearing. The news coverage of the preliminary hearing was primarily factual in nature, and there was no attempt to distort or to emphasize the alleged admission. Further, precisely the same information was presented to the jury at trial. The situation here is thus inapposite to that presented in Marshall v. United States, 360 U. S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959). In that case, the Supreme Court set aside a conviction where the jurors were exposed through news accounts to information that was not admitted at trial.
While we recognize'that the disclosure of information which is admissible at trial may nevertheless be prejudicial where that disclosure is made in a setting where the safeguards of the trial are not available, Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra, 384 U.S. at 351, 86 S. Ct. 1507, such was not the case here. As stated above, the information related through the media was simply a repetition of that which was offered at trial.
. The majority attempts to base its decision upon the theory of presumed prejudice. This tact was obviously motivated by its recognition that the record fails to support a finding of actual prejudice.