dissenting.
In ruling that Harleysville is not required to defend Madison in the underlying suit, the Majority has made a fundamental error by not reviewing the basis for the underlying claim in the personal injury action. It is clear from such a review that *148a duty to defend exists. Further, the Majority compounds this error when it finds the product at issue to be a “pollutant”, as that term is defined in the exclusionary clause of the policy. For these reasons, I dissent.
Initially it must be recalled that a duty to defend is a distinct obligation, which is separate and apart from an insurer’s duty to indemnify. Erie Ins. Exchange v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 516 Pa. 574, 582, 533 A.2d 1363, 1368 (1987). This obligation to defend arises whenever an injured party files a complaint which may potentially come within the coverage of the policy. Phico Ins. Co. v. Presbyterian Med. Serv., 444 Pa.Super. 221, 225, 663 A.2d 753, 755 (1995) (citing Gedeon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 410 Pa. 55, 56, 188 A.2d 320, 321 (1963)). The Majority in this case, has failed to appreciate that the question of Harleysville’s duty to defend necessitates an examination of the underlying personal injury claim, as well as the policy. The Majority, accepting Harleysville’s statement summarizing the underlying claim, concludes that the policy’s pollution exclusion applies and Harleysville is not responsible to defend a claim for injuries sustained as an approximate result of the inhalation of Xylene fumes. The underlying claim, however, is not a claim for injuries based upon Madison’s use or release of noxious fumes, rather it is a claim based upon the breach of certain duties including a failure to warn.
Included in the record as Exhibit “A” to Madison’s Complaint is a copy of the Complaint filed by Nicholas Ezzi which names Madison as a defendant. The Complaint alleges facts which resulted in Ezzi’s fall, and claims that Madison is responsible for Ezzi’s injuries for the following reasons.
13. The aforesaid incident and the injuries resulting to the Plaintiff, Nicholas Ezzi, occurred solely as a result of the negligence, carelessness and recklessness of the defendants, Brian Murtaugh, Kelran and Madison, who had exclusive control over the supervision of the Construction Project and the application of the chemical curing agent, which said negligence, carelessness, and recklessness consisted of the following:
*149a. Failing to properly maintain the construction site in a proper and safe manner for all construction personnel and employees of Boeing helicopters;
b. Failing to properly ventilate the work area to avoid the build-up of dangerous fumes that existed;
c. Failing to warn, by either sign or barricade, Boeing Helicopters’ employees, including the Plaintiff of the dangerous condition that existed resulting from the application of the concrete curing agent;
d. Failing to warn Boeing Helicopters’ employees, like the Plaintiff, of the likely effect of inhaling the noxious fumes that existed;
e. Failing to provide Boeing Helicopters’ employees, like the Plaintiff, with protective gear to protect them from the fumes resulting from the application of the curing agent;
f. Failing to provide adequate safeguards to prevent the injury to Plaintiff;
g. Disregarding the safety and rights of the Plaintiff and other persons in the Construction Area;
h. Failing to detect and observe the dangerous condition caused by the application of the concrete curing agent;
i. Failing to properly barricade or plate the hole where Plaintiff fell;
j. Engaging in other liability producing conduct as may become apparent during the course of discovery.
The so-called “pollution” exclusion in the general liability coverage policy issued by Harleysville excludes it from defending or indemnifying claims for “bodily injury” which arise out of the “actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants.” The injuries claimed by Izzi in his Complaint have not been alleged to have resulted from Madison’s “discharge” of a pollutant. The claims set forth against Madison in Izzi’s Complaint stem from Madison’s neglect in failing to warn and protect others from the situation, failing to ventilate the area and failing to cover a hole into which Izzi fell. These alleged negligent acts by Madison are not excluded in the Harleysville policy.
*150When one examines both the policy provision and the claims made in the Complaint filed in the underlying personal injury action, it is evident that Harleysville has a duty to defend Madison in the personal injury action. The exclusionary language of the policy which refers to pollution does not apply because the bodily injury claim made by Izzi is not premised upon Madison’s conduct as it may relate to the release of hazardous fumes. Since the claims of negligence made by Izzi do not fall under any exclusion of the policy, I would affirm the trial court’s decision requiring Harleysville to provide Madison with a defense. I would note that the trial court made this ruling on other grounds, however we are free to affirm the decision of the trial court if the result is correct, on any ground. Schimp v. Allaman, 442 Pa.Super. 365, 659 A.2d 1032 (1995).
Although I would affirm the trial court’s decision for the reasons stated above, I am compelled to also remark that the Majority misinterprets the exclusionary language in the policy at issue. Particularly I note my disagreement with the Majority’s conclusion that this case involved the use of a “pollutant,” as that term is defined in the policy.
The definition of “pollutant” included in the policy reads: [A]ny solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
The Majority concludes that the “fumes” were a pollutant. However the Majority fails to recognize that the terms “vapor,” “fumes” and “gaseous” modify the words “irritant or contaminant” which are meant to describe the type of material which constitutes a “pollutant.” Unlike the Majority, I would accept the trial court’s conclusion that the floor coating used in this case was not an “irritant” or “contaminant” because this product was a useful tool for construction. The trial court held that the Euco Floor Coat which was being used by Madison on the work site was a “necessary instrument” and “a tool of the trade,” and that it was not an “irritant” or a “contaminant” because it was neither objectionable nor un*151wanted. In support of its ruling, the trial court cited the North Carolina Court of Appeals decision in West American Insurance v. Tufco Flooring, 104 N.C.App. 312, 409 S.E.2d 692 (1991).
The West American court considered a strikingly similar situation, with regard to both the product at issue and the policy language. Therein the court was considering whether West American’s policy applied where chicken was damaged at a Perdue plant by an infiltration of vapors or fumes from a resurfacing product used by Tufco.1 The policy included a definition of pollution identical to the language of the policy at issue here. In concluding that the flooring material was not a “pollutant” under the pollution exclusion clause, the court stated:
Turfco did not bring the vapors or fumes which invaded the chicken to the Perdue plant. Rather, Turfco brought an unadulterated, pure raw material, styrene monomer resin, in one-gallon metal cans with screw-on caps. When this raw material was brought onto the site, it was neither an “irritant or contaminant.” It wras a raw material used by Tufco in its normal business activity of resurfacing floors. Yet, to be a “pollutant” under the exclusion, a substance brought onto the site must be precisely that, an “irritant or contaminant.”
Id. at 322, 409 S.E.2d at 698.
For these same reasons I find the product used in this case, a floor sealant, not to be a pollutant as that term is defined in the policy. The sealant cannot be said to be either an “irritant” or a “contaminant.” While many products may have some related irritating results, the product itself is not an *152irritant or contaminant. To so label a product would result in a finding that common household cleaners, bleaches, hair care products, or chlorine are pollutants. Nearly all products may be irritating in some fashion to someone, but this does not make the product itself an “irritant or contaminant” such as to constitute a pollutant. Contaminants and irritants are those substances which are commonly recognized as polluting the environment. They may in fact be a commonly used product, if that product is not being used as intended. However useful products, which are being used as intended, cannot, and should not, be considered pollutants.
The Majority quickly dismisses the application of West American to this case and finds that it carries “no precedential value.” While true that we are not bound by the holding of this ruling by our sister state, I believe it to be both wise and prudent to consider its rationale under circumstances so similar. Further in view of the fact that it provides sound rationale for its decision, I would rely on its ruling in support of my conclusion that the pollution exclusion is inapplicable in this case.
Unrelated to the above discussion I wish also to add my comments with regard to the Majority’s discussion of Gamble Farm Inn, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., 440 Pa.Super. 501, 656 A.2d 142 (1995). Therein Judge Beck wrote that the term “atmosphere” appearing in a pollution exclusion of a comprehensive general liability policy was ambiguous. The term was then construed in favor of the insured and it was held that the exclusion did not apply to the release of carbon monoxide from a malfunctioning water heater inside a restaurant.
With regard to the Gamble case the Majority first writes that it is distinguishable because it concerns a pollution exclusion which includes the language “ ‘into the atmosphere’ when describing the area into which a pollutant must escape so that the exclusion applies.” Opinion at 143. I have no dispute with the determination that the policy language of the two cases differ, however I do have a problem with the Majority’s latter *153discussion of the Gamble case and its sub silentio attempt to invalidate the Gamble holding in a footnote. Opinion at 146-147, ftn. 6.
In footnote five the Majority begins with a comment that it need not consider Harleysville’s second issue, which asks whether the existence of conflicting judicial authority in foreign jurisdictions established ipso facto an ambiguity in the pollution exclusion. The Majority then recounts the ruling in Gamble which finds that the existence of an ambiguity is demonstrated by the fact that the decisions of other courts have interpreted the term “atmosphere” differently. The Majority writes that it is not “invalidating” the reasoning of Gamble, however it goes on to state: “[rjather than relying on the fact that jurisdictions are split over construing the provisions or that one jurisdictional line of reasoning is better than another, courts must remember to invoke the basic tenet of contract law and look to the writing itself first, before otherwise deciding that a policy is ambiguous.” Id.
My reading of this footnote finds that the Majority is in fact attempting to do exactly what it claims not to do -invalidate the reasoning of Gamble. I find this inappropriate to do in a footnote and unnecessary to the resolution of the matter before us.
CAVANAUGH and BECK, JJ., join. McEWEN, President Judge, concurs in the result.. Although I offer this case in support of my determination that the product used here was not a pollutant, it should be noted that unlike the case now before us, the West American case involved a claim of damage directly caused by the use of a product and its emanating vapors. As I stated in my earlier discussion, here the underlying suit is not based upon a claim for damage caused by the release of vapors or the use of a product, rather other grounds of negligence are asserted, including failure to warn and failure to cover or barricade a hole in the floor.