OPINION
NEWMAN, Justice.This is an appeal of a Commonwealth Court Order, reversing the grant of the petition of a local agency, joined as an additional defendant in a personal injury action, for a change of venue pursuant to the political subdivision venue rules. For the following reasons, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
Galina Ribnicky was injured in a collision with another vehicle driven by Richard Yerex (Yerex) on January 16, 1992. Yerex was allegedly driving the wrong way on a one-way street. The accident occurred in Allentown, Pennsylvania. Galina and her husband, Richard, (the Ribnickys, collectively) filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) against Yerex, MCI Telecommunications Corporation, which was Yerex’s employer, and U.S. Fleet Leasing, Inc., which owned the truck Yerex was driving (the Original Defendants, collectively).
In January of 1994, the Original Defendants filed a writ of summons to join the City of Allentown (Allentown) as an additional defendant.1 The Original Defendants then filed a motion to transfer venue from Philadelphia County to Lehigh County, relying on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. On March 11,1994, the trial court denied the Original Defendants’ petition to transfer venue, rejecting their forum non conveniens argument.2 In the meantime, Allentown filed a petition to transfer the case to Lehigh County, pursuant to Section 333 of the JARA Continuation Act of 1980(JCA), Act of October 5,
*5581980, P.L. 693, as amended, 42 P.S. § 20043, which provides in part:
Actions ... for claims against a local agency may be brought in and only in a county in which the local agency is located or in which the cause of action arose or where a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose.
42 P.S. § 20043.
The trial court granted Allentown’s motion to transfer venue pursuant to Section 333 because Allentown is located in Lehigh County, and the accident occurred there. On appeal, a Commonwealth Court panel reversed the trial court.3 Analogizing to Chen v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 661 A.2d 25 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995), appeal dismissed, 545 Pa. 231, 680 A.2d 1156 (1996)(interpreting Commonwealth agency venue provisions), the court reasoned that Section 333 applies only when the local agency is an original defendant, not when it is joined as an additional defendant. The Honorable James R. Kelley dissented without opinion.
Both Allentown and the Original Defendants filed Petitions for Allowance of Appeal. We granted allowance of appeal in both petitions to determine whether the Commonwealth Court improperly limited application of the political subdivision venue provisions to cases where the local agency is an original defendant.
DISCUSSION
Regarding the venue of actions against political subdivisions, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2103, provides in part:
Except when the Commonwealth is the plaintiff or when otherwise provided by an Act of Assembly, an action against *559a political subdivision may be brought only in the county in which the political subdivision is located.
Pa.R.C.P. 2103(b). In Section 333 of the JCA, the legislature expanded the locations in which a party may bring an action against a political subdivision to include the location where the cause of action arose and where the transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose, in addition to the county in which the political subdivision is located. Ward v. Lower Southampton Township, 531 Pa. 532, 614 A.2d 235 (1992). Section 333 and Rule 2103(b) apply whether the political subdivision is the only, or one of several, original defendants. Id.; Township of Whitpain v. Goldenberg, 131 Pa.Cmwlth. 144, 569 A.2d 1002, allocatur denied, Goldenberg v. Chrysler Motor, Corp., 525 Pa. 660, 582 A.2d 326 (1990).
The question now arises whether the joinder of a political subdivision as an additional defendant affects the application of Section 333 of the JCA. The Commonwealth Court held that Section 333 does not apply under these circumstances. Specifically, the court held that although Section 333 differs from Section 8523 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8523, which was at issue in Chen, the language of both statutes is substantially similar; therefore the reasoning of Chen controls. In that case, a personal injury plaintiff filed suit against several defendants in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. One of the named defendants issued a summons to join the Department of Transportation (the Department) as an additional defendant. The Department subsequently filed preliminary objections, alleging improper venue. Pursuant to Section 8523, the Department argued that venue would lie only in Dauphin County, where the Department’s principal office is located, or in Delaware County, where the Department maintains a local office. Section 8523 provides in part:
Actions for claims brought against a Commonwealth party may be brought in and only in a county in which the principal or local office of the Commonwealth party is located or in which the cause of action arose or where a *560transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose.
42 Pa.C.S. § 8523(a). The Commonwealth Court ruled, however, that Section 8523 is inapplicable where the Commonwealth party is joined as an additional defendant. According to the court, the statute specifically refers only to where “actions may be brought” and, therefore, is limited to cases in which the plaintiff sues the Commonwealth party originally. Moreover, the court reasoned that a transfer of venue under these circumstances disregards the plaintiffs choice of forum, which is entitled to considerable weight. Applying Chen to the case sub judice, the Commonwealth Court held that Section 333 is not applicable to third-party proceedings in which the original defendants join the local agency as an additional defendant.
We disagree with the Commonwealth Court’s decision in both this case and Chen. A plain reading of Section 333 and Section 8523 does not distinguish between actions brought by a plaintiff against a defendant or a defendant against a third party. Because neither statute specifically defines the term “action,” the rules of statutory construction require us to ascribe to the term its ordinary meaning. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). The term “action” as defined in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure is “any civil action or proceeding at law or in equity brought in or appealed to any court of record which is subject to these rules.” Pa.R.C.P. 2251. The dictionary definition of “action” is “a suit brought in a court; a formal complaint within the jurisdiction of a court of law.” Black’s Law Dictionary 26 (5th ed.1979). In Pennsylvania, filing a praecipe for a writ of summons or a complaint may commence an action. Pa.R.C.P. 1007; see also Human Development of Erie, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Millcreek Township, 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 675, 600 A.2d 658 (1991).
Here, the Original Defendants filed a writ of summons against Allentown, joining the city as an additional defendant pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2252. Under the rules, the procedure, including pleadings, between the Original Defendants and Allentown “shall be the same as though the party joining the *561additional defendant were a plaintiff and the additional defendant were a defendant.” Pa.R.C.P. 2255(a). Thus, the Original Defendants have effectively filed an “action” against Allentown, alleging that Allentown is solely liable to the Ribnickys or liable to the Original Defendants for indemnity or contribution. As such, despite the fact that the Ribnickys did not originally seek damages from Allentown, they “shall recover from the additional defendant found liable to him alone or jointly with the defendant as though such additional defendant had been joined as a defendant and duly served and the initial pleading of the plaintiff had averred such liability.” Pa.R.C.P. 2255(d). Accordingly, an action has been brought against a local agency, thus, triggering the venue provisions of Section 333. Because Allentown is located in Lehigh County and the cause of action arose in Allentown, Section 333 mandates the transfer of venue to Lehigh County.
The same analysis applies to the joinder of a Commonwealth agency as an additional defendant pursuant to Section 8523 of the Judicial Code. Both Section 333 and Section 8523 turn on where actions against a governmental entity “may be brought” and do not differentiate between actions by plaintiffs and actions by defendants.4 Consequently, we hereby overrule Chen.
The Ribnickys argue that this result disturbs the plaintiffs choice of forum, a decision entitled to considerable weight in this Commonwealth. See Plum, v. Tampax, Inc., 399 Pa. 553, 160 A.2d 549 (1960)(involving a forum non conveniens analysis). However, in ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute, we must presume that the legislature intended to favor the public interest over any private interest. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2)(5); Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan v. English, 541 Pa. 424, 664 A.2d 84 (1995). In contravention of this rule of statutory construction, the Commonwealth Court here, and in Chen, has elevated the private plaintiffs choice of forum above *562the public interest embodied in Section 333 and 42 Pa.C.S. § 8523 of protecting governmental entities from suit in inconvenient fora. See Simons v. State Correction Institute, 150 Pa.Cmwlth. 295, 615 A.2d 924 (1992).
Therefore, we reverse the Order of the Commonwealth Court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
NIGRO, J., files a concurring opinion. CAPPY, J., files a dissenting opinion.. On June 23, 1994, the Original Defendants served Allentown with a Complaint Joining Additional Defendant, alleging that Allentown is solely liable to the Ribnickys or liable to the Original Defendants for indemnification and/or contribution.
. The Original Defendants’ forum non conveniens argument is not before this Court.
. The Ribnickys originally appealed to the Superior Court, which transferred the case sua sponte to the Commonwealth Court. The Honorable Donald E. Wieand dissented from the transfer of the appeal to the Commonwealth Court and, on the merits, opined that the trial court properly transferred venue to Lehigh County.
. With respect to Commonwealth parties, see also Pa. R.C.P. 1006(c), which provides that proper venue for a Commonwealth party controls where venue rules conflict due to multiple defendants.