OPINION
JONES, Chief Justice.This is an appeal by the prospective adoptive parents from the denial of their Petition for Iñvoluntary Termination of the parental rights of the natural mother. The child in question was born December 6, 1973. The father has consented to the adoption by petitioners.
Appellee, the natural mother, and the child’s father were married and lived together for about a week until appellee ousted him from their residence. She later moved in with her parents until after the baby was born. Prior to the birth, appellee sought assistance from vari*75ous agencies regarding placing her child for adoption. In November 1973, she made an appointment, through her physician, with Boyd Walker, Esquire, concerning the arrangement of a private adoption.
Both appellee and her mother attended this meeting during which appellee was informed about the process and the payment of expenses. It was appellee’s understanding at the end of the meeting, that when she delivered the baby to the intermediary, all rights to recover the child would terminate. Appellee delivered the baby to an intermediary at the hospital on December 10, 1973, four days after her birth. She has not seen the child since that date.
The mother received no further word, nor did she make any inquiries, concerning the adoption until August 1974 when she contacted Mr. Walker to find out what was the cause of the delay in finalizing the adoption. In that month, Donald Zamborsky, Esquire, representing the adoptive parents, called appellee to ascertain the whereabouts of the baby’s father. Subsequently, in April 1975, Mr. Zamborsky again contacted her in order to have her sign a consent to the adoption. Appellee signed the consent, but, as a result of this meeting, she apparently thought she may have an opportunity to get her child back. Appellee notified Mr. Zamborsky, in June 1975 prior to the hearing on the voluntary proceedings, that she would not go through with the voluntary termination proceedings. A petition for involuntary termination was filed by the persons having custody of the child. After a hearing, the court below refused to terminate appellee’s rights and denied the petition. This appeal followed.1
Appellants sought to terminate the mother’s rights solely upon the first part of Section 311(1) of the Adop*76tion Act, Act of July 24, 1970, P.L. 620, No. 208, art. III, § 311(1), 1 P.S. § 311(1) (Supp.1976). That section reads in pertinent part:
“The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated ... on the ground that:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child
Id.
Section 311(1) “has been interpreted as requiring a deliberate decision on the part of the parent to terminate the parental relationship and that parent must persist in that determination throughout the six-month period.” In re Adoption of Farabelli, 460 Pa. 423, 430-431, 333 A.2d 846, 850 (1975). The term “settled purpose” implies a finality of purpose. Wolfe Adoption Case, 454 Pa. 550, 312 A.2d 793 (1973). In our efforts to determine if such a purpose was present, this Court has required an “affirmative indication of a positive intent” to sever the parental relationship before we have upheld an involuntary termination. In re Adoption of McAhren, 460 Pa. 63, 70, 331 A.2d 419, 423 (1975); Wolfe, supra.
This Court has recognized that because of the serious emotional impact and irreversible nature of an involuntary termination decree, such action should be taken only when it is clearly warranted by a preponderance of the evidence. McAhren, supra, at 69-70, 331 A.2d at 422; Sarver Adoption Case, 444 Pa. 507, 281 A.2d 890 (1971). We have also placed this burden of proof upon those seeking termination. See In re Adoption of McCray, 460 Pa. 210, 215 n. 4, 331 A.2d 652, 654 n. 4 (1975). Thus, this Court has held that evidence of parental inaction and lack of interest for six months does not conclusively establish a settled purpose. Wolfe, supra. Nor can a recanted voluntary termination petition *77support an involuntary termination on settled purpose grounds when the petition was withdrawn before a final decree, even though custody had been relinquished for over six months. Sheaffer Appeal, 452 Pa. 165, 305 A.2d 36 (1973).
In reviewing the decision of the court below, we must consider the testimony and determine whether the findings of the court are supported by competent evidence. Farabelli, supra. Therefore, the issue before us is whether the trial court correctly concluded that appellant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the mother evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing her claim to the child for at least six months. We uphold the decision of the court below.
The instant case is similar to Sheaffer, supra. In that case, the mother voluntarily placed the child with a children’s services agency. She signed two agreements regarding her consent to adoption within four months after this placement. However, she subsequently withdrew the consent before a decree was issued but after more than six months had elapsed since the placement. Involuntary termination proceedings were initiated and the court, finding that the mother had abandoned her child within the meaning of Section 311(1), terminated her rights. On appeal, this Court vacated that decree stating:
“Before the hearing and decree of termination by the court, the appellant manifested an intent to halt the voluntary termination proceedings. The appellee urges that the child’s placement in the Bureau’s custody for a period of more than six months ‘has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to [the] child’ and justifies a decree of involuntary termination. We disagree.
An adjudication of abandonment necessitates a finding of neglect coupled with an affirmative indication *78of a positive intent to abandon the child. Vaders Adoption Case, supra [444 Pa. 428, 282 A.2d 359]; Hangartner Adoption Case, 407 Pa. 601, 181 A.2d 280 (1962); Harvey Adoption Case, supra [375 Pa. 1, 99 A.2d 276]. We find neither neglect nor the intent to abandon in this situation. Appellant placed her child with the Bureau pending a final decree in her petition for voluntary relinquishment. She properly withdrew her petition before a final decree was entered. That the period of time between the child’s placement in foster care and the withdrawal of appellant’s consent exceeded six months cannot, in itself, support a decree of involuntary termination.”
452 Pa. at 170, 305 A.2d at 39.
Appellants argue that Sheaffer is not controlling in the instant case because they rely upon an affirmative act by appellee and not upon a recanted petition or the mere passage of time. They assert that the delivery of the child to the intermediary in December 1973 was the affirmative indication necessary to a finding of a settled purpose under Section 311(1). It is argued that at that time, appellee believed her act to be final and irrevocable and, therefore, her intent to relinquish her rights is proven. Thus, this case is also argued to be distinguishable from Wolfe, supra, in which the mother believed she could recant within six months.
However, appellee argues that the delivery was not indicative of her true purpose. She testified that she did not want to give up the child but that this decision was forced upon her by parental pressure. Such pressure has been held to vitiate a voluntary consent agreement. See Susko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132 (1949). Appellee also argues that not until April 1975 was she aware of her right to recant her voluntary relinquishment at any time prior to a final court decree of *79adoption. She indeed had such a right. See Chambers Appeal, 452 Pa. 149, 154, 305 A.2d 360, 363 (1973). If the evidence presented on these claims by appellee were accepted as true, it could rebut the inference of a settled purpose which arises from the affirmative act of delivery of the child to the intermediary. Additionally, such evidence could undermine the argument that a final purpose persisted for the required time period because evidence of subsequent statements or inaction by the mother would have to be viewed in light of her wrongful impression that the adoption was irrevocable in December 1973. Since the evidence as to appellee’s voluntary and intelligent decision is in conflict, we believe the trial court was in a better position to resolve any factual dispute. As we stated in Farabelli in dealing with a similar issue:
“We recognize our responsibility in matters dealing with the custody of children to exercise an independent judgment based on the evidence and to consider the testimony and make such an order on the merits of the case as right and justice dictate. Commonwealth ex rel. Cooper v. Cooper, 167 Pa.Super. 492, 75 A.2d 609 (1950); Brown v. Brown, 206 Pa.Super. 439, 213 A.2d 395 (1965). This power of review is not intended to mean that an Appellate Court is free to nullify the fact-finding function of the Hearing Judge. He alone has had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and appraise their credibility, and deference, for this reason, should be given to his determination as to the weight of the evidence presented. Commonwealth ex rel. Harry v. Eastridge, 374 Pa. 172, 97 A.2d 350 (1953).”
460 Pa. at 433, 333 A.2d at 851. Because there is evidence to support such a conclusion, we affirm the ruling that appellant failed to establish the settled purpose necessary to terminate appellee’s parental rights.
Decree affirmed. Each party to pay own costs.
*80ROBERTS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which EAGEN and O’BRIEN, JJ., joined.. Jurisdiction over this matter is conferred by the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, art. II, § 202(3), 17 P.S. § 211.202(3) (Supp.1976).