(dissenting).
Three elections are involved here:
1. The first election, June 24, 1969, authorized issuance of $595,000 in 6% bonds which was passed by over 60% of the ballots. As a marketing agent stated there was no market for them, no attempt was made to sell them.
2. The second election, February 3, 1970, was for $595,000, the same amount, of 8% bonds and included a statement that it was "in lieu of issuing" the first bonds. It received a favorable vote of 204-157 which was over 50% but less than 60%, so the school district declared the election to have failed.
3. The third election, March 3, 1970, was for $625,000 of 8% bonds and also included the statement "in lieu of issuing" the first election bonds. The vote was 307 in favor and 186 against, a 60% majority and the bond issue was declared to have passed.
Neither the school district officers nor its electors had power to rescind a vote authorizing the bond issue. Custer City v. Robinson, 79 S.D. 91, 108 N.W.2d 211. Therefore, it appears to me that the first election was a valid one, and as of the date of the trial of this action and the law governing this appeal it stands as a valid election and was not rescinded by either the second or third election (SDCL 13-19-16, amended by Ch. 101, S.L. 1970, effective July 1, 1970, may affect later bond issues).
*58Further the question of submitting the bond 'issue question and the "in lieu” of the prior bonds raises another question. Assuming the district could issue the bonds and vote to cancel the prior elections, it would be submission of dual legal propositions which the court mentioned in Grabe v. Lamro Ind. Con. Sch. Dist., 53 S.D. 579, 221 N.W. 697, but found it unnecessary to consider. However, the board had the right to submit a bond issue to the electors but not to illegally include another proposition, that is, the cancellation or revocation of the prior issues. The Grabe v. Lamro opinion so held. That the "in lieu of" clause was another proposition is supported by the fact that dictionaries define "in lieu of" as "in place of" and "Instead of" (American Heritage), and as "since he could not get this, he took that" (Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Ed.).
If a second election be permitted to change the interest rate, as here to "raise" it, then it would permit one to "lower" it to a rate known to make the bonds unsalable or to reduce the "amount" to a figure which would not carry out the planned improvement. The community would be faced with endless confusion. In Schmiedeskamp v. Board of Trustees of School Dist., 128 Mont. 493, 278 P.2d 584, 68 A.L.R.2d 1035, it was held that without a specific statutory act a second election could not be held to rescind a prior one that authorized a bond issue. Many cases from Minnesota, Illinois, etc. are cited.
The school board was not authorized to rely on the advice of a Minneapolis bond dealer that the 6% tax exempt bonds could not be sold. It was the duty of the school board, as directed in SDCL 13-19-20, to publish a notice of a time and place to receive sealed bids for the bonds so as to sell them to the highest bidder. That is what the legislature required the board to do. To quote Justice Black, dissenting in People v. Hampton, June 1, 1971, 384 Mich. 669, 187 N.W.2d 404 at 408, it seems "all we have to do in this case is 'to read English intelligently' " to understand what the legislature meant in SDCL 13-19-20 when it directed:
"When the issue of bonds is authorized the school board shall cause at least three weeks' notice to be pub*59lished in a legal newspaper within the county and within the district, if there be one, stating the time when and the place where sealed bids for such bonds will be received * * *" (Emphasis supplied).
What action the board could have taken in the event no bids were received is not before us as this legal step was not complied with.
Under this reasoning, the first election approving that bond issue remains in effect and the second and third elections were of no force and effect. The only difference between the result reached by the majority and my conclusions is the majority opinion approves the third election and my reasoning approves the first. While there is thus little variance as a practical result, the principles of law involved require this dissent.