(concurring). I join in the view that R. S. 40:46-19 is mandatory and not directory in its terms and constitutes a condition precedent to a valid taking of the office to which it applies. Also, I agree that R. S. 40:46-19 obliges members of a municipal sewerage authority commission to take the oath prescribed by the statute although *377my reasons for this conclusion are different from those expressed in the majority opinion.
As I indicated in my dissent in Camden County v. Pennsauken Sewerage Authority, 15 N. J. 456, 471 (1954), a sewerage authority created under N. J. S. A. 40:14A-1 et seq. is but another example of autonomous bodies created by the State or its subdivisions with valid legislative authority. A sewerage authority “is an independent entity fin but not of' the parent [governmental unit].” Camden County v. Pennsauken Sewerage Authority, supra, at page 472. The raison d'etre of the governmental authority is to be independent of the body creating it, and in this manner operate for its limited purposes free of some of the restrictions which bind traditional governmental units. See De Lorenzo v. City of Hackensack, 9 N. J. 379, 385 (1952); New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, 3 N. J. 235, 246 (1949); State, Department of Civil Service v. Parking Authority of City of Trenton, 29 N. J. Super. 335, 338-339 (App. Div. 1954). Thus I would conclude that the authority in question is an entity independent of its creator, the Borough of Avalon.
This does not mean, however, that a municipally created sewerage authority does not come within the definition of “municipality” as that word is used in R. S. 40 :46-19. The Legislature apparently intended that persons assuming positions of public trust on the municipal level, persons who would be performing the functions of municipal government, should take the oaths required by R. S. 40 :46—19. There is no reason to assume that the Legislature referred only to officers in cities, boroughs, townships and similar traditional units. When the governmental functions of these traditional units are passed over to independent bodies, certainly the responsibilit}7, the position of trust, follows the function. It is just as logical to interpret the legislative intent in R. S. 40:46—19 to mean that the oath follows the responsibility. Eor this reason I would hold that a municipally created sewerage authority is a municipality for purposes of B. S. *37840:46-19. Thus the plaintiffs, having failed to take the oaths prescribed by R. S. 40:46-19 within the time stipulated therein, are not entitled to the offices they claim.
For affirmance—Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Burling, Jacobs, Francis, Proctor and Schettino—6.
For reversal—None.