(concurring in part).
I agree that there must be a reversal, but I do not agree that the scope of the trial on the merits should be limited to the question of monthly support payments.
Under the majority decision plaintiff will be required to take part of her case to the United States District Court. But Congress has removed from that court the whole field of domestic relations jurisdiction and vested it in the new Domestic Relations Branch, without reservation. It specifically included “civil actions to enforce support of minor children.” Code 1951, Sec. 11-762 (Supp. VII). It also spelled out the jurisdictional powers of the new court in broad and inclusive language:
“The Domestic Relations Branch is hereby vested with so much of the power as is now vested in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, whether in law or in equity, as is necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including but not limited to, the power to issue restraining orders, injunctions, writs of habeas corpus, and ne exeat, and all other writs, orders, and decrees." (Emphasis supplied.) Code 1951, § lb-763 (Supp. VII).
As I read the Hitchcock decision, it held that the Domestic Relations Branch was right in refusing to assume jurisdiction of a money claim for payments due under a foreign decree or to award a money judgment on such a debt. It also held that the Branch had exclusive jurisdiction of actions seeking to enforce support of minors.
The right of minor children to support is a direct right vested in them by law and does not derive from their'mother. Such right is not destroyed or diminished by a contract of the mother. An agreement between husband and wife is not binding on their children or on the courts, and the courts may award a larger amount for their support than is provided in such a contract. Singleton v. Singleton, 217 Ky. 38, 288 S. W. 1029; Chiarodit v. Chiarodit, 218 Cal. 147, 21 P.2d 562; Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 153 S.E. 879, 71 A.L.R. 700. Though the court may consider such an agreement in making its decision, it will always treat the needs and welfare of minor children as the paramount and controlling consideration. Boggs v. Boggs, 138 Md. 422, 114 A. 474. These holdings are in harmony with decisions in this jurisdiction. See Harrison v. Harrison, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 309, 248 F.2d 631; Rogers v. Rogers, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 97, 203 F.2d 61; Pilson v. Salvoni, 65 App.D.C. 55, 79 F.2d 411.
In Harrison v. Harrison, supra [101 U.S.App.D.C. 309, 248 F.2d 633], it was said that the right of the children persists and that it is for the courts to determine whether defendant father “has been affording to the children the full measure of support to which they are entitled.” This question can hardly ever be decided on a motion to dismiss.
As was said in Schneider v. Schneider, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 141 F.2d 542, the measure of the father’s duty will be the present needs of the children and the ability of the father to provide for them. These matters include the insurance policies, cost of summer camp, and arrangements for college education. I would hold that children are not barred from presenting such claims. The Domestic Relations Act, broad *528in its grant of jurisdiction, clearly empowers the Branch to entertain such claims, as fully as the District Court might have done. And if it needs to enforce its authority by “restraining orders, injunctions, * * and all other writs” it has the power to do so. See Code Sec. 11-763, quoted above in full.
The demand that the father make a will with certain specified bequests seems of dubious validity. But it has been held that when the promisor in his lifetime explicitly and unequivocably repudiates his promise such conduct may be treated as an immediate breach. Harmon v. Aughtry, 226 S. C. 371, 85 S.E.2d 284. And in this jurisdiction it was recognized many years ago that in some circumstances relief may be afforded on such a promise during the lifetime of the promisor. Cherry v. Whalen, 25 App.D.C. 537. Accordingly I would hold that this part of the claim cannot safely be adjudicated on a motion to dismiss.
I make a final observation. Several years ago, in construing the Municipal Court Act of 1942, it was held that jurisdiction over “civil actions” meant all actions, whether at law or in equity. Klepinger v. Rhodes, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 140 F.2d 697; Rowe v. Nolan Finance Co., 79 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 142 F.2d 93. In those two cases equitable powers grew out of the words “civil actions.” In the situation before us there is much broader language and the intent to create equity powers is unmistakable.