Michigan Employment Relations Commission v. Reeths-Puffer School District

M. S. Coleman, J.

(dissenting). I must dissent because I do not believe that the public employment rélations act prohibits an employer from dismissing an employee under these facts. Further, in my opinion the decisions below are not sup*271ported by competent, material and substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. Precedent is established whereby harassment of other employees can be labeled "an attempt to perfect a grievance”.

FACTS

On January 2, 1969, Wilma Wilder filed a complaint charging defendant with violating provisions of the public employment relations act (PERA). Mrs. Wilder alleged, in part, that the employer had discriminated against her "because she attempted to exercise rights guaranteed by law”.

Defendant replied that Mrs. Wilder had been hired as a substitute bus driver until the return of the regular driver. She subsequently "began to agitate to be assigned as a regular bus driver to a regular bus run”. Defendant said Mrs. Wilder’s actions created "confusion and moral [sic] problems”. Defendant concluded that Mrs. Wilder’s actions "were so inimical to the bus service that- it was decided to no longer use her as a substitute driver”.

A hearing was held on January 28, 1969. Mrs. Wilder testified that her supervisor said she would no longer be called upon to substitute because other drivers had complained about her. The supervisor said Mrs. Wilder "was harassing the drivers” by approaching them both on the job and at home. The president of the involved union felt Mrs. Wilder was an agitator. At one point he declined to represent her at a meeting because of "harassment that I. had got for a month — the phone calls” from Mrs. Wilder.

The supervisor testified under oath, as follows:

*272«q * * * Did the fact that Mrs. Wilder had processed a grievance have anything to do with your dispensing with her services?

"A. It certainly did not.

”Q. For what .reasons did you dispense with her services?

’A. Because of the problems she was causing these drivers; that they were calling me and complaining to me that — I guess they were being harassed by Mrs. Wilder to the point where they didn’t know whether the job was worth it. They were just in training, new drivers, and being involved in union problems, they didn’t like this.

”Q. That was the only reason?

TA/Yes.”

When questioned by the trial examiner, the supervisor told of the complaints he had received about Mrs. Wilder’s actions:

”Mr. Bixler: I have one question. Please feel free to object. You say you have dispensed with the services of Mrs. Wilder because she was calling up bus drivers?

’A. She was causing me problems with other bus drivers.

”Q. Now, these bus drivers related things to you, is that correct?

"A. Yes.

”Q. What was the jest [sic] oí what they related Mrs. Wilder said to them, what was it?

"A. To me, I took it as a complaint. They called and told me about these calls they were receiving — threatening. Well, Mrs. Stolzman’s job was threatened; she said she was going to get that.

”Q. What did Mrs. Elliott relate to you?

'A. She was disturbed that Wilma had approached her on the bus — at the school on the job, and that she bothered her at home.

"Mr. Bixler: What did she say about that?

'A. Questioning whether she had been hired, whether *273she had signed anything, and relating her problems and that she had been — felt she had been mistreated. She didn’t care to get involved in these things.

"Mr. Bixler: Who else besides Mrs. Elliott and Mrs. Stolzman?

"A. Mrs. Dora Morehouse approached me on the job at the junior high school and told me Mrs. Wilder had called her and discussed her problems and her grievances, and that she had felt she had been mistreated.

"Mr. Bixler: Who did she call?

"A. Dora Morehouse.

"Mr. Bixler: Any others?

"A. Mrs. Bollenbach told me on the job that she’d been getting calls, and she was sick and tired of it and she was threatened she was going to be taken to court.

"Mr. Bixler: Did she say anything else about what the calls were about?

"A. She didn’t go into great detail, just related that she had called and was discussing her problem that she had been mistreated.”

The trial examiner’s decision was filed February 27, 1969. It said filing a grievance pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement was concerted activity. As such, PERA prohibited the employer "from taking any action that would interfere, restrain or coerce public employees when so doing”. He found that Mrs. Wilder was not discharged for filing the grievance, but for telephoning other employees. He felt this was "inextricably related to the grievance” and "amounted to protected concerted activity”.

The Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) sustained the examiner’s finding and order. It said the telephone calls were part of Mrs. Wilder’s effort to process her own grievance.

"The testimony leads to the conclusion that the school officials, for reasons which do not appear on the record, decided to use the telephone calls as an excuse *274for terminating Wilder. Wilder, in making the telephone calls, was engaging in a protected activity, i.e., the filing of a grievance protesting the failure of the School District to assign her a regular school bus run.”

The Court of Appeals, by a 2-1 vote, granted MERC’s petition for enforcement of its order on July 20, 1972. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court on December 28, 1972.

STATUTES

Defendant was found to have violated MCLA 423.210(a); MSA 17.455(10)(a), which reads:

"It shall be unlawful for a public employer or an officer or agent of a public employer (a) to interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in section 9 * * * .”

The rights guaranteed are found in MCLA 423.209; MSA 17.455(9):

"It shall be lawful for public employees to organize together or to form, join or assist in labor organizations, to engage in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective negotiation or bargaining or other mutual aid and protection, or to negotiate or bargain collectively with their public employers through representatives of their own free choice.”

Section 16 of PERA (MCLA 423.216; MSA 17.455[16]) provides remedies for violations of § 10. Subsection (b) permits MERC to issue cease and desist orders. MERC may also require affirmative action. MERC may not require reinstatement of an employee who "was suspended or discharged for cause.” Subsection (d) provides for court enforcement of MERC orders. It says findings of fact shall be conclusive "if supported by competent, material *275and substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole”.1

ISSUES

1. Does PERA prohibit an employer from discharging an employee for any action taken by the employee subsequent to the filing of a grievance against the employer?

2. Is the decision of MERC supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole?

DISCUSSION

Issue I

PERA prevents an employer from interfering when public employees "engage in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective negotiation or bargaining or other mutual aid and protection”. Such activities are protected.

Not every act is sanctioned. It must be concerted group activity directed, in part, toward "bargaining or other mutual aid and protection”. Activities furthering a group rather than an individual interest will generally be considered concerted. Actions justifying discharge or suspension for cause are not protected.2

The Fourth Circuit reversed a reinstatement order in Joanna Cotton Mills Co v National Labor Relations Board, 176 F2d 749 (CA 4, 1949). The *276employee had been cautioned about his on-the-job conduct. The employee took offense, berated the supervisor and circulated a petition calling for his discharge. The company discharged the employee because the petition had an adverse effect on discipline.

The Court said this activity was not protected but "was a mere continuation and aggravation of the original defiant conduct”. The Court did not feel that "all activities in which employees act together are 'concerted activities’ ” for statutory purposes. The employees need not be organized but they must act together for mutual aid and protection.

In Mushroom Transportation Co v National Labor Relations Board, 330 F2d 683 (CA 3, 1964), a non-regular employee was discharged in part for telling other employees that they were not receiving the full benefit of the collective bargaining agreement. The Court said these contacts could not be considered concerted activity and set aside the order reinstating the employee.

The Court found no evidence of an effort "to initiate or promote any concerted action”. The Court would not adopt the view "that any conversation between employees comes within the ambit of activities protected by the act provided it relates to the interests of the employees”.

"It is not questioned that a conversation may constitute a concerted activity although it involves only a speaker and a listener, but to qualify as such, it must appear at the very least that it was engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or that it had some relation to group action in the interest of the employees.”

The Court said "mere talk must, in order to be protected, be talk looking toward group action”.

*277This emphasis on activity furthering a group interest is seen in National Labor Relations Board v City Yellow Cab Co, 344 F2d 575 (CA 6, 1965). Two drivers had been discharged because they joined the striking switchboard operators in picketing. The Court said this was concerted activity and quoted the following from Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in National Labor Relations Board v Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co, 130 F2d 503 (CA 2, 1942):

" 'Certainly nothing elsewhere in the act limits the scope of the language to "activities” designed to benefit other "employees”; and its rationale forbids such a limitation. When all the other workmen in a shop make common cause with a fellow workman over his separate grievance, and go out on strike in his support, they engage in a "concerted activity” for "mutual aid or protection,” although the aggrieved workman is the only one of them who has any immediate stake in the outcome. The rest know that by their actions each one of them assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the one whom they are all then helping; and the solidarity so established is "mutual aid” in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts.’ ”

Also see Morrison-Knudsen Co v National Labor Relations Board, 358 F2d 411 (CA 9, 1966) saying that " 'Section 7 rights are group rights, relating to "concerted activity” ’ ”.

As earlier stated, not every employee action is protected. It must be an element of lawful concerted activity which is directed toward mutual aid and protection. The above-cited cases contain a constant refrain. The activity must either be group activity or directed toward furthering a group *278interest.3 Judge Hand spoke of "common cause” and "solidarity”. The Third Circuit spoke of "initiating or inducing or preparing for group action” or having "some relation to group action in the interest of the employees”.

Mrs. Wilder’s activities, even though subsequent to the filing of a grievance, do not merit the protection of PERA. It is pertinent that the trial examiner found that

" * * * the record does not disclose any motivation on the part of the School District in denying the Charging Party a permanent school bus route that is prohibited by the Act. The Charging Party argues that it was contrary to the contract, contrary to seniority provisions of the contract, and generally unfair to treat her in this manner. None of these actions, however, are prohibited by PERA. This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that the Charging Party does not allege that she engaged in any concerted, protected activity up until November 17, which was her last day of work, that could give possible grounds for concluding that the Charging Party was denied permanent employment for this reason. The Charging Party joined the Union October 29, this alone, was the extent of her Union activity. ” (Emphasis added.)

Nevertheless, the trial examiner continued:

"The undersigned is of the opinion that Sec. 10(a) of PERA makes the filing of a grievance pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement protected activity, and a public employer is prohibited by PERA from taking *279any action that would interfere, restrain or coerce public employees when so doing.
"In the case at hand, however, the Charging Party was discharged not for having fled the grievance but because of the telephone calls the Charging Party made to other employees. * * *
"In the fact situation at hand, the Charging Party, when preparing her grievance, called another driver indirectly involved and told her of her intent. This, I am convinced, amounted to protected concerted activity. "(Emphasis added.)

MERC later found that there was "sufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that * * * her further attempts to solicit the aid of fellow employees * * * constituted protected, concerted activity regardless of the merits of her individual grievance”. (Emphasis added.)

The actual testimony demonstrates that her actions did not institute or implement any group action. There is no intimation of a "common cause” or "solidarity” between Mrs. Wilder and her coworkers. If anything, her actions ruptured the bonds of common cause. She even alienated the union president.

Plaintiff was not discharged for filing the grievance or for union activity or membership. She was discharged because her actions exceeded the permissible gathering of information in support of her grievance. Plaintiff did not communicate to develop facts but to complain, coerce and intimidate. Those activities do not warrant protection. Those activities furnish ample cause for discharge.4

*280 Issue II

Section 16(d) of PERA says MERC’s findings of fact are conclusive "if supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole”. This quantum of support is not present in the instant case.

MERC’s orders said Mrs. Wilder was dismissed "for reasons which do not appear on the record”. As demonstrated above, this statement simply does not reflect the facts. MERC said defendant used "the telephone calls as an excuse for terminating Wilder”. This statement is without testimonial basis. It is unwarranted, unsupported speculation.

The record must support "by competent, material and substantial evidence” a conclusion "that the activity was for the purpose of inducing or preparing for group action to correct a grievance or a complaint”. Indiana Gear Works v National Labor Relations Board, 371 F2d 273 (CA 7, 1967). This conclusion is not supplied solely by the employee’s filing of a grievance. National Labor Relations Board v Northern Metal Co, 440 F2d 881 (CA 3, 1971).* ***5

Plaintiff was discharged for cause. Her activities were not inextricably related to protected activity. Mrs. Wilder’s discharge was not predicated upon her exercise of protected rights. Plaintiff was discharged for good and ample cause which is fully reflected in the record. MERC’s findings are not equally reflected.

*281I would reverse the Court of Appeals and MERC and uphold Mrs. Wilder’s discharge.

J. W. Fitzgerald, J., did not sit in this case.

Also see Const 1963, art 6, § 28, § 106 of the Administrative Procedures Act (MCLA 24.201 et seq.; MSA 3.560[101] et seq.) and Regents of the University of Michigan v Employment Relations Commission, 389 Mich 96, 100-103; 204 NW2d 218 (1973).

See National Labor Relations Board v Phoenix Mut Life Ins Co, 167 F2d 983 (CA 7, 1948) and Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n v National Labor Relations Board, 206 F2d 325 (CA 9, 1953). Also see 6 ALR2d 416.

In 18B Kheel, Business Organizations: Labor Law, § 10.02[3] the author says the following are necessary elements of concerted activity:

"(1) there must be a work-related complaint or grievance;
"(2) the concerted activity must further some group interest;
"(3) a specific remedy or result must be sought through such activity; and
"(4) the activity should not be unlawful or otherwise improper.”

The Tenth Circuit in National Labor Relations Board v Meinholdt Manufacturing Inc, 451 F2d 737 (1971) refused to enforce an order of reinstatement. The employee had been once discharged for spending time away from his machine complaining to other employees about wages and working conditions. He was rehired and told to refrain from such activities. He did not and was again discharged. The Court said one "who 'bugs’ management for higher wages and better work*280ing conditions and who speaks with fellow employees on the job relative thereto, is not engaged in the 'concerted activity’ of employees for mutual aid and protection prescribed by the Act”. The employee’s complaints "were directed exclusively to his own wages, hours and working conditions”.

Compare National Labor Relations Board v Interboro Contractors, Inc, 388 F2d 485 (CA 2, 1967).