dissenting in which McAULIFFE, Judge, joins.
The majority holds that one who has wilfully, deliberately and with premeditation killed another may be enriched by inheriting from the victim’s estate because the killer was found not to be criminally responsible for the murder by virtue of her insanity. In light of our state’s recognition that insane criminals are guilty of the crimes they commit and are personally and morally responsible for those crimes, I find the majority’s position to be untenable. I thus respectfully dissent.
This Court adopted “the slayer’s rule” in Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933), on the basis that allowing a murderer to inherit from the estate of his victim is repugnant to public policy. The Court applied the equitable rule that “no one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, to take advantage of his own wrong, to found any claim upon his own iniquity or to acquire property by his own crime,” id. at 506 and 511, 165 A.2d 470, and held that a killer, by virtue of his murderous act, acquires no beneficial interest in the estate of his victim. Id. at 508, 165 A.2d 470.
As the majority recognizes in Part III of its opinion, an insane murderer who has been found to have acted with the requisite intent or mens rea has committed the crime of murder. See Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588, 399 A.2d 578 (1978); see also Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264, 465 A.2d 475 (1983). He is guilty, and his insanity neither justifies nor excuses his act. His misdeed is equally abhorrent as a murder committed by one sane, and although the criminal consequence—imprisonment—will be dispensed with, the murderer has not been forgiven.
Our legislature has clearly shown that the purpose of adjudging the killer’s sanity is not to determine whether the *136crime will be annulled, but to determine whether the killer should be criminally punished. Code (1982, 1985 Cum. Supp.), § 12-108 of the Health General Article, sets forth the test for insanity:
(a) Test—In general.—a defendant is not criminally responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental disorder or mental retardation, lacks substantial capacity:
(1) To appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or
(2) To conform that conduct to the requirements of the law. [Emphasis supplied.]
In its comment to § Í2-108(a), the Governor’s Task Force to Review the Defense of Insanity states:
the phrase “not criminally responsible” is substituted for the phrase “not responsible” [which appeared in the former test under § 12-107] as being a more accurate statement of the defendant’s status under criminal law. The Task Force recommends the adoption of this term to make clear to the defendant, the jury, and to society that the defendant remains morally and personally responsible for committing criminal acts, but the State does not hold the defendant subject to criminal punishment, if this test is met. [Emphasis supplied.]
The reason that the insane murderer will not be criminally punished is that “the State has determined that it cannot morally punish the defendant.” Governor’s Task Force to Review Defense of Insanity Report 30 (1984).
A dichotomy exists, then, between the moral responsibility of the State—which dictates that it should not imprison the insane murderer, and the moral responsibility which society expects from its citizens—which dictates that an insane murderer is responsible for his crime. We recognized this dichotomy in Pouncey v. State, supra. In Pouncey, the appellant, who had drowned her son because she believed him to be pursued by the devil, was found by the trial court to be both guilty of first degree murder and insane at the time of the offense. She appealed, alleging *137that the verdicts of guilty and the finding of insanity were inconsistent. This Court rejected her claim and cited Langworthy v. State, supra, for the proposition that a defendant may be found both guilty and insane. The appellant nonetheless sought “to avoid the effect of Langworthy [and] argue[d] that because ‘she was ultimately found insane, the finding of guilt was divested of legal significance for purposes of her future status as a criminal or non-criminal.’ ” 297 Md. at 268-69, 465 A.2d at 478. The appellant further argued
that if she is burdened by a record of conviction of first degree murder, she will in a practical sense have been found responsible for her conduct; that the stigma of such a “conviction” punishes her for her conduct in that, among other things, it prohibits her from voting, from serving on a jury, from acquiring licenses or contracts, and also inhibits future employment opportunities since prospective employers will ascertain that she was found guilty of first degree murder.
Id.
In this Court’s view, however, such results were not incongruous with a finding of insanity. The Court observed:
[A] finding of insanity is not tantamount to an absence of mens rea, or inconsistent with an intent to commit a crime. In drowning her child, the appellant specifically intended to kill him, and while her successful insanity defense means that she is not criminally responsible for her conduct, that determination merely relieves her of liability for punishment under the criminal law. No criminal sentence may ever be entered on the guilty verdict in this case and the appellant, therefore, does not stand “convicted” of the murder offense in the traditional sense of the criminal law. The legislature, however, has not seen fit to remove all consequences of committing a criminal act while insane, e.g., the defendant may be held in a mental institution until it has determined that a release would not constitute a danger to the *138individual or to the person or property of others. § 12-114(b)(1)(h). There is thus no support for the view that non-criminal collateral consequences are in all circumstances inconsistent with guilty but insane verdicts.
Id. at 270, 465 A.2d at 478 (emphasis supplied). Thus, the Court recognized that the civil consequences of an insane criminal’s act are not controlled by the fact that the' person has” received dispensation from criminal punishment.
Turning to the instant case, it is clear to me that the fact that the State cannot criminally punish an insane defendant is irrelevant to a determination of whether it is equitable for the killer to inherit from her victim. It is one thing to say that the State should not imprison one who was insane when she committed the murder. It is quite another to say that the insane murderer can profit from her crime. The only relevant focus here must be upon the killer’s moral and personal responsibility for the crime.
As developed in Price v. Hitaffer, supra, Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. 564, 150 A.2d 251 (1958) and Schifanneli v. Wallace, 271 Md. 177, 315 A.2d 513 (1974), the operation of the “slayer’s rule” requires two findings: that the killing was intentional and that it was committed “feloniously.” With respect to the first finding, our decisions in Pouncey and Langworthy, as well as the statute defining insanity, make clear that an insane person may have the intent requisite for the commission of the crime. As to the second finding, these cases and the statute also demonstrate that an insane killer can commit a felonious act. The majority acknowledges that a killing is felonious when the homicide committed is a felony. As indicated by Pouncey and Lang-worthy, an insane person can be found to possess the requisite mens rea, and thus can be found guilty of committing a felony. Indeed, as evidenced by our criminal responsibility statute, the existence of the crime itself is independent of a finding of insanity. The statute requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime before the issue of insanity is addressed. Thus, for *139purposes of the application of the slayer’s rule, a trial judge may find that a killer did in fact commit a felony and that the homicide committed was intentional without addressing the insanity issue.
I believe that our prior readings of the criminal responsibility statute reaffirm this conclusion. In Pouncey and Langworthy, we stated that the legislative intent of the statute was not to negate the existence of the crime but to relieve the insane person of liability for punishment under the criminal law. Thus, a finding of insanity under the statute in no way diminishes the wrongfulness of the actor’s conduct. Rather, it merely removes the possibility of criminal sanction. Because the actor’s conduct remains wrongful notwithstanding the finding of insanity, the slayer’s rule, in barring an individual from profiting from his own wrong, remains applicable.
I realize that the insane killer committed the crime either because she could not appreciate the criminality of her conduct or because she could not conform her conduct to the requirements of the law. But this reason for the killer’s volition has no bearing upon the equitable principle embodied in the slayer’s rule. If the insane killer has intentionally killed her victim, if she has acted with the required mens rea for the crime, she is personally and morally responsible for her wrong, and equity demands that she shall not benefit from the deed. It is repugnant to decency to say that an insane murderer can finance her rehabilitation with new found wealth from her victim’s estate.
Finally, I note that each of the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the majority is distinguishable in that no case addresses the question under an insanity law similar to Maryland law. Most of the cases cited apply either the M’Naughten standard or a similar test and hold that the “slayer’s rule” does not apply either because a finding of insanity is tantamount to an acquittal, Estate of Ladd, 91 Cal.App.3d 219, 153 Cal.Rptr. 888 (1979); Hill v. Morris, 85 *140So.2d 847 (Fla.Sup.Ct.1956); In re Eckhardt’s Estate, 184 Misc. 748, 54 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1945), or because an insane person cannot have the requisite intent for the murder, Estate of Ladd, supra, Turner v. Estate of Turner, 454 N.E.2d 1247 (Ind.App.1983); Anderson v. Grasberg, 247 Minn. 538, 78 N.W.2d 450 (1956); Kelley v. State, 105 N.H. 240, 196 A.2d 68 (1983); Campbell v. Ray, 102 N.J.Super 235, 245 A.2d 761 (1968), aff'd mem. 107 N.J. Super 509, 259 A.2d 473 (1969), aff'd mem., 56 N.J. 52, 264 A.2d 441 (1970); Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1973); Simon v. Dibble, 380 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ.App.1964)). Other cases simply note that an insane killer is not a murderer, and thus the “slayer’s rule” should not apply. See Blair v. Travelers Ins. Co., 30 Ill.App.2d 191, 174 N.E.2d 209 (1961); Eisenhardt v. Siegel, 343 Mo. 22, 119 S.W.2d 810 (1938); Hoffman’s Estate, 39 D & C 208 (1940). In contrast, under Maryland law, a killer deemed to be insane is not acquitted of the crime, Langworthy, supra, the insane killer can be found to have the requisite intent for the crime, and the killer is in essence found to be guilty of committing that crime. We should not blindly follow those jurisdictions which base their holdings upon standards of insanity to which our legislature has shown its express intent not to adhere.
In conclusion, I note that because Pearl Ford should be disqualified as devisee under her mother’s will, her son is the appropriate substitute legatee. Although the general rule is that a murderer’s heirs cannot through the murderer take from the victim’s estate, see Price v. Hitaffer, supra, 164 Md. at 506, 518, 165 A. 470 where the heir is also an heir of the victim and the natural beneficiary of victim’s bounty, he is the proper substitute beneficiary. See Am. Jur.2d, Descent and Distribution § 109 (1983). Here George Benjamin Ford, Jr., the son of the murderess, is the grandson of the victim and is the victim’s only lineal descendant. Therefore, I would hold that George is the proper beneficiary of his grandmother’s estate.
*141For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
I am authorized to state that Judge McAULIFFE concurs in the views here stated.