(dissenting). I dissent because the trial court’s decision was not clearly erroneous. The police officer was not in danger.1 He had arrested the defendant and taken him away from the car. Thus, although the officer had to remove the canvas sack from the defendant’s grip to handcuff him, removing the sack alone eliminated the danger. There was also no chance that evidence of the crime would be destroyed.2 The defendant was arrested for soliciting; there was no physical evidence capable of destruction. The "exigent circumstances” exceptions to a search without a warrant are factually unsupported. When the officer felt the outline of the gun in the sack, he should have gotten a search warrant on this strong probable cause. But without the warrant, and absent exi*431gent circumstances, this search was per se unreasonable.
The majority is correct that some cases, notably the car and container search cases, would uphold an admission of evidence resting on this search.3 Those cases, though, stretch the need for an immediate search too far and were decided over vigorous dissents. I believe the dissenting view, as expressed by Justice Brennan in New York v Belton, 453 US 454, 463; 101 S Ct 2860; 69 L Ed 2d 768 (1981), is true to the purpose of the "exigent circumstances” exception. A substantial legal foundation exists for this view, and a trial judge should be permitted to follow the rule as interpreted by the "dissenting” view. Following this view is not clearly erroneous and goes further to protect the defendant’s delicate rights. I would therefore affirm the suppression order and consequent dismissal of the weapons charge.
Chimel v California, 395 US 752; 89 S Ct 2034; 23 L Ed 2d 685 (1969).
Chimel v California, supra.
E.g., New York v Belton, 453 US 454; 101 S Ct 2860; 69 L Ed 2d 768 (1981) (jacket in car). But see United States v Chadwick, 433 US 1; 97 S Ct 2476; 53 L Ed 2d 538 (1977).