concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the Majority’s conclusion that the presumption of paternity does not apply to this case, but I write separately to express my view that we must expand the factors available to rebut the presumption, particularly because of the accuracy and reliability of blood testing to determine paternity.
*257I also respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision to remand this case for a determination of the estoppel issue. The evidence clearly indicates that neither the mother nor the husband is estopped from challenging the husband’s paternity because neither held Audrianna out as a child of the marriage.
FACTS
Paternity is a fact-sensitive area of the law. Therefore, emphasizing the relevant facts of this case is important to demonstrate that (1) the presumption of paternity does not apply, (2) estoppel is not a relevant issue in this case, and (3) the next logical step is to perform blood testing to decide whether Richard King (King), the putative father, is Audrianna’s biological father.
Both Lisa Brinkley (Lisa) and her now ex-husband, George Brinkley (George) testified that during the time of Audrianna’s conception, presumably February of 1991, they did not engage in sexual intercourse. Although they continued to live in the same house, George slept on the couch while Lisa slept in the bedroom. Furthermore, Lisa testified, and King did not deny, that she and King were sexually involved prior to November of 1990 until about June of 1991.
George never held Audrianna out as his child, and King accepted full responsibility for Audrianna as his daughter during the first two years of her life. King was by Lisa’s side at the hospital when she gave birth to Audrianna; he paid child support for approximately two years;1 he visited Audrianna and Lisa regularly; and he included Audrianna on his medical insurance policy. Once Lisa sought a court order *258securing the child support payments from King, he denied paternity and refused to support Audrianna.2
PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY
It has long been the law in Pennsylvania that a child born to a married woman is presumed to be a child of the marriage. Freedman v. McCandless, 539 Pa. 584, 654 A.2d 529 (1995). See also, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5102(b). This presumption arose (a) to protect marital integrity and (b) to prevent a child from being labeled a “bastard” child, a classification that carried both a social and a legal stigma.3 Modern laws, however, have erased the legal stigma of children born out of wedlock, hence depriving the presumption of one of its original purposes. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5102.4
*259The goal of protecting marital integrity is also futile in a society where legal marital status does not always translate into a loving, intimate, monogamous relationship.5 The presumption that a child born to a married woman is a child of the marriage is dubious at best and in many cases, such as here, is absurd. We are living a fable, both morally and legally, if we think that a family is typified by “Father Knows Best,” where parents and children love and respect each other and where husband and wife are faithful to each other and adultery is merely a figment of one’s imagination.6 Thus, the presumption that a child born during coverture is a child of the marriage has lost its place in modern society, especially considering the scientific testing available both to prove and to disprove paternity.
The Majority takes the first step today in updating this ancient concept to conform with modern-day realities. Accordingly, I concur with the Majority’s holding that the presumption of paternity does not apply where its purpose is not served.7 However, the time has come to take the next logical *260step in the evolution of paternity law and expand the means of rebutting the presumption.
Knowledge of biological parentage is of paramount importance for a variety of reasons, including: discovery of genetic medical conditions, especially those conditions that medical science can prevent or successfully treat when discovered at an early stage; satisfaction of a child’s innate desire to know his or her biological parents, as we often observe with adopted children; placement of moral and economic responsibility; and preservation of the rights of biological parents. Because of the significance of this determination, a party should not be unnecessarily restricted in his or her attempt to establish paternity. Therefore, I disagree with the Majority’s statement that the presumption, when it does apply, may only be overcome with proof of the husband’s non-access to the mother,8 or his inability to procreate. Technology has advanced to a level where blood tests can exclude a man as the father with a 98% degree of reliability.9 Therefore, when the presumption *261does apply, blood tests should also be available to parties to rebut the presumption of paternity.
The Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (the Act) expressly permits the use of blood tests in any case where paternity is a relevant issue. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5104. The Legislature adopted the Act because reliable scientific evidence excluding a man as the father of a child is imperative in any suit where paternity is an issue, particularly where the child was born during wedlock. Tyler v. King, 344 Pa.Super. 78, 86, 496 A.2d 16, 20 (1985). Section 5104(c) of the Act confers upon the courts the authority to compel interested parties to submit to blood testing as follows:
§ 5104. Blood tests to determine paternity
(c) Authority for test.—In any matter subject to this section in which paternity, parentage or identity of a child is a relevant fact, the court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any person whose blood is involved, may or, upon motion of any party to the action made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child and alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any party refuses to submit to the tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity, parentage or identity of a child against the party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests of justice so require.
The effect of the test results on the presumption is found in subsection (g), which provides:
The HLA blood grouping tests provide circumstantial evidence of paternity whereas DNA test results provide direct evidence of biological parentage, because DNA matches establish affirmative identification of biological parentage. Reed.See also Charles Nelson Le Ray, Note, Implications of DNA Technology on Posthumous Paternity Determination: Deciding the Pacts When Daddy Can’t Give His Opinion, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 747, 748 (May 1994). Washington County was the first county in Pennsylvania to require buccal swab DNA testing instead of blood testing to determine paternity. The buccal swab is a procedure where a cotton-tipped stick is rubbed between the teeth and inner cheek lining to obtain buccal epithelial cells. These cells are used to conduct DNA testing, which can affirmatively prove paternity. Cable v. Anthou, - Pa.-, 699 A.2d 722 (1997).
*262(g) Effect on presumption of legitimacy.—The presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is overcome if the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests show that the husband is not the father of the child.
23 Pa.C.S. § 5104. The rules of statutory construction, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq., dictate that we should give words and phrases in a statute their plain meaning unless they are terms of art. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903. Section 5104(g) clearly and expressly provides that the presumption of paternity is overcome if the tests show that the husband is not the father of the child.10 Yet, Pennsylvania courts have strenuously avoided employing the statute to compel blood tests absent a showing first that the presumption is overcome with evidence of the husband’s non-access to the mother during the period of conception or his sterility or impotency.
For instance, the Superior Court has held that where a husband attempts to deny paternity of a child born during wedlock, he may not compel blood testing of himself, the mother and the child without first overcoming the presumption of paternity with common law evidence. McCue v. McCue, 413 Pa.Super. 71, 604 A.2d 738, allocatur denied, 531 Pa. 655, 613 A.2d 560 (1992). Similarly, in Scott v. Mershon, 394 Pa.Super. 411, 576 A.2d 67 (1990), the Superior Court prohibited a mother from compelling blood tests of a third party because she had not first rebutted the presumption of paternity with evidence of her husband’s non-access or inability to procreate. See also Paulshock v. Bonomo, 443 Pa.Super. 409, 661 A.2d 1386 (1995), allocatur denied, 544 Pa. 669, 677 A.2d 840 (1996) (prohibiting the mother from utilizing blood tests that exclude the husband as the father to overcome the presumption of paternity, which also prevented her from presenting evidence of the putative father’s probability of *263fatherhood). The courts’ threshold requirement of common law proof to rebut the presumption is clearly erroneous pursuant to the Act, which explicitly provides that blood tests are an alternative method of rebutting the presumption. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5104(g).
Furthermore, Section 5104(c) permits “any party” to request blood tests, which would include the mother, the child, the husband or a putative father. Accordingly, a third party who stands outside the marriage and claims paternity of a child born during wedlock is authorized to request blood tests of himself, the child, the mother and the husband to overcome the presumption. In John M. v. Paula T., 524 Pa. 306, 571 A.2d 1380 (1990), this Court, however, denied a third party the ability to compel the husband to submit to blood tests to disprove the husband’s paternity. This decision was based on public policy, including the Commonwealth’s interest in protecting intact marriages. We stated the following:
It is true that the Act relaxes the presumption “to some extent” for it explicitly provides that the presumption “is overcome if the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests show that the husband is not the father of the child.” [23 Pa.C.S. § 5104(g) ]. However, the Act does not relax the presumption to the extent that a “putative father,” a third party who stands outside the marital relationship and attempts to establish paternity over a child born to the marriage, may compel the “presumptive father,” the husband, to submit to blood tests on the strength of such evidence as has been presented herein.
Id. at 316, 571 A.2d at 1384-85 (citations omitted). This interpretation is in direct conflict with the plain language of the Act. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5104(c). Moreover, denying a putative father the opportunity to challenge the husband’s paternity and establish his own biological parentage, effectively terminates his parental rights without due course of law. Accord, In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex.1994).11 Because I *264find that a parent or child’s interests in determining paternity outweigh the Commonwealth’s unavailing interest in preserving intact marriages, I would hold that, in accordance with the Act, any party to an action in which paternity is a relevant fact may request the court to order all parties to submit to blood tests. These results would then serve to rebut the presumption, irrespective of common law evidence. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5104(c). We would be both naive and remiss to perpetuate the strength of this presumption and ignore the results of reliable scientific tests; especially where, as here, the putative father has admitted to having engaged in sexual conduct with the mother during the period of conception, has accepted the child as his own, and has supported the child for the first two years of her life.
Pennsylvania is fast becoming one of only a minority of states that does not accept the results of blood tests that disprove the husband’s paternity to rebut the presumption. Approximately two-thirds of the states currently have statutes permitting blood tests to be considered in the determination of paternity.12 Homer H. Clark, Jr., 1 The Law op Domestic Relations in the United States 340 (2d ed.1987). The United States Supreme Court has accepted the evidentiary value of blood grouping tests to disprove paternity as follows:
As far as the accuracy, reliability, dependability—even infallibility—of the test are concerned, there is no longer any controversy. The result of the test is universally accepted *265by distinguished scientific and medical authority. There is, in fact, no living authority of repute, medical or legal, who may be cited adversely.... [TJhere is now ... practically universal and unanimous judicial willingness to give decisive and controlling evidentiary weight to a blood test exclusion of paternity. S. Schatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings § 9.13 (1975).
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 7, 101 S.Ct. 2202, 2206, 68 L.Ed.2d 627 (1981). We should join the majority of states and accept these reliable scientific tests to rebut the presumption that a child born to a married woman is her husband’s child.13
For example, in S.E.B. v. J.H.B., 605 So.2d 1230 (Ala.Civ. App.1992), the Alabama Supreme Court granted a mother’s request to compel her husband and the putative father to submit to blood testing to determine the paternity of a child born during wedlock. In Alabama, the “presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that tends to show that it is naturally, physically, or scientifically impossible for the husband to be the father.” Id. at 1232. Similarly, in Hawaii, a presumptive father may request blood tests to *266disprove his paternity. Doe v. Roe, 9 Haw.App. 623, 859 P.2d 922 (1993). New Hampshire employs a more relaxed presumption of paternity, which “may be rebutted under [] common law by satisfactory proof that the husband is. not the father,” including blood tests, testimony by experts or others, medical or scientific evidence, statistical probability evidence, physical resemblance between the child and the putative father, or acquiescence by the mother and her husband. Bodwell v. Brooks, 141 N.H. 508, 686 A.2d 1179 (1996). In Illinois, once blood tests exclude a husband as the father, the court may presume that an alleged father is the biological parent if (1) the blood tests of the alleged father do not exclude him as the father and (2) there is a probability of at least 500 to 1 that he is the father. People ex rel. Stockwill v. Keller, 251 Ill.App.3d 796, 191 Ill.Dec. 226, 623 N.E.2d 816 (1993). Utah requires blood tests in any case where paternity is an issue, and the results may conclusively rebut the presumption of paternity. In re Schoolcraft, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). But see Colorado—M.R.D. v. F.M., 805 P.2d 1200 (Colo.Ct.App. 1991) (party to the marriage not permitted to challenge husband’s paternity beyond the five-year statute of limitations even where a competing presumption arose from blood tests that resulted in a 99.86% probability that the alleged father was the biological parent of the child); and Iowa—Dye v. Geiger, 554 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1996) (prohibiting an ex-husband from overcoming his presumptive paternity with genetic tests positively establishing another man’s paternity when such rebuttal is not in the child’s best interest).
California has a more liberal approach and permits the presumed father, the husband, or the child to rebut the presumption with blood test evidence. Cal. Fam.Code § 7541. Interestingly, a man may be a “presumed father” if he satisfies at least one of the following criteria: he and the mother are married at the time of the child’s birth; the child is born within 300 days of the termination of the marriage; the couple has attempted to marry before or after the child’s birth; or the man receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his own. Cal. Fam.Code § 7611.
*267Pennsylvania’s approach to establishing paternity is clearly outdated. The unwavering interests in definitively determining biological parentage mandate that we permit the use of blood tests to rebut the “limited” presumption.
ESTOPPEL
Regardless of whether a party successfully rebuts the presumption of paternity, or the presumption does not apply, a party may nevertheless be estopped from denying the paternity of the husband if either the mother or the husband holds the child out to be a child of the marriage. John M. The theory supporting this concept is that once the husband forms a parent/child relationship with the child, neither he nor the mother should be permitted later to destroy that relationship because of marital discord. Ruth F., at 406-08, 690 A.2d at 1175.
The Majority, however, seems to misunderstand the concept of paternity by estoppel by holding that this case should be remanded to determine whether Lisa is “estopped” from denying her ex-husband George’s paternity. Here, neither Lisa nor George ever held Audrianna out to be a child of the marriage. The evidence clearly demonstrates that Lisa never misled George to believe that he was Audrianna’s father, nor did she lead anyone else to believe that George was the father. Likewise, George denied his paternity before the child was born, never supported the child financially or emotionally, and never formed a parent/child relationship with the child. Moreover, King, the putative father, accepted the child as his own, paid child support, provided medical insurance, and offered emotional support and parental guidance to Audrianna. It was not until Lisa sought court-ordered support that King denied his paternity. It is clear, therefore, that neither George nor Lisa is estopped from denying George’s paternity.
ESTABLISHING PATERNITY
Therefore, the next step is to establish who is the father. Logic dictates that once a party overcomes the presumption, or the presumption does not apply, the case should be treated *268as if the child were born out of wedlock. The paternity of a child born out of wedlock is addressed by 28 Pa.C.S. § 4348, which permits a court to compel genetic testing14 of any relevant party. Section 4343 states that genetic test results indicating a 99% or greater probability that the alleged father is the biological parent creates an affirmative presumption of paternity that may only be rebutted with clear and convincing evidence that the test results are unreliable.15 23 Pa.C.S. § 4343(c). This approach should apply equally to a determination of the paternity of a child born during wedlock where either (a) the presumption does not apply, or (b) the presumption was overcome.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, I concur with the Majority’s decision to the extent that it holds the presumption of paternity does not apply in cases where there is no marital relationship to preserve. However, I dissent from that portion of the Opinion remanding for a determination of estoppel, because I believe *269that there is no such question in this case. Instead, I would remand this case for blood testing of King, Lisa and Audrianna to finally resolve the issue of Audrianna’s biological father.
CASTILLE, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.. Lisa testified that King's wife knew that he was giving Lisa money for child support and that Mrs. King was the person writing the check for the support. King had been giving Lisa $100 per month but when she told him she needed more money to support Audrianna, he refused. Lisa then threatened to take him to court to compel him to give her more money. It appears that Mrs. King then agreed to begin giving Lisa $150 per month, however the payments ceased once Lisa filed the Complaint for Support.
. In a collateral matter involving George's obligation to support Audrianna, a Mercer County Court entered an Order on June 20, 1994 (Mercer County order), which concluded, based on DNA and blood tests of Lisa, George, and Audrianna, that George is EXCLUDED as Audrianna's father. Although King was named in that suit, he claims he never received notice of the Complaint or the hearing. The trial court in the case sub judice refused to take judicial notice of the Mercer County adjudication.
. As the Honorable Berle Schiller explained in a recent dissenting opinion:
A child protected by legitimacy could inherit from his father, had a legal right of support enforceable against his father and could pursue certain tort actions, such as wrongful death suits. (Fathers benefitted as well, for example, through curtesy, which vested only when a child was bom, and through entitlement to children’s earnings.) No such rights were available to illegitimate children. They could not inherit from their fathers, were limited to a right to support from their mothers and, in the absence of such support, became wards of the state or church. A child of marriage was also freed from the social stigma of bastardy.
Ruth F. v. Robert B., 456 Pa.Super. 398, 424-26, 690 A.2d 1171, 1184 (1997) (Schiller, J., dissenting).
. In 1971, the General Assembly eliminated the legal distinction between a child bom to a married woman, and a child born to an unwed mother by declaring all children legitimate regardless of their parents' marital status. They likewise accorded all children rights and privileges "as if they had been born during the wedlock of such parents.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5102. The "presumption of legitimacy” is now referred to as the "presumption of paternity.” John M. v. Paula T., 524 Pa. 306, 312-12 n. 2, 571 A.2d 1380, 1383-84 n. 2 (1990).
. Divorce, which was once regarded as unthinkable, is now a socially acceptable option for couples with broken marital relationships, as evidenced by the current 51.1% divorce rate. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995.
. The conflict between the moral ideals of our society is often demonstrated through the media. For example, in 1992, a controversy arose surrounding the lead character of the popular television show "Murphy Brown.” Murphy Brown, a successful, single newswoman, became pregnant, chose not to have an abortion, and decided to have the baby out of wedlock. Despite the television show's presentation of a common situation in our society, some were nevertheless unwilling to acknowledge the frequency with which women are faced with this choice. While some applauded Murphy’s decision not to have an abortion, then Vice President, Dan Quayle, criticized the television situation comedy for depicting a scenario that, to him, typified the collapse of the family values in our country. Clearly, we continue to battle the preconception of the typical "traditional” family with the reality of the makeup of the modern family.
. The Superior Court has recently characterized the purpose of the presumption to include protecting an established parent/child relationship, even when the marriage has dissolved. Dettinger v. McCleary, 438 Pa.Super. 300, 652 A.2d 383 (1994). I disagree with the Superior Court’s expansion of the purpose of the presumption beyond the preser*260vation of the marriage. The nature of the parent/child relationship is addressed and taken into consideration within the realm of estoppel.
. I dispute the Majority's use of a very narrow definition of "non-access” that would essentially require proof that it would have been physically impossible for the mother and her husband to have engaged in sexual relations during the period of conception. This Court has described "non-access” as simply the lack of sexual intercourse. Cairgle v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 77 A.2d 439 (1951). Furthermore, the Superior Court has stated that "[i]t is not necessary that the possibility of access be completely excluded.” Nixon v. Nixon, 354 Pa.Super. 232, 237, 511 A.2d 847, 849 (1986). By requiring evidence of physical impossibility of sexual relations, the Superior Court and the Majority seem to have reverted to the ancient standard of proof that the husband was "beyond the seas during the period of gestation." Cairgle (citing Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 6 Binnney 283 (1814)). I disagree with this strict definition of "non-access” and would hold that evidence of lack of sexual intercourse is sufficient to overcome the presumption.
. Deborah A. Ellingboe, Note, Sex, Lies, and Genetic Tests: Challenging the Marital Presumption of Paternity Under the Minnesota Parentage Act, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 1013, 1015 n.12 (April 1994). HLA tests, or human leucocyte antigen tests, compare the blood types of the relevant parties and calculate the statistical probability that a given person is the child's parent as opposed to someone in the general population with the same characteristics. This probability has been referred to as the "parental index." Reed v. Boozer, - Pa.Super. -, 693 A.2d 233 (1997).
. We note that this provision permits blood tests to be admitted to disprove or exclude the presumed father. After the presumption of paternity is overcome by excluding the husband as the father, then the blood tests can be weighed as part of the evidence to prove the paternity of another. Nixon v. Nixon, 354 Pa.Super. 232, 511 A.2d 847 (1986); Turek v. Hardy, 312 Pa.Super. 158, 458 A.2d 562 (1983).
. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), the United States Supreme Court upheld a Califor*264nia statute that deprived standing to a putative father to challenge a husband's paternity of a child born to the marriage. Notwithstanding, the Texas Supreme Court recently declared that a statute that prevented a putative father from challenging a husband’s paternity was unconstitutional because it deprived him of due course of law pursuant to the Texas Constitution. In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex.1994). Other states are following this trend and expanding the rights of putative fathers to challenge a husband’s paternity by establishing their own parentage. See, e.g., Cal. Fam.Code § 7541.
. Of those, at least seven states, including Pennsylvania, have adopted statutes similar to the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity: California, Cal. Fam.Code § 7555 (West 1994); Louisiana, La.R.S. 9:396-398 (1972); New Hampshire, N.H. Stat. § 522:1 (1994); Oklahoma, 10 Ok. Stat Ann. § 501-508 (1981); Oregon, Ore. Stat. § 109.258 (1993); and Utah, U.C.A. § 78-25-18, et seq.
. Massachusetts has taken one of the more extreme positions in paternity law by eliminating the presumption of paternity in favor of a balancing test. In C.C. v. A.B., 406 Mass. 679, 550 N.E.2d 365 (1990), a putative father alleged that he was the father of a child born to an intact marriage. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized the conflict between the interests of the putative father and the interest in preserving the legitimacy of the child, and held as follows:
We continue to adhere to the common law principle that motivated the presumption of legitimacy—that there is a strong interest in not bastardizing children. We are no longer convinced, however, that that interest can be protected only by requiring the rebuttal of a presumption by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In view of the gradual betterment of the illegitimate child’s legal position, which weakens the purpose behind the presumption, coupled with the corresponding recognition of the interests of unwed putative fathers, we think that there is no longer any need for a presumption of legitimacy. The interests can be adequately protected by requiring that a putative father in the plaintiff’s position be required to prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence.
C.C., at 370. The court further held that, if the putative father could demonstrate a substantial parent/child relationship between himself and the child, he need not disprove the husband’s paternity before proving his own. Id.
. The Legislature recently amended the definition of "genetic tests” as used in 23 Pa.C.S. § 4343 to include blood tests that confirm or exclude parentage. 23 Pa.C.S. § 4302, amended, July 2, 1993, P.L. 431, No. 62, § 1. The Superior Court applied this amendment as follows:
From [the case law], we must accept the higher validity and evidentiary value of DNA testing as a genetic test, and as such, it may be conclusive of paternity. As to HLA and the other blood grouping and typing tests based on genetic markers, these will be considered evidence of paternity which creates a presumption of paternity when the paternity index reaches a level of 99% and is not rebutted by the defendant.
Reed, at-, 693 A.2d at 240.
. Currently, to prove a putative father's paternity of a child born during wedlock, the challenging party must first rebut the husband’s paternity with evidence of non-access, impotency, sterility or blood tests excluding him as the father. Scientific tests then establish the putative father’s paternity. To promote efficiency and reduce the costs, time and effort involved in this determination, I would invite the Legislature to enact a provision that would permit a party to disprove the husband’s paternity with evidence that indicates a 99% or greater probability that the putative father is the biological father. Thus, one round of testing of the mother, the child and the putative father could both disprove the husband’s paternity, and prove the putative father's parentage.