dissenting.
A defendant in this case, Pamela Kane, was a patient of the plaintiff, Dr. Margo Kanaga. Dr. Kanaga located a small benign tumor in Kane and strongly recommended a hysterectomy, a surgical procedure requiring a hospital admission, to remove it. Dr. Kanaga’s office demanded a $500 advance payment before performing the procedure.
Before the hysterectomy was scheduled, Kane had an episode of heavy uterine bleeding and went to a hospital emergency room. The emergency room doctor, Dr. Domingo, removed the tumor by simply grasping it with a forceps and twisting it out — without performing a hysterectomy or other invasive surgical operation, without a hospital stay, without removing any reproductive organs and without requiring a fee to be paid in advance. These facts are undisputed.
Kane formed the opinion that she had received poor treatment from Dr. Kanaga and believed that the treatment was based on what she saw as the doctor’s greed rather than Kanaga’s informed medical opinion. Kane filed a complaint with the New Castle County Medical Society (the “Medical Society”). A newspaper owned by defendant Gannett Corporation, The News Journal, published an article about Kane’s experience with Dr. Kanaga, stating in detail the true facts, which I have recited here. The article also reported the opinion Kane had formed based upon those facts — that she had received poor treatment from Dr. Kanaga. It is Kane’s right under the First Amendment to tell her story and to state the opinions that she has formed based on her experience. It is The News Journal’s First Amendment right to print a story reporting accurately the facts of Kane’s case and Kane’s opinions based on the stated facts.
Given these circumstances, the Superior Court in 1995 properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants in this case.12 Unfortunately, this Court reversed that judgment, allowing this libel action to go to a jury based upon The News Journal *1192article I have described.13 That jury trial resulted in a verdict for Dr. Kanaga and against the defendants of more than $3 million.14 This enormous verdict (indeed, any verdict) against a newspaper or an individual for exercising fundamental freedoms of speech and press is unprecedented. If an individual can be held liable for stating her opinion about medical treatment she has received, without misstating, explicitly or impliedly, the facts upon which she based her opinion, then First Amendment rights in the context of civil litigation lie eviscerated.
In my opinion, this Court’s decision in Kanaga I will have a chiding effect on the exercise of fundamental rights of free speech and free press that are vital to our democracy. This is why I am in the uncomfortable and awkward position of having to part company with my colleagues. That awkwardness is compounded by the fact that the present appeal compels, in my opinion, reconsideration of the'Court’s decision in this case, a decision which issued almost four years ago. The law of the case doctrine, however, is not a bar to such reconsideration, as I explain in detail later, when the earlier decision is either unwise precedent or results in a manifest injustice. Ultimately, I am convinced that this Court should vacate Kanaga I, and affirm the original decision by the Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
Libel cases involve an inherent conflict between vindication of personal and professional reputations, on the one hand, and the First Amendment rights that are essential to our democracy, on the other. I believe the Kanaga I opinion to be in error in a way that leaves unprotected fundamental rights to speech and to a free press. The majority in this appeal after remand is poised to send the matter back for yet another trial, this time on the question of damages. In my opinion, however, not even the first trial should have taken place.
A libel action cannot lie against a speaker for expressing an opinion that does not imply false, defamatory facts.15 Because of the current posture of this case, I must dissent.
II. THE MERITS
As the majority correctly observed in Kanaga I, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that, although pure expressions of opinion are protected speech, publication of opinion that implies an undisclosed, defamatory fact may support an action for libel.16 Chief Justice *1193Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Mil-kovich, recognized that when a speaker says “in my opinion ‘John Jones’ is a liar,” the speaker implies a knowledge of facts that support a conclusion that Jones told an untruth.
Simply couching such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications; and the statement “in my opinion John Jones is a liar” can cause as much damage to reputation as the statement, “Jones is a liar” ... [I]t would be destructive of the law of libel if a writer can escape liability for accusations of [defamatory conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words “I think.”17
This case, therefore, raises one decisive question: do Kane’s expressions of opinion (alleged to be libelous) imply to the reasonable reader undisclosed, untrue and defamatory facts? As the Kanaga I Court correctly noted, a determination of this question turns on the context, as well as the language, of the opinions stated.18 If the opinion at issue does not imply any undisclosed facts, a court should dismiss the libel action before the plaintiff presents her case to a jury. The First Amendment protects a speaker’s pure opinion— statements “[n]o reasonable reader can understand to be impliedly asserting ... fact.”19 If, on the other hand, an opinion does imply that undisclosed facts serve as the basis for the opinion, a court should allow a jury to hear the case to determine whether those undisclosed facts are defamatory and false. Logic dictates that if an opinion is accompanied by the true and undisputed facts which serve as the basis for that opinion, then a reasonable reader (and therefore a court) would be unlikely to believe that the opinion implies some other undisclosed factual foundation beyond that already disclosed. In such a circumstance, moreover, a reasonable reader can interpret the disclosed, underlying facts for himself and determine whether he believes the opinion is justified.
*1194The Kanaga I Court quoted its earlier decision in Riley v. Moyed:
To support a cause of action for libel, the underlying facts must be false as well as defamatory. When an opinion is accompanied by its underlying nondefa-mato'ry factual basis, a defamation action premised upon that opinion would fail no matter how unjustified, unreasonable or derogatory the opinion might be .... This is so because readers can interpret the factual statements and decide for themselves whether the writer’s opinion was justified.20
The Kanaga I Court also quoted with approval Justice Brennan’s dissent in Milko-vich in which Justice Brennan indicates that the published account at issue there could not be libelous because the reporter revealed the facts upon which he was relying and made it clear at which point “he [ran] out of facts and [was] simply guessing.” 21 Accordingly, when an opinion is accompanied by its underlying, nondefa-matory factual predicate, that opinion cannot serve as the basis for a libel action.
The following true and undisputed facts were disclosed in The News Journal article:
1. Kane was a patient of Dr. Kanaga;
2. Kane had a benign tumor;
3. Dr. Kanaga recommended a hysterectomy to remove the tumor;
4. A second doctor, Dr. Domingo, removed the tumor by grasping it with forceps and twisting it out, without performing a hysterectomy or removing any reproductive organs;
5. The forceps procedure is less invasive and expensive than the hysterectomy which Dr. Kanaga recommended; 22 and
6. Dr. Kanaga’s office requested that Kane pay $500 before the hysterectomy procedure.
It is essential to a proper understanding of the issues in this case to be aware that these factual disclosures in The News Journal article are absolutely true and, themselves, cannot form the basis of a libel action.
Dr. Kanaga claims that three separate statements of Kane’s opinion that appeared in The News Journal article libeled her:
1. Kane’s “belief’ that Dr. Kanaga “committed a serious breach of the standard of care a patient has a right to expect and the duty of care required of a physician;”
2. Kane’s “conclusion” that Dr. Kanaga “chose the treatment plan that was most profitable for her with no concern for [Kane];” and that
3. Dr. Domingo appeared “incredulous” when Kane asked him if she needed a hysterectomy.
These opinions, reported in The News Journal, clearly are not libelous because it is obvious that the factual predicate for those opinions is the set of true facts that also are set forth in the article. Because I conclude, in the context of The News Journal article, that these three statements represent expressions of opinion protected by the First Amendment, I would affirm the initial decision of the Superior Court *1195trial judge granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.
To use the example cited by the United States Supreme Court in Milkovich and adopted by this Court in Kanaga I, the statement “I think Jones is a liar” may imply undisclosed defamatory facts and, thus, support a libel action despite the statement taking the form of an opinion. Suppose the entire statement, however, is that “Jones promised to paint my house yesterday. He never showed up. I think he is a liar,” and assume that the disclosed predicate facts are true. The statement of opinion (“he is a liar”) is clearly based on the facts disclosed, and the statement is not libelous. That is because no one hearing the statement would infer some undisclosed, untrue and defamatory fact: the facts disclosed are sufficient to support the opinion stated. Since the speaker has disclosed the true factual basis for his opinion, that opinion is protected speech even if it turns out that (unbeknownst to the speaker) Jones was run over by a streetcar on his way to keep his house-painting appointment.23
In this case, Dr. Kanaga told Kane, as reported in The News Journal, that she needed a hysterectomy, an invasive surgical procedure, to treat a benign tumor. Dr. Kanaga asked Kane to pay a substantial sum of money before this procedure was performed. Before her scheduled procedure with Dr. Kanaga, Kane went to a hospital emergency room where another doctor removed the tumor simply by grasping it with forceps and twisting it out. These are the disclosed, true facts. Kane’s allegedly libelous statements of opinion are that she received improper treatment from Dr. Kanaga, that Dr. Ka-naga cared about maximizing income rather than the health of her patient, and that the second doctor appeared “incredulous” when Kane asked him if she needed a hysterectomy. No reader, understanding the true facts stated in this article, would conclude that Kane’s opinions were based on anything other than the disclosed, true facts.24 No reader would infer that Dr. *1196Kanaga had committed some separate, undisclosed breach that engendered Kane’s opinions; the opinions directly and obviously flow from the stated, true facts.
While the Kanaga I Court indicated that Kane’s opinions may imply some unstated defamatory fact, its failure to identify any implied defamatory fact exposes the weakness of its analysis. In attempting to set forth what it believed to be the implied false assertions of fact in The News Journal article, the Kanaga I Court pointed to the following: (1) Dr. Kanaga knew or believed the recommended hysterectomy was not necessary; (2) that this conclusion is supported by the fact that Dr. Domingo was able to remove the tumor easily under emergency room conditions; (3) Dr. Domingo was “incredulous” at the suggestion that a hysterectomy had been recommended by Dr. Kanaga; and (4) Dr. Kana-ga’s motive was personal gain.25 None of these points, however, are implied, undisclosed, false facts. Points 1, 3 and 4 are the disputed opinions themselves, not the underlying facts that they imply. Point 2 is, in actuality, a true disclosed fact, not an implied false fact. The Kanaga I Court confusingly conflated the actual opinions and the implied facts. No rational reader of The News Journal article would infer some undisclosed factual basis for Kane’s opinions because they are amply and explicitly supported by the facts disclosed.
Moreover, this Court seems to have overlooked in part the factual support for Kane’s opinion explicitly published by The Neius Journal. A key fact supporting Kane’s statement that profit rather than care motivated Dr. Kanaga is the doctor’s demand for a $500 up-front payment for the hysterectomy procedure, a payment representing the portion of the fee which Kane’s medical insurance did not cover. That fact demonstrates to a reader how Kane reached her conclusion that profit motivated Kanaga. A full, thorough analysis of the factual basis of Kane’s opinion must consider this fact. Unfortunately, the Kanaga I Court apparently overlooked this fact:
Because she had been treated successfully by Dr. Domingo, Ms. Kane felt that Dr. Kanaga had recommended an unnecessary and radical form of treatment to earn a larger fee than the myomectomy [the forceps procedure] would have earned her. There is no evidence on this summary judgment record that Ms. Kane had or stated a factual basis for her opinion.26
This failure to consider all relevant facts, including the demand for a $500 payment before the surgery, illuminates how the Kanaga I Court reached what I believe to be an erroneous decision.
In Rinsley v. Brandt, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit examined allegedly defamatory statements about a doctor whose patient, while undergoing psychiatric treatment, choked to death during a tube feeding. The author opined that “God, parenthood and love were out; they all had been replaced by psychiatric theory. A theory to which they were willing to sacrifice a child’s life ... what does it take to stop such a man? How many more children must die?” The author claimed that the doctor in question was “accountable, in effect, to no one” and wrote that he would characterize this particular doctor’s methods by this “chilling example.”27
The Rinsley Court found that the First Amendment protected the author’s statement as opinion. The Court pointed to several reasons for its decision. Two of these reasons apply to this case. First, the Rinsley Court recognized that the author had disclosed the justification for his opinions and, therefore, readers could understand how the author had reached his conclusions. Similarly, in this case, the *1197facts upon which Kane formulated her opinions also have been disclosed. Second, the Court in Rinsley concludes that the statements are “severe criticisms of [the doctor] and his methods. But they are exactly that — exaggerated expressions of criticism. They are the types of statement that our society, interested in free and heated debate about matters of social concern, has chosen to protect.”28 The Rins-ley Court found that the First Amendment protected the author’s criticism of the doctor’s treatment of a patient.29 The same is true here.
In Gaunt v. Pittaway, the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered statements in a newspaper article questioning a doctor’s lack of training and expertise in the field of in vitro fertilization, and opining that the doctor had recommended unnecessary and excessive tests. The Gaunt Court held that this criticism was not actionable because “[t]he United States Supreme Court has held that statements of opinion relating to matters of public concern which do not contain provable false connotations are constitutionally protected.” 30
Similar to Gaunt and Rinsley, and under the same rationale this Court stated clearly in its Riley v. Moyed,31 decision, the expressions of opinion at issue here, even if erroneous, do not imply undisclosed, untrue and defamatory facts and are thus protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.32 Kane received what she believed to be improper medical treatment from Dr. Ka-naga. She stated the true factual basis on which she based this opinion, and then forcefully stated the opinion. If an individual cannot state her opinion in the context of its factual basis, without being subject to liability, it is difficult to understand what remains of the right to free speech in the context of a private libel action. It is precisely in this type of situation — where a patient has received treatment or advice from a physician that she believes to have been improper or substandard — that the right to voice that opinion is paramount not only to the speaker, but to society in general. The fact that Dr. Kanaga was ultimately cleared of wrongdoing by the Medical Society has no bearing on the protected nature of Kane’s opinion.
In this case, Kane criticized her doctor and a newspaper published a story about it. The Medical Society later cleared the doctor and the newspaper published a follow-up story. Regardless of the ultimate decision of the Medical Society, the public has a legitimate interest in knowing, that a patient has accused her doctor of unethical behavior. In allowing Dr. Kanaga to proceed to a jury to vindicate purported damage to her reputation, the Delaware Supreme Court has put into place a deci-sional framework that will necessarily have a chilling effect on the ability of the press to publish information of vital importance to the public. A consequence of the Kanaga I decision will be mischief that I am sure this Court did not intend.33
*1198III. LAW OF THE CASE
In a careful and thoughtful opinion in this case in 1995,34 the Superior Court trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants concluding that the statements in question were constitutionally protected opinions. That decision was appealed to this Court, considered by a panel of which I was not a member, and reversed in 1996 (Kanaga 1). It is that 1996 decision by a panel of this Court that I find erroneous, and from which I dissent. Following the remand to the Superior Court, the case was tried before a jury, which awarded money damages to the plaintiff. Currently on appeal are other issues not directly related to this Court’s liability opinion in its Kanaga I decision.35 Given the current posture of this case, then, it is legitimate to ask whether the law of the case doctrine forms a bar to Kanaga Fs reconsideration. Although I am loathe to disagree in this forum with my colleagues, it is my belief that Kanaga I is not only in error and unjust to the litigants, but it will also have a chilling effect on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights by others. The law of the case doctrine must give way before the weight of these considerations.
Under the law of the case doctrine, issues resolved by this Court on appeal bind the trial court on remand, and tend to bind this Court should the case return on appeal after remand. Is law of the case a bar to our reconsideration of Kanaga F?
The law of the case doctrine certainly binds inferior courts to act in accordance with an appellate court mandate.36 This Court imposes this rule to promote the obedience of inferior courts as well as the objectives of efficiency and finality.37 In the context of a post-remand appeal to the appellate court, of course, the obedience rationale of the doctrine does not apply. Still, earlier decisions in the same case generally bind this Court. The effect of abandoning the doctrine in that context would not be inconsequential, because considerable inefficiencies would result if parties were free to relitigate after remand issues decided in an earlier ruling of this Court.
The doctrine is not applied inflexibly, however, as higher values than efficiency do exist. This Court has recently emphasized that it need not apply the doctrine to promote efficiency at the expense of this Court’s greater interest in preventing unjust results or unwise precedent. In Brittingham v. State, this Court noted that although
[t]he ‘law of the case’ doctrine ... bars relitigation [of the issue in question] where that issue has been previously decided by this Court .... [the doctrine] is flexible (unlike res judicata ...). It will not be enforced where doing so would produce an injustice. But it does apply ... unless some reason is shown for not applying it .... 38
*1199The doctrine thus applies a constraint, but not an absolute bar, to reconsideration of issues by this Court. A court “enunciating a rule of law to be applied in a particular case establishes the law of the case,” which “other courts owing obedience to it must, and which itself mil, normally apply to the same issues in subsequent proceedings in that case.”39
In addressing the law of the case doctrine, this Court has cited with approval the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Westbrook v. Zant.40 In Westbrook, the Eleventh Circuit noted that appellate courts impose the law of the case doctrine upon themselves in the interest of judicial efficiency, and that those courts maintain the power to disregard the doctrine. The Westbrook Court held that the doctrine is “not an inextricable command ...,” emphasizing that “justice is better than consistency.”41 Among the circumstances in which the law of the case doctrine should not apply, the Westbrook Court noted the situation where “the previous decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”42
The majority opinion correctly notes that law of the case analysis, like application of stare decisis, always involves a tension between our desire to develop a consistent jurisprudence and our duty to decide each case correctly to the best of our ability and understanding of the facts and the law. The majority points out that the Kanaga I Court had a “different composition”: I was not a member. No one understands better than I that this makes the necessity of dissent here doubly awkward. It gives me no pleasure to pen this dissent, and the doctrine of law of the case is a device that I would gladly employ to avoid it, were I not convinced that injustice would be the result.
The majority, while right to value consistency as a virtue, overstates its importance. If, as they claim, a result here inconsistent with Kanaga I will shake public confidence in the courts, how much more will a consistent but unjust and unwise result shake public confidence in the courts? To its credit, this Court has not always found consistency a bar to self-correction in the interest of justice.43
Ultimately, we have two options before us. Let Kanaga I stand on law of the case grounds, with the potential for future mul-ti-million dollar verdicts and the resulting chilling effect on the exercise of constitutional rights, or exercise our plenary power not to apply the doctrine in the interests of justice. With due respect for the promotion of judicial efficiency, we are not bound by the decision in Kanaga I if,- as I believe clearly is the case, that decision was erroneous, unjust and unwise precedent. The law of the case doctrine does not bar this dissent. And it certainly does not bar this Court, which is after all a court of last resort.44
*1200IV. CONCLUSION
Because The News Journal article published only true assertions of fact together with Kane’s opinion, and because that opinion, in the context of those published true facts, does not imply any undisclosed defamatory facts, the Superior Court trial judge’s original judgment for defendants was clearly correct. As Justice Felix Frankfurter once wrote, “wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.”45 It is not too late for this Court to act wisely and to affirm the Superior Court trial judge’s thoughtful opinion granting summary judgment to the defendants.
I dissent.
. Kanaga v. Gannett Co., Inc., Del.Super., 1995 WL 716938, Herlihy, J. (Oct. 20, 1995 (“Trial Court Op.”)).
. Kanaga v. Gannett Co., Inc., Del.Supr., 687 A.2d 173 (1996)(“Kanaga I ”).
. The jury returned a verdict of $422,000 against Kane, $2,850,000 against Gannett and $10,000 against the reporter who wrote the article. This included compensatory and punitive damages. The amount of damages is the issue currently on appeal.
. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Company, 497 U.S. 1, 23-36, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1156 (9th Cir. 1995)("we join with the other courts of appeals in concluding that when an author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements Eire generally protected by the First Amendment”); Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d 724 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 974, 112 S.Ct. 2942, 119 L.Ed.2d 567 (1992); White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 522 (D.C.Cir.1990); Foretich v. Glamour, 753 F.Supp. 955 (D.D.C.1990); Roffman v.. Trump, 754 F.Supp. 411 (E.D.Pa.1990); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Berosini, 111 Nev. 615, 895 P.2d 1269 (1995); Immuno, A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 567 N.E.2d 1270, cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954, 111 S.Ct. 2261, 114 L.Ed.2d 713 (1991); Rappaport v. W Publishing Corp., 223 A.D.2d 515, 637 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1996); Diez v. Pearson, 834 S.W.2d 250 (Mo.Ct.App. 1992).
.A libel action involves four elements — defamation, falsity, fault, and damages. In order to find a defendant responsible for libel, a jury must find that the speaker published a *1193statement that injured the plaintiff’s reputation, that the statement was false, that the statement was published with a requisite degree of fault, and that a financial injury to the plaintiff resulted. Inseparable from libel analysis, however, is a necessary constitutional inquiry, which I discuss in the text of this dissent.
. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19, 110 S.Ct. 2695 (citation omitted).
. The "context” of a statement, however, is more subtle than the Kanaga I opinion indicates. A proper analysis of "context” involves three elements. First, a court should consider the factual context, the background of events leading to the speaker’s statement. See, e. g., Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980) (analysis of party’s motivation for bringing suit would be unlikely to be interpreted as statement of fact in political and labor contexts). Second, a court should consider the linguistic context, verbal cues often prefacing the challenged statements indicating that the speaker is voicing her opinion. See, e.g., Stuart v. Gambling Times, Inc., 534 F.Supp. 170 (D.N.J.1982) ("I consider” signals opinion); Tease v. Telegraph Publishing Co., 121 N.H. 62, 426 A.2d 463 (1981) ("I do feel” signals opinion). Third, a court should consider the formal context, whether the challenged statements appear in, for example, a column, an editorial, a review, or (as here) as part of a "news package”. See Bruce W. Sanford, Libel and Privacy, Aspen Law & Business (2000, 2d ed.) pp. 200.5-200.23. If a court concludes, after considering all three contexts, that the average reader would realize that the statements constitute solely the speaker’s opinion, then the court must find that the First Amendment protects those statements. I conclude that the explicit context of the allegedly libelous opinions here (which include recitation in the same newspaper article of the facts upon which those opinions were based) clearly indicates that the opinions are protected speech. Therefore, I need not address the three types of context mentioned above, which are helpful analytical tools in many First Amendment cases. See generally, Bruce W. Sanford, Libel & Privacy, supra, pp. 194-200.23.
. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 28-36, 110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990) (Brennan, L, dissenting) ("[A]s long as it is clear to the reader that he is being offered conjecture and not solid information, the danger to reputation is one which we have chosen to tolerate in pursuit of individual liberty .... ”).
. Kanaga I, 687 A.2d at 178 (quoting Riley v. Moyed, Del.Supr., 529 A.2d 248 (1987)).
. Kanaga I, 687 A.2d at 179-80 (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 28-36, 110 S.Ct. 2695 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
. The forceps procedure (known as a "myo-mectomy”) is not an experimental or novel gynecological procedure. To me, that fact further supports the reasonableness of Kane’s suspicions about Dr. Kanaga’s recommendation of the far more intrusive, and expensive, hysterectomy procedure. See Dr. Gary S. Berger, M.D., Outpatient Utenne Myomectomy (visited March 30, 2000) http://www.inci-id.org/myomectomy.html (Twenty-five percent of all operations for fibroid tumors are myo-mectomies. Myomectomies preserve a woman's fertility and can be performed as outpatient surgery at half the cost as in-hospital surgery.); see also, Dr. Stanley T. West M.D., The Hysterectomy Hoax (visited March 30, 2000) <http://www.repmed.com/ >.
. See Riley, 529 A.2d at 254 ("when an opinion is accompanied by its underlying nondefa-matory factual basis, a defamation action premised upon that opinion will fail no matter how unjustified, unreasonable or derogatory the opinion might be”).
. The only disputed statement that arguably implies an undisclosed defamatory fact is the statement in the article that Dr. Domingo appeared to have reacted with incredulity after Kane asked him whether she needed a hysterectomy. The article does not represent that Dr. Domingo stated that he was incredulous, however, or that he was in fact incredulous. What it did report was apparently Kane’s opinion that, in his response, he spoke "incredulously,” that is, he sounded incredulous. The article implies that Kane inferred from his tone of voice that Dr. Domingo was surprised at Dr. Kanaga's recommendation. The explicit context of this statement of opinion is that Dr. Domingo removed Kane’s tumor with a simple forceps procedure rather than the hysterectomy recommended by Dr. Kanaga. Kane's opinion that Dr. Domingo sounded surprised at Dr. Kanaga’s recommendation implies no fact beyond the true facts explicitly stated in the article and, thus, that statement of opinion cannot support liability. Put another way, it is a true fact that Dr. Domingo's course of treatment differed radically from that proposed by Dr. Kanaga, and no reader would infer another, unstated reason for the surprise which Kane believes she heard in Dr. Domingo’s voice.
As I have stated repeatedly, my dissent is based upon what I perceive to be the constitutional damage done by the Kanaga I opinion. With respect to the statement that Dr. Domingo spoke "incredulously,” however, it is worth noting that whether Kane perceived a tone of what appeared to be incredulity in Dr. Domingo's voice is not readily subject to proof, and thus cannot support a libel action. Compare Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21-22, 110 S.Ct. 2695 with Gaunt v. Pittaway, N.C.App., 520 S.E.2d 603, 608 (1999). The trial court correctly described the perceived "incredulity” as nothing more than Kane's "spin” on events. Trial Court Op. at 7.
For a recent example where a court found statements not objectively provable as true or false to be protected opinion, see Cochran v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 58 F.Supp.2d 1113 (C.D.Cal.1998), aff'd., 210 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir., 2000) (holding statements that lawyer’s trial strategy was to “get off” a clearly guilty defendant, even at the expense of the truth, was protected speech because the comments were not susceptible of being proven true or false).
. Kanaga I, 687 A.2d at 181.
. See Kanaga I at 175 (emphasis added).
. Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir.1983).
. 700F.2dat 1309.
. Id.
. Gaunt v. Pittaway, N.C.App., 520 S.E.2d 603, 608 (1999).
. 529 A.2d 248 (1987).
. Perhaps I should pause here to note that the Kanaga I opinion included cryptic references to Art. I, § 5 and § 9 of the Delaware Constitution of 1897. To me, these references miss the mark because slate constitutions may provide more generous rights than the United States Constitution, but a state constitution may not (as the Kanaga I opinion implied) operate to afford citizens (or the media) less freedom than the United States Constitution.
.To make matters worse, Kanaga I provides cold comfort to busy trial judges interested in direction on difficult libel cases involving potentially defamatory statements of opinion. It gives no helpful direction on the appropriate procedure to follow in such cases. We should provide clear guidance for trial judges in cases where expressions of opinion are involved. As a general approach to the problem I would propose the following: If a judge determines that the statement claimed to be libelous is an expression of opinion, the judge first must inquire whether the statement *1198nonetheless implies a fact that itself may be false and defamatory. If the answer to this inquiry is negative, as a matter of law under the appropriate Superior Court Rule 12(b)(6) or 56 standard, the judge should dismiss or enter judgment in favor of the defendant. If the judge determines that the opinion may imply false and defamatory facts, the judge should identify such implied facts before submitting the issue to the jury and should require the jury to make a specific finding of truth or falsity as to each of the implied facts. Any damages must be tailored to redress the injury, if any, caused only by particular implied facts found by the jury to be false.
. Kanaga v. Gannett Co., Inc., Del.Super., 1995 WL 716938, Herlihy, J. (Oct. 20, 1995).
. On the other hand, had the Kanaga I Court not made the mistake of reversing the grant of summary judgment in the first place, the issues with which the majority grapples here (in an opinion with which I concur) would never have been reached.
. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of America v. Barker, Del.Supr., 628 A.2d 38, 40 (1993).
. Barker, at 41, citing Litman v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 825 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.1987).
. Brittingham v. State, Del.Supr., 705 A.2d 577, 579 (1998) (quoting United States v. Mazak, 789 F.2d 580, 581 (7th Cir., 1986)).
. Westbrook v. Zant, 743 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir.1984)(emphasis added), (quoting inter alia 1 Moore, Federal Practice § 0.404(1)).
. Barker, 628 A.2d at 40 (citing Westbrook, 743 F.2d at 768).
. 743 F.2d at 768.
. 743 F.2d at 769.
. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, Del.Supr., 746 A.2d 244 (2000); Public Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale, Del.Supr., 735 A.2d 378 (1999); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 701 (1983).
.Trial courts also recognize their power and duly to correct their own error. See, e.g., Ct. Ch. Rule 60 (allowing Court to correct sua sponte earlier judgment). For an excellent recent example where a Court of Chancery trial judge honestly and straightforwardly corrected an earlier legal error in the same case, see Scureman v. Judge, Del.Ch., 747 A.2d 62 (1999) (holding the Court had incorrectly assumed that a public right of way moves with the shoreline of a public waterway; Court granted relief from its earlier judgment, even though the earlier erroneous judgment had been affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court).
. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l. Bank, 335 U.S. 595. 600. 69 S.Ct. 290. 93 L.Ed. 259 (1949).