The Court of Appeals1 set aside a jury’s verdict for the plaintiff against defendant Ford Motor Company and remanded the case for retrial against that defendant only.
The facts giving rise to the claim are not complicated.
Plaintiff’s decedent sustained severe and permanent injury to his right foot when a tow truck driven by defendant Dixon jumped a curb and crushed decedent’s foot against a cement step.
The death of plaintiff’s decedent occurred after this suit was tried and while the appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals. It does not appear to have been caused by the accident.
The action was brought against defendant Dixon for recovery of damages for the personal injuries sustained. The complaint alleged negligence on the part of defendant Dixon in the operation of his vehicle. Plaintiff, by an amended complaint, added Jack Dykstra Ford, Inc., as a defendant, alleging that Dykstra breached its duty to repair the Dixon vehicle in a workman-like manner. In plaintiff’s second amended complaint Ford Motor Company was added as a defendant, and the allegation made that Ford neglected to provide brakes reasonably fit for their intended purpose and neglected to *285advise or warn the defendant Dixon of the faulty brakes of the truck. Subsequently, Jack Dykstra Ford, Inc., filed a cross-claim against defendant Ford Motor Company, alleging that if the brakes on the vehicle did fail and that such failure was a proximate cause of the accident, such failure was due to breach of implied and expressed warranties by cross-defendant Ford Motor Company in that the master cylinder of the vehicle and its related apparatus was defectively manufactured and/or designed so as to allow fluid to leak out of the cylinder, causing a failure of the braking system of the truck. Dykstra alleged that if a verdict was entered against it, it would be entitled to indemnification from Ford Motor Company. In its answer, Ford Motor Company denied that it was liable to plaintiff McKinch, or to cross-plaintiff Dykstra.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court committed reversible error by submitting to the jury a field of inquiry, viz., defective design,, which was not within the testimony.
It cited as relevant the following excerpt from the court’s charge:
" 'Three: If you find that defendant Ford Motor Company installed a defectively designed braking system on this vehicle; or that at the time the vehicle left its factory Ford failed to provide adequate rubber seals for the master cylinder, or failed to provide an adequate master cylinder housing for defendant Dixon’s vehicle when used for its intended purpose; and if you find that this failure was the proximate cause of the accident— then you will find for plaintiff and against defendant Ford.
" 'If you find that defendant Ford did, at the time the vehicle left its factory, provide it with an adequately designed braking system when used for its intended purpose, and did provide it with rubber seals for the master cylinder, and with a master cylinder, all of *286which were free from defects and reasonably fit for their intended purposes at the time it left Ford’s; or if you find that the Ford people failed in one of these respects, but that such failure was not a proximate cause of the accident — then you will find for defendant Ford and against plaintiff.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court then said at 232:
"The record in the instant case does not contain the requisite evidentiary foundation sufficient to support the instruction regarding defective braking system design.”
We disagree.
While admittedly scant, there was some evidence touching on design. Witness Smith gave his opinion that the groove in the master cylinder was caused by a grain of sand which could have dropped in whenever the top was removed for checking the fluid level when the brakes were adjusted. He also testified there was no screen or filter to prevent dirt from falling into the master cylinder.
Witness Riding, defendant Ford’s expert, testified that in designing the system, they did not put a filter on because they did not regard it as a problem. He testified that they could have taken care of it had they considered it to be a problem.
According to the transcript of the court’s jury charge defendant Ford’s counsel objected to the instruction on design and the court ruled on the objection as follows:
"Mr. Reagh: As I previously stated, and stated in regard to objections to charge, Mr. Buchanan did argue in regard to defective design, and I don’t believe there was anything in the case to warrant such an argument or such an instruction. The only thing in this case beyond the design that we have is purely speculation and only along the line that there must have been some *287other way of doing it. I don’t think that is proper argument in view of the facts in this case. And also don’t think there should be a charge on it.
"The Court: As Counsel pointed out earlier today, there was a small amount of testimony concerning the possible beneficial effect of a screen being placed in the cylinder. I think that is enough factual element — injects enough factual element into the case as to design on it.”
Because we cannot say that all reasonable men would agree that the lack of a filter or screen in the master cylinder did not constitute faulty design, we cannot hold that the trial court erred in submitting the question to the jury under the instruction given.
The Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause remanded for entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict. Costs to plaintiff.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Swainson, Williams, and Levin, JJ., concurred with T. G. Kavanagh, J.43 Mich App 229; 203 NW2d 758 (1972).