concurring.
I join the Majority, but write separately to point out that the Superior Court in the cases at hand misinterpreted our decision in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Wick*345ett, 563 Pa. 595, 763 A.2d 813 (2000), by holding that the filing of post-trial motions was not required following the trial court’s granting of declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. As indicated by the analysis of the Majority, we have addressed a similar issue in Chalkey v. Roush, 569 Pa. 462, 805 A.2d 491 (2002), where this Court unequivocally held that, so long as a post-trial order fell within the parameters of Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c), it was subject to the requirements of the post-trial motion procedure. At the conclusion of our opinion in Chalkey, we pronounced that, given the confusion concerning the proper post-trial motions procedure, our holding in that case would apply prospectively. 805 A.2d at 497. The present cases arose prior to our decision in Chalkey and illustrate the erroneous interpretation of Wickett by the courts of this Commonwealth. To thwart further confusion and to cement Chalkey with our present decision, at the risk of redundancy, I feel it is necessary to re-emphasize the prospective application of our decision in Chalkey.