(concurring). It is undisputed that the Capitol Drive Airport had operated for many years prior to 1969, the time Krueger commenced the operation of the lawn and garden supply and equipment business. The airport was L-shaped, providing north-south and east-west turf runways. The Krueger store was located across the road, directly south of the west boundary of the airport. The flight path at that time for the north-south runway caused aircraft to fly over the area immediately east of the Krueger store.
In 1978 the defendant airport operator paved a runway which utilized the north-south runway area. In order to gain a slightly longer runway, the paved runway was moved slightly from the area of the turf runway so that it ran from the northeast corner of the north-south leg of the airport to the southwest corner. This change caused the aircraft to fly directly over the store rather than immediately to the east of the store.
Under the facts of this case, I conclude that Krueger could have been denied recovery of damages under the doctrine of “coming to the nuisance.” This court has noticed this doctrine. “A plaintiff, of course, is not *109ipso facto barred from relief in the courts merely because of ‘coming to the nuisance,’ but it is a factor which bears upon the question of whether the plaintiff used his land reasonably.” Abdella v. Smith, 34 Wis. 2d 393, 401, 149 N.W.2d 537 (1967) (citing W. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts, sec. 92, 632 (3d ed. Hornbook Series 1964). Dean Prosser also notes that a plaintiff may be barred from recovery where the defendant’s activity is one in which the public has a major interest. W. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts, sec. 91, 611 (4th ed. Hornbook Series 1971).
Here there was no enlargement of the airport. The airport had a major public interest. When Krueger established his business, the runways were grass which made them subject to modification by the simple act of mowing. The utilization of airport property for maximum safety and efficiency was clearly foreseeable. The fact that a paved runway might be installed with a slight change in direction was as foreseeable as a possible change in runway direction by mowing. The size of the property dictated the length of the runway and the type of aircraft which would use the field. This was also foreseeable.
Krueger elected to establish a business at the end of a runway. The end of the paved runway is on the site of the end of the grass runway. The maxim “volenti non fit injuria” is applicable. A plaintiff who voluntarily places himself in a situation whereby he claims to experience damage from a nuisance maintained by another should not be allowed relief. 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances sec. 217 (1971).
It appears to me that the plaintiff could have foreseen the injury of which he complains and could have been denied recovery. I note, however, the defendants approved the instruction which was given to the jury as follows: “The fact that the Capitol Drive Airport exist*110ed and was operating on its present site when the plain-your determination of liability and damage of the burden of proof to all of these questions upon the plaintiff.” tiff moved onto the adjacent property is irrelevant to
Thus, the issue upon which the defendants could have prevailed was removed from the case. Therefore, I concur with the majority.