Dissent.
Dissenting Opinion by WILNER, J., which HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ., join.
It is often said that hard cases make bad law. Occasionally, a court is faced with a situation in which the normal application of legal principles that are either well-established on their own or that would naturally flow from the objective interpretation of broader common law or statutory mandates will produce a result that the judges of the court feel is unduly harsh, or even unfair, to a litigant. The temptation arises not *405to apply those principles as the law would ordinarily require, and the judges, instead, look for some way to create a little bubble, or exception, to avoid the perceived harsh or unfair result. What often happens when they do that, of course, is that the law, itself, becomes less certain, less reliable, and, in the end, less just.
That is what the Court is proposing to do here. The Court believes that Ms. Garfink should be able to dry her clothes without violating the county Fire Code, as indeed she should. To allow her to achieve that objective, however, the Court stretches the scope of an easement well beyond what the plain language of the easement would allow and gives less even than lip service to a clear and critical element of the condominium regime—control over the common elements and building exterior by the council of unit owners.
There are three problems with the Court’s approach, apart from ignoring the wisdom of the adage that hard cases make bad law. The first is that, despite its valiant effort to circumscribe its ruling just to this case, the ruling cannot be so neatly cabined. The scope articulated by the Court is ambiguous and, as it attacks critical elements of nearly every residential condominium project and most other developments that are subject to reciprocal restrictive covenants, it will create considerable uncertainty and will likely generate a good bit of litigation in an area that should remain absolutely clear and certain. Second, even if the Court could make the contours of its self-created bubble clear, so that its ruling really is unique to this one situation, the ruling would then be wholly inconsistent with the long and consistent view of this Court that certiorari is not to be granted except to consider an issue of public importance, one that is beyond the interest of just the litigants. It is hardly consistent with that notion for this Court to establish a rule applicable only to one unique situation such as this, that has no interest to anyone beyond Ms. Garfink and the council of unit owners of The Cloisters at Charles, Inc. Finally, and perhaps most important, it is unnecessary in this case. One does not have to go through the legal gyrations and gymnastics—the unwarranted stretching of *406some legal principles and the sharp contraction of others—in order to permit Ms. Garfink to dry her clothes without violating the county Fire Code.
As the Court notes, Ms. Garfink purchased her unit in 1991. It had been used by the developer as a model unit and apparently had a clothes dryer in it that was included with the sale. Where the dryer was located in the unit is not clear.1 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is a fair inference that the dryer was not intended to be used while the unit served only as a model. Whether for that or some other reason, the dryer was vented into the furnace room and not to the outside. Whether that was a Code violation prior to the sale to Ms. Garfink, it certainly became one when she purchased the unit and began to use the dryer. Use it she did, however, luckily without incident, for about nine years. It was only when the dryer died, the service technician refused to install the new one because of the unlawful venting, and Ms. Garfink decided to deal with the matter by punching a hole in the exterior wall without seeking permission from the council of unit owners did the controversy before us surface.
The Court correctly identifies the relevant statutory, property, and contractual provisions that apply. Maryland Code, § 11-115 of the Real Property Article, which is part of the Maryland Condominium Act, provides that, “[s]ubject to the provisions of the declaration or bylaws and other provisions of law,” a unit owner may make improvements or alterations to his or her unit that do not impair the structural integrity or mechanical systems or lessen the support of any portion of the condominium, but may not alter, make additions to, or change the appearance of the common elements, or the exterior appearance of a unit ... without permission of the council of *407unit owners. (Emphasis added). Section ll-124(c) requires that the declaration, bylaws, and condominium plat be construed together and be deemed to incorporate one another, i.e., to be read in harmony and not in a manner that would create conflict. Thus, unless the declaration, bylaws, or plat, construed together, dictate otherwise, the law requires a unit owner to get permission from the council of unit owners before making any alteration or addition that changes the appearance of a common element or the exterior appearance of a unit.
The pertinent provision in the condominium declaration is § 15.2, which grants an easement to each unit “in the common elements for the purposes of providing maintenance, support, repair or service for such unit to and for the ducts, pipes, conduits, vents, plumbing, wiring and other utility services to the unit.” (Emphasis supplied). If there are ducts, pipes, conduits, vents, plumbing, wiring, or other utility services serving the unit that intrude upon the common elements, the unit owner may, pursuant to that easement, enter the common elements for the limited purpose of maintaining, supporting, repairing, or servicing those ducts, pipes, conduits, or vents, etc. I see nothing in that easement, however, that permits a unit owner, without approval of the council of unity owners to install new ducts, pipes, conduits, vents, plumbing, wiring, or other utility services in the common elements where none previously existed. The Court apparently does—but just for this one case; I do not.
Finally, there is Art. IX of the bylaws which, except for original construction of the units, improvements accomplished concurrently therewith, and “proper maintenance and repair,” prohibit unit owners from altering “in any manner whatsoever” the exterior of any condominium unit or any common element without approval of the council of unit owners. That clear, unambiguous provision in the bylaws can be read, and should be read, harmoniously with the easement contained in § 15.2 of the declaration and § 11-115 of the Real Property Article. If a unit owner wants to install a new duct or vent in the common element or exterior of the building, other than for *408the repair or maintenance of an existing one, he or she needs to get approval from the council.
There is nothing harsh, strange, or oppressive about Art. IX. It is a requirement that is not only common but probably universal in residential condominium regimes, and it has an obviously beneficial purpose. As noted, the law itself imposes that requirement.
On the supposition that, unless the requirement of council approval provided for by both the statute and Art. IX of the bylaws is somehow rendered inapplicable Ms. Garfink will not be able to dry her clothes, the Court holds that the requirement is, indeed, inapplicable. To achieve that objective, the Court tacitly construes the exception in Art. IX for “repair”2 as extending to punching holes in the exterior wall for new pipes, ducts, eondu' vents, and the like. That is a rather dramatic extension, for which the Court cites no authority, and creates a loophole that could well emasculate the requirement of council approval. Indeed, such a cavalier extension could well inject considerable confusion and uncertainty into the law of easements generally. Perhaps wary of the implications of such a tortuous ruling, the Court declares it applicable only “to the particular situation here extant” (Opinion at 898, 897 A.2d at 220) or “to instances where the inherent problem results from an initial construction defect and where the Condominium Declaration contains an express easement and there is a Bylaw exception permitting the repair without prior approval” Opinion at 402, 897 A.2d at 222). That continues to presume, however, that the exception in Art. IX for “repair” includes the installation of new invasions of the common *409elements and exterior walls, and thus is not so limiting as the Court perhaps intends.
Upon this analysis, it is not at all clear just how small the bubble is that the Court has created. What is “the particular situation here extant?” What is a “construction defect?” Suppose the contract required an exhaust fan over the stove or in the bathroom and the developer forgot to install it or installed it improperly? Would Ms. Garfink, nine years later, be able to punch new holes in the exterior wall or roof, at a location of her choosing, to accommodate the belated addition of a range hood or bathroom exhaust fan on the theory that she was correcting a construction defect? The bubble requires that the condominium contain “an express easement.” What kind of easement will suffice; does it matter how the easement is worded? Must the easement be precisely in the language of this one in order for the new special rule to apply and, if not, how much of a deviation will be allowed? Does the Court really intend to hold that the words “maintenance” or “repair,” as used in the statute, the easement, and the bylaw, encompasses new invasions of the exterior walls and other common elements for the installation of new pipes, ducts, and vents? If so, the ruling in this case will affect virtually every condominium in the State, not to mention rights-of-way and other forms of easements. It will not be limited at all.
That is the first problem with the Court’s analysis; the contour of the bubble created for Ms. Garfink is not at all clear. Even if it could properly be construed as limited to Ms. Garfink’s peculiar situation, how is such a ruling consistent with the long-standing principles governing the exercise of our discretion in granting certiorari? How is this case, as molded by the Court, of any importance to anyone other than Ms. Garfink and the council of unit owners of The Cloisters at Charles, Inc.? Is there another Ms. Garfink out there somewhere?
Finally, on this record, the Court’s disregard for the plain meaning of each of the provisions it acknowledges as relevant is wholly unnecessary. There is a far easier way to allow Ms. Garfink to connect her dryer to the outside world and a far more important principle to confirm. Although Ms. Garfink did not seek approval from the council before installing her *410vent—hence the action for injunctive relief to require her to remove the vent—the Circuit Court stayed its ruling in favor of the council so that the parties could negotiate a sensible solution. Unfortunately, it appears that egos got in the way of common sense. It seems clear from the record that the council did consider her proposed solution and rejected it in favor of alternatives that were either equally violative of the Fire Code or unreasonably expensive and that, as a result, were rejected by Ms. Garfink.
When, either as part of a condominium regime or as a result of restrictive covenants in a deed, an owner is required to seek and obtain approval from a council, board, or association created by or through the property documents before undertaking some improvement or alteration to the exterior of the owner’s property, the body with approval authority must act reasonably and in good faith. It may not reject an application arbitrarily or capriciously. See Kirkley v. Seipelt, 212 Md. 127, 133, 128 A.2d 430, 434 (1957) (refusal “would have to be a reasonable determination made in good faith, and not highhanded, whimsical or captious in manner”); Carroll County v. Buckworth, 234 Md. 547, 553, 200 A.2d 145, 147 (1964) (“approval or disapproval must be reasonable and ... the power must be exercised in good faith”); Harbor View Imp. Ass’n v. Downey, 270 Md. 365, 373, 311 A.2d 422, 426 (1973); Colandrea v. Wilde Lake, 361 Md. 371, 761 A.2d 899 (2000). In Markey v. Wolf, 92 Md.App. 137, 163, 164, 607 A.2d 82, 95 (1992), the Court of Special Appeals (Cathell, J.) correctly noted that approvals and disapprovals are not treated equally, and that, because a disapproval may constitute a restraint on the free use and alienability of land, a disapproval “should be very closely scrutinized.”
Ms. Garfink is entitled to have, and use, a clothes dryer in her home, and it must be vented to the outside in order to conform to the Fire Code. On this record, it is unclear where the most appropriate place for the vent is, comparable to where other dryer vents in the condominium are located. See n. 1, supra.
*411The only significance that this case, with its peculiar facts, really has is in confirming once again the principle that approval bodies must act reasonably. That does have public importance; that is a “cert-worthy” issue. Resolution of that issue as I propose it will allow Ms. Garfink to dry her clothes lawfully. It will achieve the Justice sought by the Court without torturing basic legal principles and making bad law. I too would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, but I would remand the case to that court with instructions to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand to that court for the parties to introduce into evidence the documents reflecting where dryers are vented (and/or were vented at the time of original construction of the condominium units) in all units similar to the one Ms. Garfink occupies. With that basis in place, a reasonable resolution of this dispute should be clear. Should the parties not reach an amicable solution, the Circuit Court may assess the reasonableness of the parties’ competing positions. I would continue the stay until a final resolution is achieved.
Judges HARRELL and BATTAGLIA authorize me to state that they join in this dissent.
. At oral argument, counsel were asked by the Court whether the record contained floor plans, architectural drawings, or condominium documents indicating where the dryer was in Ms. Garfink's unit and any other units in the development that had diyers similarly situated, as well as how and where those other units’ dryers were vented when originally constructed. We were advised that such documents were not in evidence.
. It is not entirely clear whether the majority favors Ms. Garfink’s position because of its construction of "repair.” For example, the majority states, op. at 398, 897 A.2d at 220, that "[w]e believe that in the unusual circumstances of this case, the situation is the functional equivalent of maintenance necessary for the reasonable and safe operation of the dryer.” (Emphasis supplied). The majority relies elsewhere on “maintenance” also (see Maj. op. at 396, 897 A.2d at 219), but confusingly alludes to "repair” as equally justifying its conclusion. See Maj. op. at 400, 897 A.2d at 221 and 404, 897 A.2d at 223-24.