dissenting:1
A majority of the court today has decided to admit to our bar three persons who have been convicted of a homicide,2 attempted armed robbery of a bank, and felonious sale of narcotics. I cannot in good conscience join in that decision; accordingly, I dissent.
When the Manville case was initially before us, I joined with Judge Nebeker in his statement of reasons for voting sua sponte to rehear the case en banc. In re Manville, 494 A.2d 1289, 1298 (D.C.1985). I still agree with the views expressed then by Judge Nebeker. I shall not restate those views here, but shall confine my observations to what the majority has done today.
Accepting for the sake of argument the majority’s assumption that we cannot adopt a per se rule excluding any convicted felon from our bar, I would nevertheless hold that a prior conviction of certain serious crimes (which would certainly include the crimes of which Manville, Strauss, and Brooks were convicted) raises a presumption of bad moral character.3 I would further hold that an applicant for admission to the bar must overcome that presumption by clear and convincing evidence (not merely a preponderance of the evidence, as the majority seems to conclude, ante at 1134 n. 7) before he or she may be considered for admission to the bar. I do not believe that these three applicants have met that burden of proof, and I would deny their applications for admission.4
*1139Eandell Hunt Norton, Esquire, has filed a “Dissenting Statement in Opposition to Brief Amicus Curiae [of two sections of the District of Columbia Bar] in Support of Application to the Bar of Three Convicted Felons.” In his dissenting statement, Mr. Norton writes:
The bar admissions process is not ... akin to the penal system where rehabilitation is one of the primary interests. The admissions process is aimed at selecting not only those persons who will honestly and competently handle their clients’ interests, but also those persons who will not diminish respect for the legal profession as an institution.... Certainly the crimes involved here, murder, attempted armed robbery, and drug sales, are precisely the type of crimes which are serious enough to engender such public repugnance that admitting a person convicted of such a crime would seriously damage public confidence in the bar.
I agree with these sentiments, and I share Mr. Norton’s distress about the damage that the admission of these three applicants will inflict on what he describes as the “honored and honorable profession” of attorneys. I fear that the action of the majority today has placed an indelible stain on the integrity of the District of Columbia Bar and on the entire legal profession.5
I respectfully dissent.
. Associate Judge Nebeker was a member of the court at the time of oral argument. His status changed to Associate Judge, Retired, on September 1, 1987, and he left the court on December 11, 1987. Before his departure, he noted his concurrence in this opinion.
. Originally charged with murder, Manville was convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter as a result of a plea bargain.
. There is no need here to define the outer limits of what I refer to as a "serious crime.” As that term applies to suspension and disbarment cases, however, it is defined in Rule XI, § 15(2), of our Rules Governing the Bar. See generally In re Hutchinson, 474 A.2d 842 (D.C. 1984). The definition in that rule would not necessarily apply in a case such as this, involving an applicant for admission, but it would at least provide a starting point for discussion.
.I recognize that such a burden may be difficult to meet, but that is no reason to lighten it. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has spoken on this point:
An applicant's attitude and behavior subsequent to disqualifying misconduct must demonstrate a reformation of character so convincingly that it is proper to allow admission to a profession whose members must stand free from all suspicion.... The more serious the misconduct, the greater the showing of rehabilitation that will be required_ However, it must be recognized that in the case of extremely damning past misconduct, a show*1139ing of rehabilitation may be virtually impossible to make.
In re Matthews, 94 N.J. 59, 81, 462 A.2d 165, 176 (1983) (citations omitted).
. I note with dismay the seeming indifference of most of the organized bar to these cases. Before oral argument, the court entered an order inviting "any sections or committees of the District of Columbia Bar," as well as six voluntary bar associations, to file amicus curiae briefs. None of the voluntary bar associations responded, and only two of the twenty sections of the unified Bar filed a brief; the other eighteen remained lamentably silent.