concurring and dissenting.
I join in much of Chief Justice Erick-stad’s opinion for the majority. The Bureau’s determination, that a two-year program was sufficient to substantially rehabilitate Smith’s earning capacity to his pre-injury level, was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence.
However, I believe that the Bureau’s refusal to fairly consider paying Smith’s expenses to relocate to another city to attend college for the desired rehabilitation was also arbitrary and unreasonable.
NDCC 65-05.1-05 authorizes the Bureau to contract to pay the “cost” of a rehabilitation program, to furnish the “equipment and tools” for the training, and. to pay weekly support to the claimant up to the “amount of weekly compensation and dependent benefits ... plus twenty-five percent” as spelled out in NDCC 65-05.1-06. A claimant’s noncompliance with a contracted rehabilitation program relieves the Bureau from paying disability. NDCC 65-05.1-04. Similarly, as the Bureau’s proposed Rehabilitation Contract in this case illustrates, “upon completion of the rehabilitation retraining program, the claimant will be deemed qualified for gainful employment within his chosen vocation.” Thus, a rehabilitation contract ends the Bureau’s responsibility for disability payments to the claimant for the injury. The goal of rehabilitation is to save the public pocketbook from a large, long-term disability cost by a smaller, short-term educational investment.
Surely, reasonable expenses of moving to a new place for rehabilitation are a part of the “cost” of the program. It is incomprehensible to me how an authorization for moving expenses after rehabilitation can become a limitation on moving expenses for rehabilitation. Considering the large saving to the Bureau from rehabilitation results, it is a “penny-wise and dollar foolish” act by the Bureau to insist that a disabled and strapped claimant foot the cost of moving to the rehabilitation program.
The Bureau’s penurious position does not “ensur[e] ... services, so far as possible, necessary to assist the claimant and the claimant’s family in the adjustments required by the injury” which the legislature directed in establishing the scheme of rehabilitation services. NDCC 65-05.1-01. The Bureau diminishes the “sure and certain relief” envisioned “for workers injured in hazardous employments, and for their families and dependents.” NDCC 65-01-01. Unrealistically, the Bureau seeks savings by a claimant’s sacrifices.
The Bureau’s refusal to consider rehabilitation moving expenses for a distressed claimant and his family is intolerable and unreasonable. Therefore, I would also require the Bureau to fairly consider Smith’s relocation expense. On that item, I respectfully dissent.