concurring
I join Mr. Justice McDermott’s Opinion and Mr. Justice Larsen in affirming the Appellant’s convictions and sentence of death imposed on Raymond Whitney. I write separately because I am distressed by the suggestion of the dissent that the prosecutor’s closing statement may have compelled a sentence of death based on passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. For this Court to reverse a sentence of death, it must determine that “the sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.” 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9711(h)(3)(i). This requirement exists in light of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), which imposed on the States the responsibility of drafting sentencing codes which would guide and channel the sentencing authority’s discretion by resorting to the examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against the imposition of the death penalty. Commonwealth v. Pursell, 508 Pa. 212, 495 A.2d 183 (1985). Total arbitrariness and capriciousness is thus eliminated in the imposition of a sentence of death.
The evidence of record compels the jury’s findings of aggravating circumstances 6, 7, and 8 (42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9711(d)(6, 7, 8)1). These circumstances sufficiently outweigh the mitigating circumstance found by the jury, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8), “Any other evidence concerning the character of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.” Since the jury found that the three aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstance, they were required to return a sentence of death. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(l)(iv). For a review of the facts considered by the jury, I need only refer to Mr. Justice McDer*257mott’s recitation of the gruesome facts as set forth in the Majority Opinion.
The District Attorney’s comments do not constitute reversible error unless “the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant so that they could not weigh the evidence and render a true verdict.” Commonwealth v. Pursell, supra; Commonwealth v. Beasley, 504 Pa. 485, 475 A.2d 730 (1984); Commonwealth v. Tabron, 502 Pa. 154, 465 A.2d 637 (1983); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 501 Pa. 275, 461 A.2d 208 (1983). Viewed in this context, the comments must so prejudice the jury as to interfere with its rendering of a true sentence, thereby forcing its issuance of a totally arbitrary or capricious imposition of death, forbidden by Furman.
The intensity of the closing remarks of the District Attorney to the jury was not so overbearing, overshadowing or convincingly argued as to hypnotize, inflame or impassion the jury against Appellant and disable the jury from rendering a true verdict. This jury was not a glob of dough that was kneaded into submission by the oratorical display of the prosecuting attorney. This jury returned a verdict of death because the Appellant had killed an innocent human being by means of torture, and because Appellant, while committing a felony, had killed a human being, and because Appellant had knowingly created a grave risk of death to another while committing the offense.
Why are the dissenters so sensitive to dramatic oratory, yet insensitive to the heavy weight of the clear evidence which supports the conclusion of the jury? Why do they ascribe more weight to the words of expressive comparisons than they do to the plunging of the dagger twenty-eight times into his victim, while a horrified wife looked on, than they do to the attempted ravaging of the wife, than they do to the Appellant’s stabbing and cutting of the wife? How can the Dissenters believe that any oratorical flair of the prosecutor could possibly intensify in the minds of the jury the horrors of the deeds committed by Appellant?
*258Given the outrageousness of Appellant’s conduct towards his victims, it was only natural for the prosecutor to argue as forcefully as possible in favor of a death sentence, and while he did so expressively, his arguments were within acceptable bounds of advocacy during the sentencing phase. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1983). The argument of the District Attorney could not deceive the jury into returning a totally arbitrary death sentence. Clearly, this jury’s decision was influenced by facts and not by argument of counsel. CF, Darden v. Wainwright, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986).
. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9711(d) provides in pertinent part:
Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: (6) The defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony.
(7) In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense.
(8) The offense was committed by means of torture.