dissenting:
Pursuant to information based on a wire-tap conducted by the New Jersey police, Pennsylvania police swore out a warrant authorizing a search of appellee’s home. The lower court granted appellee’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of the warrant. The appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, contends that the use of this wiretap information was legal.1
On February 25, 1974, Pennsylvania State Trooper Kenneth Anthony filed before a Bucks County justice of the peace an affidavit in support of a warrant to search “[a] two story frame and yellow stucco, and partial stone front dwelling, located at 143 Walnut Terrace, Middletown Twp., Langhorne, Penna. and a yellow Dodge . . . parked in the driveway . . . .” Trooper Anthony’s affidavit revealed the following factual history: During the course of a 1972 investigation of a major interstate sale of marijuana, Anthony received information from a confidential informant that Lee Philip Hartshorn, residing in East Amwell Township, New Jersey, was involved in drug trafficking. Anthony gave that information to Detective Kenneth Harding of the New Jersey State Police who, according to the affidavit, conducted an “independent investigation.” Based on the tip and his own investigation, Detective Harding obtained authorization on February 8, 1974, for a wiretap of Hartshorn’s telephone as provided by the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act.2
*468On the same day, a tap was placed on the telephone located at the New Jersey address. In fact, the number was listed under the name of William Rogers, who apparently shared the residence with Hartshorn. During the next fifteen days, the effective period of the court’s order, the New Jersey police conducted a twenty-four hour a day wiretap. Appellee was one of the people implicated in conversations with Rogers.3 The police recorded calls made to appellant by Rogers as well as calls by appellant from his home in Pennsylvania to Rogers.
The New Jersey Superior Court's order stated that “. . . good cause having been shown, the contents of any intercepted wire communications obtained pursuant to this Order, or evidence derived therefrom, may be discharged [to] appropriate law enforcement personnel in Pennsylvania who have provided information during the course of this investigation.” Because the New Jersey investigation originated with Pennsylvania Trooper Anthony’s tip, Detective Harding gave Anthony the summaries of the wiretaps. Based on that evidence, Anthony swore out the contested warrant on February 25, 1974.
On the same day, the police stopped the appellee as he left his home on his way to work. He was told that he could proceed to work, but that the police were going to search the premises. The search resulted in the seizure of a blue suitcase containing a residue of marijuana, cigarette papers, a plastic bag of marijuana, a “smoking” pipe, a small scale, a “hash” pipe, a red notebook containing notations of prices, a tin can containing marijuana and a large note pad with notations, presumably relating to drug sales.
*469On October 8, 1974, the grand jury indicted appellee on charges of possession of a controlled substance and possession with intent to sell a controlled substance. The lower court heard appellee’s motion to suppress the physical evidence on November 14, 1974, and granted the motion on November 28.
Both in the court below and on appeal, the litigants have focused on the constitutionality of the New Jersey wiretap. Because we believe that § 5703 of the Crimes Code 4 is controlling in the instant case, we do not reach the constitutional question.5
Section 5702 of the Crimes Code provides in part, that “ [a] person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he:
“(1) intercepts without permission of the parties to the communication a message or other communication by telephone or telegraph;
“(2) installs or employs any device for overhearing or recording communications passing through a telephone or telegraph line with intent to intercept a communication in violation of this chapter; or
“(3) divulges or uses without the consent of the sender or receiver the existence or contents of any such message or other communication if the actor knows that the message was illegally intercepted, or if he learned of the message in the course of employment with an agency engaged in transmitting it.” Section 5703 provides for the exclusion of evidence seized in the course of a wiretap: “Except as proof in a suit or prosecution for a violation of this chapter, no evidence obtained as a result of a violation of privacy or breach of privacy of messages shall be admissible as evidence in any legal proceedings.”
*470On its face, the statute prohibits the use of all evidence obtained as a result of a breach of privacy. The Legislature did not explicitly except evidence lawfully gathered by a breach of privacy by Federal authorities or law enforcement officials of another state under broader statutes.6 The Commonwealth argues, however, that because the purpose of an “exclusionary” rule is to deter illegal police conduct, our courts should not exclude this evidence because the wiretap was legally conducted under New Jersey law.
I do not dispute that the constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), is grounded in the notion that it deters illegal police conduct. “The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way— by removing incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). Thus, in situations in which exclusion would not alter police behavior, courts have not extended the doctrine. See, e. g., United States v. Callaway, 446 F.2d 753 (3rd Cir. 1971), (evidence seized by foreign police and subsequently proffered to United States authorities was admissible because our courts cannot hope to deter the conduct of foreign police); accord, Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967); Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1967) (evidence seized by private person not acting in conjunction with police was held admissible in trial for criminal offense); accord, Miramontes v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.App.3d 877, 102 Cal.Rptr. 182 (1972); People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal.App.2d 768, 34 Cal.Rptr. 65 (1963).
*471Section 5703 is not constitutionally mandated. Thus, it does not follow that the sole legislative purpose of the § 5703 “exclusionary” rule is the deterrence of police conduct. Rather, my view of the legislative history and prior case law convinces us that Chapter 57 of the Crimes Code expresses hostility towards all wiretapping7 and that, except as limited by the Federal statute,8 all Pennsylvania citizens are entitled to be free from its intrusion.
Two cases decided by our Supreme Court have addressed the Pennsylvania public policy behind the law governing the use of wiretap information.9 In Commonwealth v. Murray, 423 Pa. 37, 52-53, 223 A.2d 102, 110 (1966), Justice MUSMANNO stated: “Were it not for the Act of 1957, irresponsible agencies could be emboldened to tap wires to obtain unauthorized information for the use of social scavengers, discredited business sharpers, and political buccaneers. They could pry into the most personal dealings and the most sacred relationships. . . . Without this guardian of our rights of privacy, every telephone user would have to conjure the possibility that the phantom hands of the electric eavesdropper could be clutching the very instrument into which he speaks. . . .
*472“Wire-tapping does not end with the mere listening operation. After the wire-leech has sucked in the blood of guarded secrets, he is then in a position to blackmail his unwary victim. He is in a position to traffic with corruption, threats and ill-gotten gains. That such a potential infamy could be tolerated in the name of the enforcement of the law would be the most extraordinary paradox in these paradoxical lines.
“The Pennsylvania Legislature has recognized all these perils and has legislated against them. It becomes the duty of the Courts to apply that legislation so that the Peeping Toms, the Paul Frys and the Meddlesome Charlies may not put to naught the expressed will of the people in defending the dignity of man, the sanctity of family communication, and the liberty of its citizens.” (Emphasis added).
In Commonwealth v. Papszycki, 442 Pa. 234, 236, 275 A.2d 28, 29 (1971), the Court held that “a person other than a receiver can [not] testify as to the contents of a telephone conversation if he overheard the call by means of an amplification device without the consent of the caller.” The Court noted that Pennsylvania’s prohibition against the use of wiretap evidence is absolute. “[T]he Legislature has determined as a matter of state public policy that the right of any caller to the privacy of his conversation is of greater societal value than the interest served by permitting eavesdropping or wiretapping. Such a determination, when within constitutional limits, is solely within the discretion of the Legislature.” 442 Pa. at 239, 275 A.2d at 30.
A review of the legislative history of the 1957 act, reenacted in Chapter 57 of the Crimes Code, supra, reveals a similar uncompromising attitude towards the evidentiary use of wiretap information. During the debate, Representative FINEMAN stated that “ . . .if the police can effectively undertake to do their work without the aid of wiretapping, then we should not give them *473such a right, when giving them such a right means such an insidious invasion of the rights which have been guaranteed to us, the right to be secure in our homes, in our personal thoughts and in our personal papers.” Legislative Journal, 1957, Vol. II, p. 1686. (Emphasis added). Other representatives expressed concern that wiretapping was a substitute for good police work,10 and that such a practice is contrary to our basic concept of freedom.11 The history indicates that the Legislature did not seek primarily to deter the police, but rather intended to protect Pennsylvania citizens’ privacy from any electronic intrusion.
While research has revealed no case precisely on point, the California Supreme Court has recently resolved an analogous problem. In People v. Jones, 30 Cal.App.2d 852, 106 Cal.Rptr. 749 (1973), the United States Attorney received twenty tapes recorded pursuant to a wiretap authorized under the Omnibus Crime Control Act, supra. The U. S. Attorney then gave the tapes to the San Diego District Attorney who then presented them to a grand jury. The evidence was suppressed and the Court in Jones upheld the suppression under the California Penal Code, § 631, which is identical to §§ 5702 and 5703. After holding that the Omnibus Crime Control Act does not pre-empt the field of legislation, the Court held that the state’s prohibition was absolute and despite the legality of the wiretap under federal law, that legali*474ty did not render the tapes admissible in state court. Accord, United States v. Turner, 17 Crim.L.Rptr. 2449 (9th Cir. July 24, 1975).
I am persuaded that the same rationale controls in the instant case. Section 5703 was not aimed solely at deterring Pennsylvania police practices; rather, it expressed hostility to wiretap evidence. The section does not except evidence seized legally in another jurisdiction. Neither case law nor legislative history convinces me that we should fashion such an exception. Our legislature has the power to protect our citizens from any invasion of privacy despite the decision by the New Jersey legislature to provide lesser protection.
In addition, I must emphasize that the active participation of Pennsylvania State Trooper Anthony enabled the New Jersey authorities to secure the warrant to institute the wiretap. Thus, by reversing the lower court’s suppression order, the Majority is inviting the circumvention of our state law.
Therefore, I would affirm the order of the lower court.
JACOBS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.. The Commonwealth does not have sufficient evidence to bring the appellee to trial absent the suppressed evidence. Therefore, the order is final and the appeal is proper. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963). Cf. Commonwealth v. Deren, 233 Pa.Super. 373, 337 A.2d 600 (1975).
. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 et seq.
. For example, the summary of a conversation on February 19, 1974, includes the following: “ . . . Benji [William Rogers] says that he will charge for a straight 25 pounds — Benji tells Vince [appellee] that he owes him (Benji) for ‘35’ — Vince states that it will be ‘3375’ (dollars) (known to your affiant that 25 lbs. of marijuana, selling at a going rate of approx. $135.00 per lb. will equal as a cash price, approx. $3375.00).”
. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1 et seq.; 18 Pa. C.S. § 5703, as amended 1974, Dec. 27, P.L. 1007, No. 327, § 3.
. For a discussion of the constitutional issues raised by a continuous wiretap, see generally, Minimization: In Search of Standards, 8 Suffolk L.Rev. 60 (1973).
. See, e. g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title III; 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520, which permits a wiretap with consent of one party to the conversation and in certain other narrowly prescribed circumstance, with consent of neither party.
. The 1974 amendments to Chapter 57, note 4, supra, have broadened the statute to permit wiretapping in certain narrowly defined situations, more in conformity with the Omnibus Crime Control Act. However, the amendment had not yet been enacted when the instant case arose, and would have no relevance to the instant holding even if in effect at that time.
. We do not contend that Federal authorities cannot wiretap the phone of Pennsylvania citizens even within Pennsylvania under the Omnibus Act, supra. Cf. United States v. Jones, 369 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1966). However, the field of possible legislation is not pre-empted by the Act. See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 78 S.Ct. 155, 2 L.Ed.2d 126 (1957); People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 186 N.Y.S.2d 230, 158 N.E.2d 817 (1959); Criminal Law-Federal Pre-emption, 14 Santa Clara L.Rev. 159 (1973).
. Both of the cited cases deal with the law prior to the new Crimes Code. However, the Penal Code provisions, Act of July 16, 1957, P.L. 956, No. 411, § 1, 18 P.S. § 3742, are the same as the new Code.
. See, e. g., comments by Miss DUFFY: . . I do not think we need [wiretap evidence] ... I think it is merely a substitute for good police service.” Legislative Journal, supra, at 1687.
. See, e. g., comments by Mr. ANDREWS: “. . . We are not in Russia today. We are in America. We are in the good Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . .. Let us free ourselves from this stink of wire tapping.” Legislative Journal, supra at 1688; by Mr. SHIELDS: “. . . When it comes to the place where you cannot conduct a conversation over the telephone when you are in terror, a man is helpless. Take the freedom away from the people and you have a great problem on hand.” Id.